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Abstract                                            
The University of Manchester 
Nicola Teresa Wall 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Further Evolution in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Changes in the 
Division of Labour and Markets for Technology 
February 25, 2011 
 
The pharmaceutical sector has undergone many changes, particularly in the 
past several decades. The purpose of this research was to ascertain the 
existence of further changes to the division of labour and changes in the 
markets for technology within the sector.  This research was also undertaken 
to understand the specific issues that may be impacting the division of labour 
and the changes in the markets for technology including the role of finance 
and the role of a surplus of unexploited knowledge. The division of labour 
between large and small new firms was initially more pronounced as the fully 
integrated firms continued to develop, manufacture and market drugs while 
‘classical biotechnology’ firms pursued an exploratory business model of 
supplying knowledge and early stage drug candidates to these fully 
integrated companies (McKelvey, 2008).  However, firms are changing in this 
sector and changes may be evident that have not been discussed in the 
literature to date. A new type of firm is evident within this sector, the No 
Research Development Only (NRDO) firm, as well as changes in the existing 
firms. This has impacted markets for technology as changes are also 
apparent in the way in which firms exchange products and knowledge.  
 
A combined quantitative and qualitative study was used to answer the 
research questions. A random sample of 100 EU and US companies that 
own and develop drug products was generated. Descriptive statistics were 
gathered to form a database of information and case studies were compiled 
to provide in-depth data related to a sample of eight firms. The newly 
identified NRDO firms do not possess internal capabilities to discover their 
own products; surprising given the historically research intensive nature of 
the types of small firms that operate in this sector. There also appears to be 
changes in the markets for technology as large firms are selling drug 
candidates to these hitherto research-intensive discovery and development 
(DD) firms who are willing to in-license these drug candidates to bolster 
pipelines and financial valuations. Markets for knowledge in this sector have 
undoubtedly evolved and a more complex set of arrangements are evident. 
The roles of finance and a surplus of unexploited knowledge have played an 
important part in these changes as the sustained level of exploration in the 
sector has resulted in a greater number of exploitation opportunities. Overall 
there is evidence to support further evolution in the sector.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Overview 
Eminent philosophers have told us that the only constant is change.  
Understanding changes and why they occur is a central theme of this 
research. This thesis identifies a new type of firm in the pharmaceutical 
sector illustrating changes in the division of labour and markets for 
technology. It sets out to update the current understanding of the division of 
labour and the way in which firms are trading products and knowledge by 
examining two key influences: The role of finance and the role of a surplus of 
unexploited knowledge.  
1.2. Background to the Research 
The developments in the pharmaceutical sector that have taken place since 
the introduction of aspirin in the 19th century have profoundly impacted the 
lives of many people with a range of illnesses. New drugs1 have improved 
quality of life and longevity for many people. Pharmaceutical innovation has 
increased life expectancy and lifetime income and represents a substantial 
contribution to economic growth (Lichtenberg, 2006).  Maintaining a current 
understanding of how such a dynamic and important sector functions and the 
way in which it functions is key to making sure that the quest for better and 
cheaper drugs continues.   
A great deal of change has taken place both within and outside of the sector 
particularly over the last 50 years. The growth of knowledge related to 
biotechnology (including molecular biology biochemistry, immunology, 
virology and cell biology) chemistry and information technology, combined 
with the development of research tools, created many opportunities for small 
firms to enter the sector (Henderson et al, 1999; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 
2001). Many of these new firms (Classical Biotechnology Firms) were formed 
to develop new ideas and scientific advances from public institutions 
                                            
1 For the purposes of this research, a drug includes any product, small molecule or biologic intended 
for human therapeutic use but not diagnostic use. 
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(including universities and government laboratories) with the overall aim of 
discovering new and effective drugs. These developments in the knowledge 
bases also changed the way in which incumbent firms operated as these 
firms had to internalise new capabilities related to the new developments 
(Gambardella, 1995; Galambos and Sturchio, 1998). The growth in 
knowledge and the focus on drug discovery has ultimately resulted in the 
growth of the number of opportunities in terms of potential new drugs and a 
surplus of unexploited knowledge.  
However, drug development requires concentration on those processes that 
can ensure successful commercialisation as a result of clinical trials and 
regulatory adherence. It also requires funding. Projections of financial 
requirements for drug discovery and development indicate that a firm can 
spend up to $1.7 Billion in related costs (PHrMA, 2007; www.Tufts.com). 
These costs have created serious problems for all firms who need to fund 
drug discovery and development. Big firms who have traditionally operated 
as the bastions of the sector with historically deep pockets, as far as funding 
is concerned, are increasingly facing financial pressures to make that funding 
stretch further. This year Pfizer2 announced cuts to its R&D budget of over 
$1.5 Billion and announced that they were exiting a number of therapeutic 
areas including internal medicine and urology (www.fiercebiotech.com; 
www.pfizer.com). Pfizer is not alone following moves by other companies 
including AstraZeneca, Roche, Bayer, Abbot and Sanofi Aventis who have 
laid off over 37,00 staff between them last year3 (www.fiercebiotech.com).   
These problems, however, are related to one key issue: the new 
developments have not necessarily increased the success rate of new drug 
introduction (Hopkins et al, 2007).  The changes that are now visible in the 
sector have actually created opportunities for a new type of firm that has 
emerged and has been visible for some time. This research has identified a 
new economic agent that has focused on drug development and provides 
                                            
2 http://www.fiercebiotech.com/story/pfizer-carving-15b-rd-budget-dropping-diseases/2011-02-01  
3 http://www.fiercepharma.com/special-reports/top-10-layoffs-2010  
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empirical support for this claim. This thesis argues that the emergence of this 
new type of firm is a response to a surplus of unexploited knowledge and the 
financial pressures that have become apparent in the sector. The thesis 
further argues that other firms in the sector, the traditional ‘classical 
biotechnology firm’ and the incumbent large firms, have also changed the 
way in which they operate in response to these two key factors. 
1.3. Theoretical Framework 
There is much prior research on the fundamental changes in the organisation 
of the pharmaceutical sector throughout its history that illustrates the 
dynamic nature of the sector. The notion that industrial change was an 
evolutionary process was key to a better overall understanding of industrial 
dynamics. Nelson and Winter proposed that firms adapt and change in 
response to their environment and with varying levels of success also 
dependent on the individual firm’s goals (Nelson and Winter, 1982). An 
associated body of literature on the firm level with respect to exploration and 
exploitation activities has also provided a critical context for this research. A 
balance of exploration and exploitation is key for the firm’s continued 
survival, however, exploitation activities will tend to dominate over 
exploration activities because the returns on investment are more visible and 
immediate (Levinthal and March, 1993; Rothaermel, 2001). The balance of 
exploration and exploitation will tend to change over the firm’s lifespan and 
the lifespan of a sector (Levinthal and March, 1993; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 
2006).  
The key changes that occurred in the pharmaceutical sector (impacting the 
organisation of the sector) include:  the internal creation of research and 
development organisations within the large firms during the early part of the 
20th century, increased funding of research at a government level during the 
mid 20th century (particularly in the US), key developments related to 
biotechnology and the corresponding development of the small classical 
biotechnology firm in the latter part of the century (Kenney, 1986: 
Gambardella, 1995; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; Galambos and Sturchio, 
1998; Henderson et al, 1999; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001). This range of 
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disciplines related to discoveries in biotechnology created many 
opportunities for new classical biotechnology firms (McKelvey, 2008) to 
conduct research in this sector. A division of labour emerged as small firms 
conducted research and were primarily exploratory focused while the large 
firms focused on commercialisation and provided the exploitation capabilities 
for small firms (in addition to their own exploratory capabilities). For the new 
small firms, the relationships with large incumbent firms were a key part of 
the successful division of labour as these small firms provided potential new 
drugs to large firms who then provided the resources for commercialisation. 
Developments of prolific networks of firms and institutions emerged (Powell 
et al, 1996) as well as markets for technology (Arora et al, 2001). 
Consequently scientific advances were (are) viewed as the lifeblood of 
success for small firms and a great deal of emphasis has been placed on 
research related to drug discovery activities. These small firms have taken 
on a ‘new importance’ in the sector’s innovative capability (Galambos, 2006). 
The developments in biotechnology have created many opportunities for new 
firm formation (combined with developments in chemistry and information 
technology). However, scientific advances alone are meaningless in terms of 
impact on lives and on society. Scientific advances must be translated into 
safe and effective drugs for use and this requires financial capital. The 
financial literature provides an important context and overall, illustrates that 
without adequate means of funding, small firms in particular will not be able 
to fund research or related exploratory activities (Oakey, 2003; Hyytinen and 
Toivanen, 2005; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). As recent evidence suggests 
the success rates of drug development (when measured using numbers of 
new drugs approved) have not matched expectations of financial markets 
(Pisano, 2006; McKelvey, 2008), the current organisation of the sector will 
have to undergo change.  
1.4. Research Questions  
This thesis is about change in the pharmaceutical sector and how the firms 
who provide the vital drugs that are so necessary to the well being and 
survival of most of us, are changing and/or adapting to the pressures 
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inherent in the search for new efficacious drugs. Understanding more about 
the nature of this industry is key to ensuring that our knowledge is up to date 
and relevant and that this knowledge can be used to inform important 
debates and policy. The key premise of this thesis is that the sector is 
undergoing important changes in how its firms are structured and how they 
are interacting with one another. Changes in the nature of firms were visible 
to the author while working in the industry from 2000 onwards. Exposure to a 
range of firms through various work related projects as well as the local 
network in the Philadelphia and New Jersey area (and the wider network 
spanning to New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts and California) kindled a 
number of questions with respect to the type of firms operating in the industry 
and their key business drivers. Trade literature also pointed to changes in 
small drug development firms with respect to their core business. The 
anecdotal evidence in the trade literature together with personal experience 
suggested that some firms were not necessarily research oriented as was 
commonly understood.  
This research has therefore set out to prove the existence of a new type of 
firm and understand where it has come from. The first research question is 
therefore as follows: 
1. What changes have occurred in the division of labour in the 
pharmaceutical sector? 
Ongoing advances in both biotechnology and small molecule drug discovery 
have increased the stock of available knowledge related to drug discovery 
but the costs of drug discovery and development have continued to rise. 
However, success in terms of new drugs approved has not risen in 
conjunction with the expectations related to this new knowledge. The nature 
of the impact of finance was visible in the firms that the author was exposed 
to through the local and wider network and this also fostered key questions 
about what this meant in terms of the decision making within the firm. The 
key role of finance in terms of firms’ innovation strategies was also reflected 
somewhat in the trade literature and reinforced the notion that there were 
important questions to be answered. It was also apparent that some firms 
 
19 
were obtaining drug candidates for development from outside the firm, some 
of which were in advanced states of development. This seemed somewhat 
unusual for small firms but also seemed to be related to the financial 
considerations. 
Therefore, this research then set out to understand both the role of finance 
and surplus of available knowledge in this division of labour based on 
personal experience, the literature review and anecdotal sector evidence. 
The following questions were posed on the specific role of financial 
considerations and a surplus of available knowledge related to drug 
candidates for development: 
2. What was the role of finance in the new division of labour? 
3. What was the role of a surplus of knowledge in the new division of 
labour? 
Given that a new type of firm was visible in the sector and its focus was not 
on research, this also implied that changes to other firms may have been 
taking place and consequently changes in the markets for technology. Again, 
personal experience and evidence from the trade literature suggested that 
the flow of products and knowledge between the various firms in the sector 
may not be as straight forward as previously thought. Historically, these 
relationships were thought of as a flow of products from small firms to large 
firms with large firms providing expertise in clinical development but the flow 
of products and knowledge may be more complex with large firms 
transferring products to small firms and indeed the presence of a new type of 
firm. This was considered another very important area for testing empirically 
and the final question was as follows: 
4. What was the nature of changes in the markets for technology?  
It is hoped that by addressing these questions, this research will make an 
important contribution to knowledge on the extent and nature of the changes 
occurring in this sector.  
 
20 
1.5. Research Approach 
The research questions above necessitated two complementary approaches 
to ensure that they were adequately addressed. Testing the changes in the 
division of labour meant identifying and classifying a new type of firm called 
the ‘No Research Development Only’ (NRDO) firm. This also meant 
distinguishing the traditional classical biotechnology firm and ensuring that 
the difference between the two was clear, hence the term Discovery and 
Development (DD) firm was used. This required a quantitative approach to 
ascertain the extent of the existence of a new type of firm. Understanding 
why changes had occurred in the division of labour and markets for 
technology consequently required a qualitative approach.  
1.5.1. Quantitative Analysis - Database and Descriptive Statistics 
The research question related to the division of labour was focused on a 
specific cohort of firms because it was believed that the division of labour 
that had taken place was specific to small firms and more importantly, those 
that develop drugs for human use. This required the compilation of a sample 
of firms that were small drug development firms (each firm had to own at 
least one product in development). A sample of 100 firms was compiled into 
a database to provide data for identification of descriptive statistics that 
would indicate the presence of a new type of firm and thus a division of 
labour. Specific information was collected on each firm to determine if it was 
a NRDO firm or a DD firm. The number of NRDO firms and DD firms was 
ascertained from the sample based on the information gathered in the 
database.  
1.5.2. Qualitative Approach - Case Studies 
There are many questions that can be answered by data collection activities 
and a quantitative approach but a series of important questions were related 
to why changes had occurred and a multiple case study approach was 
deemed most appropriate. Eight firms were selected and in depth company 
profiles were put together as well as interviews with chosen firms to answer 
the important ‘why’ question to ascertain specific knowledge required to 
answer research questions 2, 3 and 4.  
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1.6. Contribution to Knowledge 
This is a story of change. This research has set out to update our 
understanding of changes in the pharmaceutical sector. A new type of firm 
has been identified, changes to existing firms have been identified and 
changing patterns of interaction within markets for technology between all 
the firms in the sector have been identified. This research has highlighted the 
importance of finance and a surplus of unexploited knowledge both of which 
have a critical impact on the development of firms and thus changes in the 
division of labour and the markets for technology. Overall, there are 
consequences for the level of innovation and experimentation (defined as 
exploration and exploitation) in the sector that warrant important future 
research.  
1.7. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters and a brief description of chapters 2 
- 8 follows: 
Chapter 2: Understanding the Division of Labour and Changing Firms in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector. This chapter reviews the literature on the 
pharmaceutical sector, its history and the developments that have occurred 
related to changes in the knowledge base, the new classical biotechnology 
firm and the markets for technology. It also discusses how the sector has 
evolved and the role of knowledge and finance in that evolution. 
Chapter 3: Identification of Further Changes in the Pharmaceutical Sector. 
This chapter examines the evidence and presents arguments for changes in 
the sector including the division of labour (with the identification of a new 
type of firm - the No Research Development Only firm) and the markets for 
technology.  
Chapter 4: Methodological Approach. This chapter discusses the research 
questions and presents the research approach. The appropriate 
methodological literature is reviewed and discussed and the approach to 
answering the research questions is detailed.   
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Chapter 5: Evidence for the Changing Division of Labour and Markets for 
Technology. This chapter presents the findings from the quantitative analysis 
that was conducted. It discusses the database that was formed and the 
results of the data analysis.  The evidence for a new type of firm is put 
forward.  
Chapter 6: Case Studies. Case studies were compiled on four NRDO firms 
and four DD firms. This chapter presents the highlights from the case studies 
and discusses the key issues that emerged from the study of the eight firms.  
Chapter 7: Understanding and Explaining the New Division of Labour and 
Changes in the Markets for Technology. This chapter reviews all of the 
findings from the data gathered in the database and from the case studies 
and the case is presented for a changed division of labour in the 
pharmaceutical sector related to finance and a surplus of unexploited 
knowledge. Evidence for changes in the markets for technology is also 
presented and discussed.  
Chapter 8: Conclusions of the Research. This is the final chapter and 
summarises the key findings from the research and outlines the overall 
contribution to knowledge. There is evidence for a changed division of labour 
with the identification of the NRDO firm and evidence for more complex 
markets for technology. Areas for future research are presented.  
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Chapter 2. Understanding the Division of Labour and 
Changing Firms in the Pharmaceutical Sector 
2.1. Introduction 
The dynamics of an industry and the way in which firms evolve, adapt and 
survive or die poses many interesting questions for researchers. The 
organisation of firms and firm boundaries will change continuously 
throughout the evolution of an industry (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996) and 
this is particularly evident within the pharmaceutical sector4 with respect to 
those firms that discover and develop new drugs. Discoveries in 
biotechnology, particularly related to molecular biology, represented 
important advances in the way in which companies in the pharmaceutical 
sector looked at how to create and develop new drugs. The entry of the new 
‘Classical Biotechnology Firms’ (McKelvey, 2008) into the pharmaceutical 
sector represented a fundamental change in the division of labour with 
respect to the discovery and development of new drugs.  
These firms were the initial conduits of the new knowledge from public sector 
institutions to the commercial sector where this knowledge was then 
developed and sold. The supply of new knowledge from these institutions 
was a fundamental part of the reason for the existence of the new small 
‘classical biotechnology’ firms whose primary business was the ‘exploration’ 
of knowledge, tools and techniques related to the new discoveries in 
biotechnology. This process was later facilitated by regulatory changes, 
particularly in the US, (the Bayh-Dole Act) allowing intellectual property to be 
traded between public institutions and private firms5.  
The entry of new firms into the sector was also greatly impacted by the role 
of financial providers and their willingness to fund these new firms. These 
new small firms needed to finance their businesses and understanding the 
                                            
4 As captured particularly succinctly by Mazzucato and Dosi, ‘which we take nowadays to include both 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms’ (Dosi and Mazzucato 2007). 
5 it should be noted that Genentech was created before this.  
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extent to which their businesses were the manifestation of the availability and 
source of finance is discussed as a fundamental enabler of the division of 
labour in this sector. This link specifically between the division of labour and 
the role of finance has not been researched in any great depth in the 
literature to date. The entire spectrum of drug development is a capital 
intensive process that has become steadily more expensive.  The financial 
needs of those companies that pursue the development of drugs for human 
use are substantially different and are in marked contrast to any firm who has 
self funded (using personal finance) or obtained debt finance (Grieve-Smith 
and Fleck, 1988). Firms have had to look externally for finance because of 
substantial resource requirements and the time it takes to generate a product 
that can be sold. Estimates at the end of the 1990s put the cost of drug 
development at around $802 million (DiMasi et al, 2003) but current 
estimates are in excess of $1 billion and include potential costs of developing 
so called ‘biopharmaceuticals’ (DiMasi, 2007). However, more recent 
arguments on the poor performance of small firms in this sector have 
indicated that changing financial considerations and pressures may well be 
forcing firms in a different direction and thus fundamentally altering the 
division of labour once again.  
The markets for technology that have emerged in this sector have been the 
source of much discussion and analysis (viewed by some as markets and 
others as networks with varying degrees of overlap, agreement and 
disagreement). The role of markets for technology in this sector is integral to 
the division of labour. There is considerable variety in the nature of how 
these transactions take place but they have been critical to the survival of 
both types of firm in the sector: the new small firm and the incumbent large 
firm. This discussion summarises why and how markets for technology 
emerged and characterises the current understanding of the flows of 
knowledge between the various main players in the sector. 
The contention of this thesis is that a new chapter is unfolding in the 
pharmaceutical sector – a new division of labour associated with changes in 
the availability of knowledge and increasing financial pressures. This is also 
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accompanied by further changes in the markets for technology which are 
becoming more complex than has been previously recognised. The literature 
review therefore also covers previous conceptual and empirical studies that 
are subsequently used to build an analytical framework to investigate these 
propositions.  The focus of this chapter is to discuss how and why firms have 
evolved in the business of making drugs and how the interplay of knowledge, 
finance and markets has impacted that evolution and thus the division of 
labour.   
The chapter is structured as follows: the first Section, 2.2 describes the 
overarching literature on the dynamics of industrial evolution to provide a 
theoretical foundation for the research and also discusses the role of finance 
within firm development and growth on a macro level. Section 2.3 then 
provides an overview of the pharmaceutical sector. This section is divided 
into six main areas. The first three sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.3 deal with a 
historical overview of the sector by epoch. The developments in 
biotechnology and the subsequent impact on the sector as a whole are then 
discussed in the latter three sections 2.3.4 – 2.3.6 addressing the division of 
labour that was characterised by the classical biotechnology firm with a 
discussion of the emergence of this small firm and its major characteristics. 
This section also deals with the role of finance during this period and its 
relationship to the division of labour. The discussion then moves onto the 
role of networks and markets for technology a critical feature of the third 
epoch. Section 2.4 deals with how both the small firm and the large firm went 
through a series of changes to their activities and thus their business models 
and introduces the notion of exploration and exploitation as a lens with which 
to view how and why firms may change the scope of their activities.     
2.2. Industrial Evolution and Firm Growth  
2.2.1. Structural Transformation of Industries 
The fact that industries grow and change (and within them firms are the 
engines of this change) should be no surprise to anyone in the second 
decade of the 21st century.  The essence of this is captured by Malerba and 
Orsenigo who note that, ‘Industrial evolution is characterized by intense 
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change at any relevant time scale. New firms enter a sector, some exit, some 
firms grow, others decline. In addition, economic entities expand or contract 
their boundaries and undergo organizational change’ (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1996). 
It must be recognised that our understanding of how and why that change 
takes place must constantly be updated and the way in which industries grow 
and change remains a constant push for research into how this 
transformation takes place. This is also because of the need for dynamic and 
responsive policy and economic and education systems that can nurture 
growth (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Much research has already been 
conducted within the realm of industrial change. According to Metcalfe, ‘it 
should not be necessary to belabour the evidence in favour of the ongoing 
structural transformation of economies as they develop and grow, the 
support for this most important of stylized facts is conclusive’ (Metcalfe, 
2002).  
That being said, this section very briefly revisits some of the major 
contributions in this area because they undoubtedly anchor this research to a 
body of critical knowledge that has been built up over the last century. There 
is probably no better place to start than with Schumpeter whose work 
recognised the inherent importance of technological change and innovation 
to the economy and the role of the entrepreneur in the development process 
of ‘carrying out new combinations’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982). His Mark I and 
Mark II theories alternately viewed the role of large and small firms as 
varying in their importance to economic growth. Notably Schumpeter revised 
his stance on the role of small firms in his Mark II theories from recognising 
them as important engines of economic growth to also acknowledging that 
large firms had a critical role to play in technological change and economic 
growth (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Schumpeter succinctly identified the 
varying contributions of large and small firms in sector change. The former 
was noted for its ability to reap advantages from large scale use of an 
innovation and the latter for its ability to carry out ‘new combinations’ (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982).  
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Nelson and Winter’s contribution to the theory of economic growth and sector 
evolution is another key part of the primary foundation to any contemporary 
study on industrial dynamics and change precisely because the theories 
inherent in this work were advanced to take account of the evolutionary 
nature of industrial change. That is, firms grow and change/adapt in 
response to their environment (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In changing 
situations, ‘...firms do different things… some of these turn out to be more 
successful than others. The least satisfactory of the responses may tend to 
be eliminated; the better of the responses tend to be used more wisely’ 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
This was critical in terms of the ability to explain varying outcomes of 
success for different firms in a range of situations. It is important for this 
research because it creates the starting point: that firms are responsive 
entities and will change in order to make sure that they can continue their 
business in their current environment. And yet according to Malerba and 
Orsenigo, a full understanding of the dynamics and evolution of industries is 
‘far from accomplished’ (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). While some 
dimensions of sector dynamics have been examined in depth and structural 
dynamics have been explored by the sector life cycle model, not much is 
known about the structural evolution of industries (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1996). Malerba’s later contribution to the debate within the sectoral systems 
approach was key. He proposed that a ‘sectoral’ view provided a 
‘multidimensional, integrated and dynamic view of a given sector’ (Malerba, 
2002).  The sectoral view took into account products and ‘the set of agents 
carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation, production 
and sale of those products’ (Malerba, 2002). The interactions of various 
agents (individuals and organisations) are shaped by institutions and thus a 
sectoral system will undergo change through a process of coevolution of its 
various constituent parts. Essentially this tells us that industrial change is an 
all encompassing process that is shaped by a range of agents involved in 
many different ways. For this research it sets out an important framework 
with respect to understanding and explaining issues such as a division of 
labour and the markets for technology. It provides a base that acknowledges 
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the role of such factors as knowledge and finance in the evolutionary 
process.  
The role of knowledge in the process of industrial change is key. New 
knowledge is unevenly distributed and will inevitably open up further 
opportunities for innovation and investment; in essence economic growth is 
predominantly due to the growth of practical knowledge. Knowledge driven 
systems are unpredictable and necessarily evolutionary in their nature 
(Metcalfe, 2002). This is particularly relevant for the pharmaceutical sector 
and is discussed in further detail in the following section. The pharmaceutical 
sector is an excellent example of how new knowledge can impact and 
transform a sector and provides an important basis for this study. The major 
changes that took place in this sector over its lifespan (but particularly in the 
third epoch) provide an important foundation for discussing further changes.  
2.2.2. Finance and Firm Growth 
The role of finance in terms of its impact on the ability of a firm to emerge 
and grow must be included in any discussion that relates to changes to firms, 
industrial dynamics and evolutionary change. It becomes particularly relevant 
in any discussion involving the pharmaceutical sector because of the very 
high costs associated with product development (DiMasi et al, 1991; 2003; 
2007).  The entire spectrum of drug development is a capital intensive 
process that has become steadily more expensive, particularly in the third 
epoch (Grabowski and Vernon, 1994; Pisano, 2006).  Therefore, this section 
is intended to provide a high level overview of the key points related to 
finance and firm growth in the innovation and finance literature to ground this 
discussion in an overall context that clearly relates finance (including sources 
of finance) to a firm’s strategy and indeed its existence and growth.  
According to Denis, small firms and new businesses in general have become 
an increasingly important part of economic development, particularly in the 
US (Denis, 2004). Audretsch notes that new firm creation is important for 
employment growth (Audretsch, 2002). Overall, the rate of new firm 
incorporation has increased with this trend continuing throughout the 1990s 
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(Denis, 2004). The process of nurturing small firm formation and growth has 
been acknowledged in the context of its importance relative to the creation of 
new innovative sectors and therefore the role of government has expanded 
in the last few decades as many governments have instituted programmes to 
provide funding to new small firms (Moore and Garnsey, 1993; Lerner, 1999; 
Oakey, 2003). There has also been an increase in the amount of capital 
allocated to the private equity6 market with the most dramatic increase in 
funds allocated to venture capital7 increasing from $3.1 billion in 1992 to a 
high of $87.3 billion in 2000 (Denis, 2004). These numbers suggest that 
growing numbers of new firms correspond to growing capital markets. 
The question of finance is central to the existence of all firms (but particularly 
new small firms) as they need to raise, use and reproduce capital in order to 
discover, develop and market products (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). While 
financial issues impact all firms, this has particular relevance for the smaller, 
human therapeutics firm or the (drug) discovery and development (DD) firm. 
Overall, one of the most important issues facing small firms is their ability to 
access capital (Denis, 2004). Historically, small firms have always faced 
funding issues (Moore and Garnsey, 1993; Oakey, 2003) where the 
problems of information asymmetry and sophistication of technology have 
traditionally impacted a firm’s ability to obtain funding.  Small firm growth is 
constrained by lack of finance, particularly where technological sophistication 
is a factor (Westhead and Storey, 1997). Finance is required to conduct 
research and development at the pre-product stage and at this early stage, 
there are no guarantees that there is a viable market, let alone a viable 
product (Westhead and Storey, 1997).  
In terms of access to capital for new small firms, studies such as that by 
Moore and Garnsey illustrated the difficulties that small innovative firms face 
                                            
6 A private equity security (investment) is exempt from registration with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission by virtue of its being issued in transactions ‘‘not involving any public offering” and it 
includes all forms of investment such as venture capital and angel investments in a range of 
transactions. (http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/168/default.htm) 
7 Venture capital is a specific type of private equity 
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when financing their business. Uncertainty around the commercial prospects 
of new products as well as uncertainty around managerial competence 
explains why firms face difficulties raising capital (Moore and Garnsey, 
1993). The study noted that an ‘information gap’ (which has also been 
labelled ‘information asymmetry’) between seekers and providers of capital 
also exacerbates the difficulties of financing new small firms. Available 
financing for small firms was also found to be deficient at the time (related to 
the 1980s in the UK).  Westhead and Storey found that continual financial 
constraints on firms impeded firm growth, particularly when compared with 
less technologically sophisticated firms confirming prior findings by Oakey in 
1984 (Oakey, 1984; Westhead and Storey, 1997). Therefore, if firm growth is 
impeded by a lack of finance, the converse must also be true that firm growth 
and change is therefore impacted by those financial sources that support and 
fund their growth. This is discussed further in Section 2.3.5. 
2.3. Pharmaceutical Sector Overview 
2.3.1. The Nature of Firms and Product Development 1850 - 1945 
The history of the pharmaceutical sector can be broadly divided into three 
epochs, the first two of which are prior to the developments in modern 
biotechnology. The first epoch, which has been broadly related to the period 
between 1850-1945, was one where firms were concerned with making 
drugs related to chemicals (McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; Walsh, 2004) and 
a gradual integration of microbial biochemistry based on the acceptance of 
the germ theory of disease (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998). Many of the 
early companies leveraged competencies in organic chemistry to 
manufacture drugs. The approach to drug discovery was based on a tradition 
of the medical use of plants known also as the Extractive Paradigm (Walsh, 
2004).   
It was during the mid to late 19th century that major changes took place and 
firms were formed that supplied drug related products in the form of alkaloids 
(plant extracts) which were usually supplied to pharmacists for final 
preparation. The initial business model was for large firms to supply the 
intermediate products; the preparation of the drug using those products was 
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up to the pharmacist effectively illustrating a division of labour. It was 
dependent on the ability of pharmacists to prepare the drugs prior to sale to 
the customer. However, there were two major types of pharmaceutical firm 
during this first epoch. The first type were large chemical producing 
companies with specialised pharmaceutical divisions that diversified from 
their core business to produce pharmaceuticals. This included German 
chemical giants such as Ciba, Bayer, Hoechst, IG Farben and Sandoz as 
many of the first drugs were dyes and dye intermediates (Walsh, 2004). 
These firms that diversified were mainly German and Swiss chemical firms 
that capitalised on their scientific and technical competencies in organic 
chemistry as well as chemical synthesis and medicinal chemistry (Orsenigo, 
1989; Walsh, 2004; Mazzucato and Dosi, 2006). According to Walsh, the first 
site of specialist mass production for pharmaceuticals was opened in 1813 in 
Germany (Walsh, 2004).  
The second type of firm was formed specifically to produce pharmaceuticals 
predominantly in the UK and the US. These specialised ‘imitator’ companies 
included Pfizer, Wyeth, Eli Lilly and Warner Lambert that emerged to engage 
in the marketing and sale of pharmaceutical products. They also pursued 
linkages with universities for chemistry. These companies started out as 
manufacturing pharmacies and evolved into the fully integrated 
pharmaceutical companies that came to prominence in the 1930s and 1940s 
(Galambos and Sturchio, 1996).  
During the first epoch of the development of the pharmaceutical sector the 
dominant business model was the large pharmaceutical firm and 
consequently the major source of funding was revenues from their product 
sales. It is generally understood that up until the discovery of Sulfonamide in 
the 1930s, very little formal research was conducted by these firms 
(McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001). Some of these firms were publicly traded 
and listed on various international stock exchanges and so were able to 
utilise revenues from issues of stock for the conduct of their business.   
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2.3.2. The Nature of Firms and Product Development 1945 – 1980 
The second epoch characterised as the random screening period, is 
generally considered to run from 1945 to the early 1980s. The Second World 
War created enormous changes in the pharmaceutical sector and stimulated 
greater demand for drugs and ultimately precipitated a large increase in 
research and production efforts of US companies as the government 
sponsored the accumulation of vast search capabilities (Mazzucato and 
Dosi, 2006). The Second World War also precipitated critical changes in the 
levels of government funding of research and greater amounts of research 
activity took place in publicly funded institutes. Governments ultimately 
became more active funders of research, particularly in the USA (McKelvey 
and Orsenigo, 2001). 
The commercialisation of penicillin proved to be a profitable enterprise and 
firms began to organise large R&D units within their organisations. After the 
success of the discoveries related to antibiotic manufacturing and the 
realisation of the extent of the potential pharmaceutical market demand, 
firms’ business models were adapted to focus on research in drug discovery 
and the ability to randomly screen vast numbers of synthesised chemicals. 
But in terms of product development, the emphasis during this period was on 
naturally derived as well as chemical products which were randomly 
screened in test tube experiments and in laboratory animals for therapeutic 
activity. Companies were ‘mastering drug development by design, applying 
the molecular insights provided by microbial biochemistry and enzyme 
inhibition’ across a broad front (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998). However, this 
search process was inefficient and estimates put the rate of success at 
around one compound in five thousand (McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001).  
The large and vertically integrated firm led the sector into the age of 
medicinal chemistry (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998). Thus, companies 
funded capabilities in analytic and medicinal chemistry to design new 
compounds as firms realised that drug discovery and development could be 
a highly profitable enterprise given the target rich environment (McKelvey 
and Orsenigo, 2001). By the time significant advances in biotechnology were 
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being realised, the pipelines of large vertically integrated firms contained 
promising new drug candidates. The method of random screening worked 
well enough to generate several important new drugs creating these 
‘blockbuster’ products that were extremely successful.  This meant that firms 
were dependent on the revenues from these products, but as large markets 
were apparent, firms experienced high rates of growth and were able to 
internally fund their discovery and development activities.   
However, during this epoch key changes in the regulatory environment also 
impacted the financial requirements of drug development. The regulatory 
requirements demanded by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the 
USA (Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of 1962) and the Medicine Act in 
the UK in 1971 placed a burden of proof on firms to prove the efficacy and 
safety of a drug based on adequate and controlled trials (McKelvey and 
Orsenigo, 2001) and this dramatically increased the costs associated with 
new product development in this sector. This increased the resources 
necessary to obtain new drug approval (and thus increased drug 
development costs overall) as well as prolonging the time it took to develop a 
new drug (McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001).  
Summary 
The history presented thus far of the pharmaceutical sector illustrates how 
the sector was dominated by the presence of large firms and the importance 
of the chemistry knowledge base. By understanding the historical 
development of the sector it is possible to contrast this to the following epoch 
and demonstrate the significant structural change that took place related to 
the emergence of new types of knowledge.  
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2.3.3. The Third Epoch of the Pharmaceutical Sector - Modern 
Biotechnology, the Division of Labour and Changing Markets 
for Technology 
2.3.3.1. Sector Boundaries and Knowledge Bases 
The third epoch of the development of the pharmaceutical sector is 
fundamentally characterised by the key discoveries related to biotechnology8 
(and developments in information and communication technologies). The 
identification of the double helix by Watson and Crick in 1953 ultimately 
triggered a new epoch of technological and industrial change for a range of 
industries driven by biotechnology based discoveries. The development of 
new knowledge bases in modern biotechnology was then given another 
boost in 1973 with Cohen and Boyer’s recombinant DNA technique 
essentially providing the means for genetic engineering. This technique 
ultimately made it possible to alter the genetic code of an organism and 
manipulate protein production (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998). For the 
pharmaceutical sector, these discoveries heralded the increased 
understanding of biological systems and the mechanism of action of many 
drugs.  
There were now two distinct paradigms in drug discovery, but one did not 
displace the other. Biotechnology added new approaches to the toolkits of 
the drug innovators (Walsh, 2004) and radically changed both the prospects 
and the processes of drug discovery (McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001). It 
provided a methodological basis for creating potential new pharmaceutical 
products including creation of targets for screening and evaluating potential 
drug products (Zucker and Darby, 1997). Changes in the underlying 
knowledge bases of the pharmaceutical sector occurred thanks to 
discoveries related to biotechnology and these knowledge bases are 
fundamental to the pharmaceutical sector and have profoundly impacted the 
organisation of the sector.  Critically, a new breed of small firms emerged 
                                            
8 Authors such as Powell have noted that Biotechnology is not a sector but rather a set of tools and 
techniques (Powell 1996). 
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that were able to capitalise on the opportunities that this new knowledge 
created. 
2.3.4. A New Division of Labour – Classical Biotechnology Firms 
The most striking institution to come out of the developments in 
biotechnology was the small start up firm founded by entrepreneurs and 
university professors and funded by venture capital (Kenney, 1986). 
McKelvey has labelled this general model as the ‘classical biotechnology 
firm’ (McKelvey, 2008). However, it should be noted that this does not 
necessarily indicate a homogenous class of firms rather, it identifies firms 
with important similar characteristics overall. These were firms engaged in 
exploratory activities utilising new technologies (the balance between 
exploration and exploitation is discussed further in Section 2.4). The 
definition of exploration utilised here is ‘the pursuit of new knowledge of 
things that might come to be known’ (Levinthal and March, 1993). This 
characterised the division of labour. This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
This diagram depicts the various stages of drug discovery and development 
in order to clearly demonstrate the key activities undertaken by this new 
agent, the classical biotechnology firm. These firms were formed primarily to 
develop new knowledge and technology associated with the early stages of 
drug discovery. This focus on these early stage exploratory activities 
illustrates clearly the division of labour where most new small firms focused 
their activities on the upstream areas of research in drug discovery (Kenney, 
1986; Orsenigo, 1989; Gambardella, 1995; Powell et al, 1996; Henderson et 
al, 1999; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001). Some firms integrated further 
downstream as illustrated by the presence of firms to the right of the solid 
line in the diagram but it should be noted that these firms also continued to 
conduct research and discovery.   
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Figure 1. The Classical Biotechnology Firm and the Division of Labour 
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Based on a review of the associated literature, there were several attributes 
that many of these firms have in common and so three important dimensions 
of the classical biotechnology business model can be identified: 1. Source of 
knowledge and technology; usually an academic institution, 2. Source of 
funding; usually venture capital and large firms and 3. Collaboration; many of 
these firms entered into agreements with other firms and institutions 
(Kenney, 1986; Orsenigo, 1989; Henderson et al, 1999; McKelvey and 
Orsenigo, 2001; Pisano, 2006). The resulting classical biotechnology 
business model is indicative of many firms who have been founded since the 
1970s. Genentech is a good example and indeed the first example of the 
classical biotechnology business model where the academic founders 
together with venture capital backing commercialised their university based 
scientific discoveries in biotechnology (McKelvey 1996) through research 
agreements with other firms (in this case Eli Lilly).  
2.3.4.1. Source of Knowledge and Technology 
Importantly, these firms formed during this epoch of the development of the 
pharmaceutical sector have been characterised as university spin-offs. Many 
firms were typically founded as a spin-off from publicly funded research in 
molecular biology following important discoveries that were made in an 
academic setting9 (Kenney, 1986; Henderson et al, 1999; McKelvey and 
Orsenigo, 2001). Academic scientific discoveries and technological 
inventions were then developed within the boundaries of these 
entrepreneurial firms. These were firms founded by new innovators who 
were not locked into the old established procedures and research 
perspectives (Walsh et al, 1995). This new knowledge originated in the 
universities and publicly funded government laboratories and as such these 
firms were formed as a result of collaboration between scientists (usually 
those responsible for the various discoveries being commercialised) and 
professional managers who brought business acumen to the venture.  
                                            
9 Genentech, the first co called classical biotechnology company, was formed by Herbert Boyer 
(involved in the development of recombinant DNA) with Robert Swanson (a venture capitalist). 
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However, the role of intellectual property rights (IPR) and changes in the 
rights of universities with respect to their IPR in particular (especially in the 
US), played a key role in the ability of universities to commercialise 
knowledge and thus the prolific genesis of new firms. The Bayh-Dole Act in 
1980 allowed universities to retain the rights to inventions that were derived 
from federally funded research and a further change in 1984 expanded 
university rights further in terms of their ability to assign property rights to 
other parties e.g. spin out firms (Henderson et al, 1999). The increased direct 
involvement of universities and their scientists in commercial activities played 
a key role in enabling the new division of labour as universities became 
directly involved in entrepreneurial activities.  
2.3.4.2. Source of Funding 
Genentech was the first biotechnology firm founded in 1976 using a business 
model that included venture capital backing (McKelvey, 1996). Genentech’s 
example was closely followed by a large number of firms, particularly after 
their successful Initial Public Offering (IPO) in 1980 which opened up public 
markets to these types of firms (Ryan et al, 1995; Pisano, 2006). As the 
potential for a successful IPO became apparent, more funding for classical 
biotechnology firms was available from venture capital sources. However, 
established companies formed an equally important source of funding (Arora 
et al, 2001). Established companies needed to acquire and develop this new 
knowledge so they entered into a range of different types of agreements with 
the new small firms and provided funding in exchange for research and 
development contracts. 
2.3.4.3. Collaboration 
The growth of knowledge from the discoveries made in biotechnology 
created a need for incumbent firms to acquire and develop expertise in this 
new knowledge.  Conversely, many new small firms who were involved in 
exploratory research and trying to make drugs were not able to become fully 
integrated because of the cost, scale and expertise required. Consequently, 
a market for knowledge and products emerged in the pharmaceutical sector.  
Many of these companies who were specialised suppliers of high technology 
 
39 
intermediate products entered into agreements with incumbent large firms 
(Powell et al, 1996; Henderson et al, 1999; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; 
Arora et al, 2001; Pisano, 2006). The sheer number of these agreements 
resulted in a vast network of firms that also included many other agents 
including financial providers, universities and other intermediary firms (Powell 
et al, 1996; Powell, 1998; Arora et al, 2001). Markets for technology were an 
important part of this network (Arora et al, 2001). This is widely recognised 
as a key distinguishing factor of the third epoch and this discussion is 
revisited in greater detail in Section 2.3.5. 
2.3.5. Finance and Drug Development During the Third Epoch 
The substantial financial requirements prohibited many firms from becoming 
fully integrated and in essence, the division of labour is closely related to the 
financial difficulties faced by these classical biotechnology firms. Financial 
considerations are exceptionally important to firms in this sector because of 
the long product development life cycle and the associated regulatory 
requirements that are involved in terms of clinical testing as well as quality 
assurance. These regulatory requirements have impacted the time that it 
takes to develop and test a new drug product and therefore have impacted 
the cost of drug discovery and development (Grabowski and Vernon, 1994; 
McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; Pisano, 2006). Current estimates illustrate 
that it may take an average of 10 years to develop a product (DiMasi et al, 
2003). According to Arora et al ‘it soon became clear that the high costs and 
high failure rates of product development and commercialisation in 
pharmaceuticals were a serious barrier to the vast majority of biotech start-
ups’ (Arora et al, 2001). As a result, many small firms specialised in the 
earlier research stages (Orsenigo, 1989; Gambardella, 1995; Henderson et 
al, 1999; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; Pisano, 2006). The following 
discussion is intended to understand more about the cost pressures involved 
in this sector and the providers of finance that in essence enabled the growth 
of the small classical biotechnology firm during the third epoch. 
 
40 
2.3.5.1. Financial Requirements for Drug Development 
The drug discovery and development continuum diagram above (Figure 1) 
illustrates that the path of drug discovery and development can take up to 18 
years (Pisano, 2006). The table below has been compiled by the author to 
capture four important aspects related to the financing of this sector that 
have not previously been assembled in this way: 1. Overall exploration/ 
exploitation phases; 2. Specific key phases of the drug research and 
development (R&D) lifecycle within the overall exploration/exploitation 
phases; 3. the estimated costs for the various phases (where provided) and 
4. The primary sources of funding. This was compiled based on a review of 
the available evidence from the range of key sources on the sector (noted 
below).  
Figure 2. Costs of Drug Development and Proposed Sources of Finance 
During the Phases of Drug Development 
 
SOURCE: Compiled by the Author based on DiMasi et al, 2003 
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NOTE 1. The Discovery phase includes the phases of: Target Identification, 
Target Validation, Lead Identification, Lead Optimisation.  
NOTE 2. The proposed sources of capital by phase of drug development 
have been compiled by the author based on input from a range of sources 
(Kenney, 1986; Orsenigo, 1989; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; Pisano, 
2006; Hall and Wood, 2008) in an effort to gather together all of the current 
information on the financial life cycle of the drug development firm which was 
not explicitly available in the literature.  
DiMasi et al analysed the research and development costs of a random 
selection of new drugs, utilising data obtained from 10 pharmaceutical firms 
(DiMasi et al, 2003). Their findings represent the most in-depth analysis to 
date and the best currently available estimates of the total costs for the 
clinical drug development period. The combined costs are estimated at $802 
million. The table illustrates the required financial resources separated into 
the two major periods: drug discovery (exploratory phase) and drug 
development (exploitation phase). This allows a comparison of costs as they 
relate to these two major phases. The data shows that the discovery phase 
of drug development represents 42% of the total estimated costs while the 
development phase represents 58% of costs. From the perspective of the 
small firm, this means that developing a drug all the way to regulatory 
approval would, at a minimum, double the cost involved.  
The difference between out of pocket costs and capitalised costs as 
presented in the table, however, is significant. It must be noted that 
capitalised costs are based on the data obtained from relatively large firms 
and include significant resources and funding needs associated with the 
running of a large firm. These costs include such things as the process of 
capital depreciation over time (DiMasi et al, 2003). The actual out of pocket 
costs are therefore significantly lower at roughly $125 million which is almost 
a quarter of the capitalised costs but still a substantial sum. If the same ratio 
was applied to the discovery phase out of pocket costs (about 27% of 
capitalised costs), these costs would still be around $90 million.  
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Undoubtedly, this still represents a large sum of money for a small firm to 
raise and represents one of the key reasons why the division of labour in the 
sector meant that small firms only focused primarily on the 
exploration/discovery end of the continuum. It was too expensive to be fully 
integrated. It also illustrates another key point:  financial requirements were 
critical to the growth and survival of the firm and thus those who covered 
these costs ultimately facilitated the division of labour and the emergence of 
successive waves of small firms. External sources of finance were critical 
enablers of the division of labour by enabling the entry and growth of firms in 
this sector. Venture capital, the public stock market and large firms are the 
most widely cited sources of finance for new small firms in this sector 
(Kenney, 1986; Orsenigo, 1989; McKelvey, 1996; Henderson et al, 1999; 
McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; Walsh, 2004; Pisano, 2006; McKelvey et al, 
2006; Lazonick and Tulum, 2010). Mc Kelvey and Orsenigo noted that ‘There 
is little question that venture capital played a key role in facilitating the 
creation of New Biotechnology Firms and of a market for technology in the 
USA’ (McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001). They also add that ‘Larger established 
corporations provided a potentially even more important source of capital’ 
(McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001).  
2.3.5.2. Sources of Funding for the Classical Biotechnology Firm During the 
Third Epoch – Venture Capital, The Stock Market and Large Firms 
Given the nature of the difficulties facing new small firms in obtaining finance, 
it therefore begs the question of who then provides these valuable sources of 
finance when they can be obtained. As most firms are typically not profitable 
in the beginning and lack tangible assets in many cases, debt financing is not 
an option (Denis, 2004). Primary sources of outside equity financing include: 
venture capital/angel investors and corporate investors. However, for those 
small new firms entering the pharmaceutical sector, the role of funding from 
established incumbent companies, public stock markets as well as venture 
capital have formed the most substantial sources of funding (Lazonick and 
Tulum, 2010). The role of large incumbent firms as funders of small new 
firms in the sector was (and is still) considerable (Gambardella, 1995; Arora 
et al, 2001, McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; Pisano 2006). Most recent figures 
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suggest that over $17.2 billion was spent by large incumbent firms on 
corporate partnering (of which R&D alliances are an important form) 
(Lazonick and Tulum, 2010). From 1978 – 2004, venture capital investments 
in the ‘biotech’ sector totalled over $38billion (Pisano, 2006). According to 
Pisano public equity markets accounted for $168 billion of IPOs (as well as 
secondary stock issues by US biotechnology companies) between 1978 and 
2004 (Pisano, 2006). Two-thirds of these funds were raised after 1993 and 
most of the money flowing into the sector was during the speculative boom of 
1999-2000 (Lazonick and Tulum, 2010).   These sums of money suggest that 
the role of financial providers in shaping the sector is therefore significant.  
Genentech’s business model was based on venture capital backing that 
meant that the firm eventually went public (listed on the stock market). 
Genentech’s example was closely followed by a large number of firms, 
particularly after its successful Initial Public Offering (IPO) in 1980 which 
essentially opened up public markets to classical biotechnology firms 
(Robbins-Roth, 2000; Pisano, 2006). Genentech’s alliance with Eli Lilly 
provided another valuable source of funding and was also influential in its 
IPO success. The story of Genentech essentially illustrates the three major 
sources of funding that were most notable for the new small firm. As the 
potential for a successful IPO became apparent, more funding for these new 
small firms was available from venture capital sources and the public stock 
markets (Pisano, 2006). Thus the development of small new companies in 
the early stages of the third epoch of the pharmaceutical sector was very 
closely associated with the availability and willingness of venture capitalists, 
large firms and the stock market to provide a source of finance to these new 
small firms.  Financial deregulation encouraged the development of venture 
capital markets and in particular, the ability of pension funds to invest in 
venture capital (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Walsh, 2004). The Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980 (that encouraged patenting of the output of publicly funded university 
research) was also another important development that played a part in the 
financial relationships that became widespread between small start-up 
companies and venture capital firms because intellectual property (from 
universities) ownership was a critical part of being able to value a company.  
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However, an additional consideration (particularly for firms in this sector that 
require so much in terms of finance) is how these sources of funding can 
impact the activities of small firms and the balance of exploration and 
exploitation10 within the firm.  The division of labour discussed earlier 
indicates that many small classical biotechnology firms in this sector are 
primarily exploratory firms and therefore the sources of finance that have 
supported these firms have also supported this level of exploratory activity in 
the sector overall. This is fundamental to this discussion because the basis 
for this research concerns the factors impacting the division of labour in this 
sector.  The information on sources of finance is briefly reviewed to ascertain 
how sources of finance can have a direct impact on firm activities. 
Venture Capital 
As noted above, venture capital represents a key source of funding for the 
pharmaceutical sector. Venture capital can be defined as independent 
professionally managed dedicated pools of capital that focus on equity11 or 
equity linked investments in privately held high growth companies (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2001). The venture capitalist is understood to provide intensive 
oversight of firms in their portfolio (Lerner, 1995).  Venture capital funding 
may be staged and thus linked to key milestones as venture capitalists seek 
to gather information and monitor the progress of firms. Further commitment 
of capital is only made contingent upon the achievement of these milestones 
(Owen-Smith et al, 2002) and this staging of investments is used as a tool for 
keeping the management team of the firm focused on key milestones critical 
to the firm’s successful development. They will also maintain the option to 
abandon projects (Gompers, 1995). It appears that venture capital firms are 
in a strong position to direct the operation of the firm based on the evidence. 
The potential for control over the level of exploration and exploitation within a 
firm is considerable.  
                                            
10 Exploration is defined as ‘experimentation with new alternatives’ while exploitation is defined as the 
‘refinement and extension of existing competencies’ (March 1991). 
11 Equity defined as ownership. 
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This influence increases with syndication. Venture capital investments in 
firms may also be made as part of a syndicate whereby a group of venture 
capitalists will make a joint investment in a firm. Consequently, another 
venture capitalist company’s willingness to invest may be an important factor 
in the final decision made by the lead venture investor (Lerner, 1995). This 
also means that if one investor decides not to invest, others may in turn also 
decide not to invest and so the nature of syndication also implies a wider 
impact on the entire sector because of the links between venture capital 
firms (Lerner, 1995). There is considerable potential for a widespread 
influence that would impact large numbers of firms and this has implications 
for a sector such as pharmaceuticals where so much venture capital is 
invested.  
Large Firms 
Most large pharmaceutical firms were (and still are) publicly traded and have 
historically had access to public stock markets to fund drug development. But 
the creation of NASDAQ and changes to stock market listing rules in various 
European countries created important opportunities for new and small firms 
to access capital through stock markets (Bertoni and Randone, 2004; 
McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 2007). But critically, Genentech’s successful 
IPO initially demonstrated that it was possible to raise money from public 
stock markets even without product sales revenues and that it also might be 
possible for these new firms to consider vertical integration (Henderson et al, 
1999; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; Pisano, 2006).  
Established incumbent companies formed an important source of funding for 
new small firms in the sector which included equity and non-equity based 
investment. They needed to acquire and develop this new knowledge so they 
entered into a range of different types of agreements with small firms and 
provided funding in exchange for knowledge and products (Gambardella, 
1995; Galambos and Sturchio, 1998, Henderson et al, 1999; McKelvey and 
Orsenigo, 2001). Historically, funding of research external to the large firm 
operating in the pharmaceutical sector was through agreements with 
universities or government funded institutions (Walsh, 2004). But large firms 
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essentially realised that they could exchange financial support and a range of 
capabilities in clinical research, regulatory affairs, manufacturing and 
marketing for the smaller firm’s technical expertise and/or patents (Galambos 
and Sturchio, 1998). As many new small firms represented a source of new 
product ideas it is understood that they offered the corporate sponsor a 
window on emerging technologies as well as a way to create new revenue 
streams.  
Public Stock Markets 
Public stock (equity) markets offer a way in which firms can raise enough 
capital to adequately fund the scope of their operations and this is the main 
motivating factor for firms that choose to go public (Arkebaur, 1991). As 
noted above, the costs involved in funding drug development, manufacturing 
and clinical testing operations are huge and venture capital and alliance 
revenues are not usually adequate particularly for those firms wishing to 
pursue vertical integration (Pisano, 2006). However, an additional benefit 
resulting from being a publicly traded firm is that the management of the 
company can issue subsequent shares at a later date to generate more 
funds. While this is subject to a range of particular rules and regulations, the 
potential to do this still represents a powerful way in which to generate 
subsequent funding.  
Therefore, access to the large amounts of capital available through public 
stock market funding mechanisms was (and still is) an important funding 
opportunity for firms. A number of firms went public (issued shares on the 
stock market) to obtain significant amounts of funding for their business and 
their predominantly exploratory activities. But it was the creation of new small 
firm focused stock markets and thus the willingness of shareholders in both 
the US and the EU to invest in these promising new firms that was influential 
in the access to public stock market funding. A range of successful IPOs 
meant that investment in these new small companies who were 
predominantly exploratory in nature promised lucrative financial returns on 
investment for investors.  
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2.3.6. Coordinating the New Division of Labour 
While some collaboration has been evident from the very earliest stages of 
the development of the pharmaceutical sector (sector/university collaboration 
between Hoechst and Cassella and the Erhlich institute in Frankfurt in the 
late 1800s) the greatest change in the extent and nature of collaborative 
relationships took place during the third epoch of the pharmaceutical sector. 
This ‘network’ of relationships became a critical feature of the sector (Arora 
and Gambardella, 1990; Powell et al, 1996; Powell, 1998). The discoveries in 
biotechnology impacted the development of complex organisational solutions 
between the academic community, established companies and classical 
biotechnology firms (Powell et al, 1996; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). This 
also meant that a market for technology emerged as firms entered into a 
range of agreements and transactions for trading technology, products and 
knowledge. The discussion below reviews the general nature of these 
relationships and the markets for technology in order to illustrate their 
importance and relevance, particularly to the division of labour discussion. 
2.3.6.1. The Development of Networks 
The literature concurs on one very important general point: that there has 
been a considerable increase in corporate partnering in various forms 
(Hergert and Morris, 1988; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990; 1995, Powell 
et al, 1996; Arora et al, 2001). Firms are working with external organisations 
to produce and exchange knowledge and products. According to Powell et al 
firms ‘execute nearly every step in the production process from discovery to 
distribution through some form of external collaboration’ (Powell et al, 1996). 
This corporate partnering has been characterised broadly as a ‘network’ of 
interorganisational collaboration by these authors (and others since) in order 
to capture the nature and extent of the variety of ways in which firms work 
together. The network is a term thought to best describe the 
interconnectedness between firms and other organisations that is all 
encompassing. The idea of a network covers the many ways that firms come 
together to work on various aspects of their knowledge and production 
processes including: R&D partnerships, equity joint ventures, technology 
exchange agreements, licensing and sub-contracting.  
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The network view also holds that ‘the complex reality of rapidly developing 
fields in which knowledge is both sophisticated and widely dispersed 
transcends the simple calculation of a make or buy decision’ (Powell at al, 
1996). Collaboration in high-tech industries involves more than just formal 
contractual exchange and although these served a range of needs the key 
point is that these various forms of relationships were about more than 
contracts. Contracts were merely one of the many vehicles used by firms to 
exchange knowledge, services and products. For the pharmaceutical sector, 
this is particularly relevant because the nature of new and complex 
knowledge created the need for a wide variety of forms of collaboration 
between firms. 
2.3.6.2. Markets for Technology 
A related discussion has since focused on a more specific topic: the nature 
and working of ‘markets for technology’ (also called ‘markets for knowledge’) 
– namely markets for intermediate technological inputs12  (Arora et al, 2001). 
It is important to define technology in order to define intermediate 
technological inputs. The definition for technology as described by Arora et al 
is that technology can take the form of ‘intellectual property or intangibles, be 
embodied in a product or take the form of technical services’ (Arora et al, 
2001). These intermediate technological inputs are the essence of what is 
being exchanged by large and small firms in the pharmaceutical sector. Drug 
candidates that have not yet been approved are a perfect example of an 
intermediate technological input.  
These authors noted at the outset that the use of the term ‘market’ had to be 
utilised in a very broad sense because ‘strictly speaking, market transactions 
are arms-length, anonymous and typically involve an exchange of a good for 
money’ but the key issue is that ‘many if not most transactions for technology 
would fail one or other of these criteria’ (Arora et al, 2001). These authors 
discuss the nature of the way in which knowledge and technology are 
                                            
12 There is a clear line between the market for the thing itself and the market for the technology used 
to create it (Arora et al, 2001). 
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exchanged in the pharmaceutical sector and conclude that ‘alliances are still 
a major factor in the sector and these are the form through which exchange 
takes place in this market for technology’ (Arora et al, 2001). They conclude 
that markets for technology are not easily defined but the value of this 
discussion for this sector is that it focuses on how and why firms can trade 
drug candidates which are intermediate technological inputs.  
But the way in which these technologies are exchanged must also be 
understood which is how discussions on markets may provide more detail 
than discussions related to networks. Licensing is one of the many forms of 
technology exchange taking place within markets for technology in the sector 
and some authors have paid particular attention to its role in the sector 
because it is viewed as an important mechanism of exchange. According to 
Luukkonen, the drug discovery and development business is all about 
developing and out-licensing product innovations (Luukkonen, 2005). 
McKelvey also notes that business models of firms depend on obtaining and 
selling licenses in order to invest in research with long time horizons 
(McKelvey, 2008). Kollmer and Dowling define licensing as an important 
means of exploiting technological innovation within a firm that does not have 
the resources or assets to exploit their developments internally (Kollmer and 
Dowling, 2004). However, Powell et al reflect that licensing rarely occurs 
without prior contact between the two parties to explore the viability of the 
project. For this research, the network and market perspectives are 
complementary ways in which to view how firms in this sector work together 
to exchange and share technology on a continuum that involves a vast array 
of relationships. Having established some ways in which to view these 
relationships, the discussion can now turn to the nature of the relationships 
and why they were established. 
2.3.6.3. The Development of Networks – New Knowledge Produced by 
Classical Biotechnology Firms 
The classical biotechnology firm was a key agent in the exploratory research 
realm of the sector and embodied much of the new knowledge that was 
generated. Classical biotechnology firms concentrated on the development 
and transfer of these new technologies through various interactions 
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(Orsenigo, 1989; Powell et al, 1996; Henderson et al, 1999; McKelvey and 
Orsenigo, 2001). The classical biotechnology firms were faced with a much 
different problem to the incumbent firm which in turn led them offer products 
and knowledge for sale. They lacked the resources to be able to 
manufacture, develop, distribute, market and support their own products. 
They needed financial assistance and clinical development expertise which 
they obtained from fully integrated companies. Many of the small firms who 
were involved in research and development to make drugs were not able to 
become fully integrated because of the cost, scale of resources and 
expertise required, as noted earlier. As a result, many of these companies 
became specialised suppliers of high technology intermediate products and 
entered into a wide range of agreements with large firms to exchange new 
products and knowledge for financial support as well as clinical development 
and regulatory expertise (Arora et al, 2001; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; 
Pisano, 2006). 
2.3.6.4. Acquisition of New Knowledge by Incumbent Firms 
These new developments in the various fields related to molecular biology 
were not immediately integrated into the R&D departments of the majority of 
large incumbent firms. This was the first twentieth century transition in this 
sector where the initial stages of applied research and commercial 
development did not take place in the incumbent firms (Galambos and 
Sturchio, 1998). During the 1970s, at the same time the developments in 
biotechnology were taking place, large incumbent firms were more 
concerned with ‘mastering drug development by design’ building upon the 
knowledge gained from microbial biochemistry and enzyme inhibition in the 
1950s and 1960s (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998). This approach was 
producing important new therapies for the large firms and was their primary 
consideration.  
In addition, these large firms were making substantial investments in 
microbial biochemistry and enzyme inhibition illustrating that their focus was 
elsewhere at the time. As noted by Galambos and Sturchio ‘the former 
investments remained too promising; the latter investments [in 
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biotechnology] still too questionable to justify so sudden a change in 
research strategy’ (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998). The new developments 
were thus primarily the realm of the new small firm.  Arguably this slow 
transition by the large incumbent firms created an important opportunity for 
small firms who were able to fashion themselves as research boutiques and 
therefore upstream providers of the new knowledge, tools and products 
(Galambos and Sturchio, 1998). In addition, Powell noted that large 
pharmaceutical companies lacked the kind of internal research environment 
that fosters innovation and that this was one of the primary drivers of why 
large companies sought relationships with smaller companies and paid for 
R&D (Powell, 1996).  
The types of technological changes resulting from discoveries related to 
biotechnology meant that fully integrated pharmaceutical firms had to expand 
their knowledge bases and keep abreast of scientific developments 
(Gambardella, 1995; Galambos and Sturchio, 1998). The established large 
firms channelled their investments in biotechnology research to these new, 
smaller firms through a range of agreements forming a ‘network’ of 
collaborative endeavours and contracts. Ultimately, the incumbent firms had 
to incorporate the knowledge, tools and products associated with 
developments in biotechnology and this was done through many various 
agreements that were established between themselves and the new players 
in their market: the small classical biotechnology firm. Collaboration was key 
and these large fully integrated firms sustained their business model as 
competencies were gained through external relationships. 
2.3.6.5. Characterising the Key Relationships in the Pharmaceutical Sector 
in the Third Epoch Market 
The nature of the development of knowledge and technology in the sector 
meant that classical biotechnology firms were able to trade technology13 at 
various early stages of development because there was a corresponding 
                                            
13 Defined utilising the Arora et al (2001) discussion that distinguishes ‘technology’ as an intermediate 
input.  
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need to acquire this technology on the part of large incumbent firms. The 
flows of technology can be thus illustrated in Figure 33.  
The diagram shows the way in which knowledge flowed between the major 
types of organisation in this sector. The arrows are uni-directional to reflect 
the evidence the flows of technology specifically. The diagram thus 
represents what is currently understood in terms of the markets for 
technology in the pharmaceutical sector. It also reflects the division of labour. 
The universities and government laboratories are positioned at the top to 
reflect their important position as knowledge generators during this epoch. 
There is a better defined arrow that connects these institutions to the 
classical biotechnology firms to reflect the flows of knowledge. There is a 
less well defined arrow that connects these institutions to large 
pharmaceutical firms to reflect a smaller flow of technology and knowledge 
than that between public institutions and small classical biotechnology firms 
(as discussed). The most well defined arrow connects the classical biotech 
firm to large pharmaceutical firms to reflect a more substantial flow of 
technology and knowledge between these two major types of firm in the 
sector.  
Figure 3. Markets for Technology – Historical Representation of Flows 
of Technology and Knowledge 
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2.4. Understanding the Evolving Landscape of the Third 
Epoch of the Pharmaceutical Sector  
2.4.1. Heterogeneity of Classical Biotechnology Firms – Analytical 
Debates 
The classical biotechnology model described above is a broad 
characterisation of the business model of many different firms that have 
emerged in the last 35 years. However, discoveries in modern biotechnology 
had consequences for a number of industries. As a result of the proliferation 
of research trajectories and techniques, a wide range of opportunities 
opened up for the creation of new firms who set about commercialising the 
discoveries that were being made at academic institutions (Orsenigo et al, 
2001). Brink et al’s ‘Axis of product based sectors’ captures the diversity of 
the sectors impacted by biotechnology (Brink et al, 2006) including: 
Pharmaceuticals, Agriculture, Chemistry, Forestry, Pulp, Paper, 
Environment, Instruments and Equipment, Food and Medical Technology. 
Essentially, these discoveries created a market for new technology and 
opportunities for the formation of a large number of firms in a range of 
industries (Quéré, 2006).  
Some recent studies on biotechnology firms have contributed to a deeper 
understanding of the heterogeneity of those firms within the classical 
biotechnology business model across the range of sectors impacted by 
biotechnology.  Mangematin et al studied biotechnology firms across all 
application segments and looked closely at the pattern of development of 
and determined that there was a key difference in the business models of 
firms based on the desired growth and the subsequent size of the innovation 
project. This study differentiated biotechnology firms based on their 
innovation projects concluding that there are two major types of 
biotechnology firms: Those that are less research intensive and target 
smaller markets and those that are research intensive firms that target bigger 
markets with a broader reach (Mangematin et al, 2003). The former Type A 
firms experience steady growth and are usually less risky in comparison to 
the latter Type B firms who have greater ambitions to become large firms. 
Luukkonen’s study of biotechnology firms also examined all biotechnology 
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application sectors and firm organisation, but this study concluded that the 
forms of organisation of a firm will in fact vary by application sector in 
biotechnology and that there is more variability among biotechnology firms 
than the two business models as proposed by Mangematin et al (Luukkonen, 
2005). She notes that this variability relates to the degree of forward 
integration, backward networking or forward networking (Luukkonen, 2005). 
This study determined that when the application area of the biotechnology 
firm was part of a stringent regulatory system, the form of organisation 
tended to be a ‘network firm.’ This ‘network firm’ was less vertically 
integrated, obtaining resources through collaborations with other firms. 
These firms were involved in drug development.  
While the overall characteristics of biotechnology companies’ business 
models are generally agreed, there is a considerable debate between 
various authors concerning ways in which further dimensions of variability in 
business models can be characterised, illustrated in part by the discussions 
above. Classifications such as those by Pisano, Orsenigo et al and Quere 
also represent differences in the characterisations of the business models of 
these classical biotechnology firms based on the knowledge base of these 
companies and when they were formed (Orsenigo et al, 1998; Pisano, 2006; 
Quere, 2006). All of these studies represent differences in the way that 
various authors have tried to make additional classifications of biotechnology 
companies.   
Overall, the findings of these studies also create an awareness of the 
difficulties of looking at biotechnology companies and business models 
across the range of application segments of biotechnology. These studies 
also illustrate that the range of application segments of biotechnology have 
impacted the variety of business models of firms as they highlight the 
diversity of business models that are apparent and undoubtedly result from 
the different industries that these firms ultimately operate within. Reviewing a 
cohort of biotechnology firms therefore presents difficulties when trying to 
identify the specific issues that impact firms within one sector. While different 
industries have been affected by developments in biotechnology, reviewing 
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one single cohort of biotechnology firms makes it difficult to ascertain direct 
influences on changes to firms. This is best achieved by singling out these 
firms that specifically operate in one sector. The pharmaceutical sector has 
been profoundly impacted by biotechnology with firms utilising the 
technologies and knowledge to discover and develop drugs and so it is the 
pharmaceutical sector that represents the focal point of this research. 
2.4.2. Waves of Entry of New Classical Biotechnology Firms 
The classical biotechnology firm has been a useful description that 
encompasses a set of important features that many small firms have in 
common in this sector. However, while this overall general description is 
useful, it is necessary to explore the heterogeneity of firms within this 
classical biotechnology group and to understand what has influenced this 
heterogeneity.  The purpose of this section is to review the literature that 
looks in more detail at firm differences. 
Different waves of new entrants into the sector have been described based 
on various technologies and knowledge bases and consequently, differences 
in business models are apparent (Orsenigo, 1998; Pisano, 2006). The first 
wave of new entrants during the period of 1976-1985 focused on the new 
technologies of recombinant DNA and Monoclonal Antibodies (Pisano, 
2006). Orsenigo et al’s distinction is slightly different. They distinguish 
between generations of firms formed between 1973-1980, 1981-1986 and 
then from 1986 onwards based on increasing specialisation of firms with 
each new generation becoming more narrowly specialised (Orsenigo et al, 
1998). Importantly, they note that the life sciences in general have evolved 
by deepening more specific research hypotheses and consequently, new 
generations of classical biotechnology firms have tended to focus on more 
specific domains within each research paradigm (Orsenigo et al, 1998). 
According to Pisano, during the initial stages of the development of 
biotechnology, some firms wanted to be ‘all things to all markets’ (Pisano, 
2006). These firms were ‘research boutiques’ with great ambition, expecting 
to compete with large established firms (Quéré, 2006). Companies such as 
Amgen, Cetus and Biogen formed during this first period utilised a broad 
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range of techniques related to genetic engineering to produce a range of 
products for the agrochemical, biofuel and human therapeutic markets 
(Pisano, 2006). Some of these companies pursued specialised niche 
markets, for example, diagnostics based on hybridoma technology. They 
developed products that could be sold in the marketplace as soon as 
possible, concentrating on the most immediate applications of genetic 
engineering and on products that did not require large scale production 
processes or substantial marketing efforts (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996).  
Some of these firms were able to access capital from public equity markets 
which allowed them to pursue a strategy of becoming more fully integrated 
drug development firms (Pisano, 2006). Some of the earliest firms, 
Genentech and Amgen, for example, initially started off as contract research 
companies but changing financial fortunes enabled them to pursue a fully 
integrated strategy.   
During the mid to late 1980’s, a second wave of new entrants to the sector 
took place and the focus of a number of these companies was on disease 
and new methodologies around structure based drug design and small 
molecule drugs (1985-1990). The difficulties associated with the 
development of drug products (especially those based on proteins) became 
more apparent as well as difficulties related to funding issues for these firms.  
Consequently the second wave of entrants14 did not necessarily aspire to 
become fully integrated companies and focused efforts on research and 
collaborative strategies based on technologies that included gene therapy, 
cell therapy, tissue engineering, and antisense (Pisano, 2006). As further 
research was conducted on biological systems and disease, it was evident 
that there was a way to leverage these technologies to understand the role of 
both small molecules as well as larger molecules traditionally associated with 
the new biotechnologies. During the second wave of new entry and into the 
third wave, from the 1990s onwards, many firms specialized in early 
research.  
                                            
14 Notably, this period was characterised by firms who were more willing to examine and review the 
role of small molecules. 
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The third wave of new entrants during the 1990s resulting from the 
developments in Genomics and the mapping of the human genome created 
a new wave of ‘investor enthusiasm’ and platform technology based 
business models were adopted by many firms (Pisano, 2006). This business 
model focused on inputs into the drug discovery process including tools, data 
and disease targets. The expectation was that firms founded using these 
new technologies would provide important information that would speed up 
the drug development processes and so public stock markets were 
responsive to these types of business models. The trend became one where 
many firms opted not to become fully integrated and pursued a model where 
they provided drug discovery research services to other firms and entered 
into research agreements that also provided much needed capital financing 
(Saviotti, 1998; Rothman and Kraft, 2006). 
The discussion above has highlighted some of the differences in the types of 
business models adopted by new firms that were formed during the last 35 
years. For these smaller firms, much of the change was related to the type of 
knowledge upon which the firm was founded. But some firms did move down 
the integration continuum pursuing further development and production of 
products internalising either the activities or the management of these 
activities. As some of the larger fully integrated firms desired products to be 
in more advanced stages of development, this in turn created opportunity (or 
pressure) for firms to develop products further downstream (Pisano, 1991). 
Large pharmaceutical companies were investing substantially in 
collaborations with these firms and the productivity of these agreements was 
not as always as expected. Consequently, larger firms began to demand 
products to be in later stages of development and this created pressure on 
some of these firms to integrate further downstream to produce products with 
greater evidence of efficacy (Pisano, 2006). This also meant that the small 
classical biotechnology firm realised a greater pay-off for products that were 
further developed (Luukkonnen, 2005) and this acted as an incentive for 
companies to pursue clinical development of products.  
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Recent studies of genomics companies have revealed further changes in 
their business models akin to moving down the integration continuum.  While 
this business model initially focused on platform technologies and the 
provision of licenses or subscriptions fees as a method of revenue 
generation, this model was to have short lived commercial viability (Rothman 
and Kraft, 2006). The increased availability of DNA sequencing technologies 
made possible by the development of open access and free public genomic 
data reduced these services/products to commodities and furthermore, these 
technologies were integrated into large pharmaceutical companies effectively 
reducing the market considerably (Rothman and Kraft 2006; McMeekin and 
Harvey 2007). A study of a US genomics company cohort revealed that over 
half of the sample had established internal drug development programmes, 
thereby moving downstream into drug development and manufacturing 
activities. Thus the business model of these companies evolved to cope with 
the market pressures that were effectively eliminating the viability of their 
business model. 
2.4.3. Changes to Existing Firms - Evolving Fully Integrated Large 
Firms  
The developments in biotechnology in the last 30 years have created 
pressures on the fully integrated incumbent firms to adapt their business 
models in order to take advantage of the new discoveries.   Many fully 
integrated companies gradually strengthened their in-house research 
capabilities in biotechnologies during the 1980s and the 1990s (Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 1996).  A case study on one large pharmaceutical firm highlighted 
the tasks involved in transforming technological identity and the business 
model in response to the developments in biotechnology. This was one of 
the top five pharmaceutical companies with proven abilities in science based 
drug discovery, management of clinical testing and regulatory affairs as well 
as marketing (Zucker and Darby, 1997).  A new head of research was 
recruited and led the conscious effort of transformation of how the firm 
conducted drug discovery. The new head of research introduced the 
organisation of focused groups of scientists (within the drug discovery unit) 
on various biotechnologies as a method of implementing biotechnological 
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based drug discovery. Over a period of three to four years, the use of 
biotechnologies such as cloned human targets, were introduced and many 
experienced scientists in the field of biotechnology were hired to diffuse new 
methods within the firm. The firm’s strategy was to develop excellent in-
house research that would also enable the firm to make more informed 
decisions with respect to selective relationships with new small classical 
biotechnology firms.  This firm devoted the resources necessary and hired 
the right personnel to transform its research technologies to include cutting 
edge, leading technologies of the biotechnology period. 
During the 1980s and the 1990s some firms modified their business models 
in the hope that integrating pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology divisions 
would create synergies that could be built on the basis of the new 
biotechnology discoveries (Chataway et al, 2004). But by the late 
1990s/early 2000s, most companies had again split their pharmaceutical and 
agro-chemical divisions. The negative public reaction and difficult policy 
environment in Europe created potential conflicts of interest between 
agricultural and health based sectors. The result was a change in business 
model of these large firms and a series of mergers and de-mergers among 
companies with agro-chemical and seed divisions who were eventually split 
off from pharmaceutical divisions (Chataway et al, 2004).  
Even though academic based biological sciences created a series of new 
technological breakthroughs, productivity in the sector declined in the late 
1990s because more drugs were coming off exclusivity protection than were 
being replaced by new drugs (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). The internal 
productivity issues meant that those firms who had not yet integrated 
biotechnology based drug discovery and design capabilities had to review 
the sources of innovation and determine how best to integrate these new 
capabilities into their existing business model.  The integration of these 
capabilities has complemented rather than supplanted medicinal chemistry 
and random screening to discover new and effective drugs (Walsh, 2004).  
However, the continued survival of these firms has also been contingent on 
one or more of both of two main strategies including: 1. Mergers and 
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Acquisitions and 2. Various forms of joint development of products and 
processes.  Mergers and consolidation among incumbent firms has produced 
behemoths such as Sanofi Aventis, Novartis, and Pfizer in an effort to 
overcome the negative effects of declining productivity. Many fully integrated 
companies experiencing a decline in their research pipelines have tried to 
reverse this trend through acquisitions of small firms to acquire 
competencies in new technologies (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). One 
notable example is Roche who acquired a controlling interest in Genentech.  
Eli Lilly, Merck and Pfizer have also made some substantial investments 
through acquisition of firms to enhance their in-house biotechnology-related 
research and development competencies. Finally, as noted earlier, 
collaborative efforts with a range of partners have been an important strategy 
for firms to bolster their in house R&D production. While the core business 
model of the vertically integrated firm has arguably remained the same (firms 
continue to discover, develop, register, market and support the sale of their 
products) the business model for these firms has evolved from the sole 
reliance on in-house capabilities providing all technology to one where 
external sources of technology are sourced to complement in-house efforts.  
2.4.4. Changes to Firms – The Exploration/Exploitation Balance 
Throughout this chapter, there has been consistent reference to the notion of 
exploration and exploitation in firms. The reason for this is related to the 
importance of the division of labour in the sector and to begin the discussion 
on how that may be evolving by utilising the exploration/exploitation 
framework. The exploration/exploitation literature discusses the notion that 
firms incorporate two basic sets of activities into their business (exploration 
and exploitation) at any point in time and that this ‘balance’ will change.  
March notes that ‘A central concern of studies of adaptive processes is the 
relation between the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of 
old certainties’ (March, 1991). The study of adaptive processes is a 
particularly relevant theme for this research and thus the 
exploration/exploitation discussion provides a framework that can be used to 
characterise the nature of firms in the sector and consequently to understand 
changes to those firms. Exploration can be defined as the search for new 
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ways of doing things and the search for new opportunities.  It can be defined 
using such terms as discovery, experimentation and risk taking (March, 
1991). Exploitation on the other hand is the development of things that are 
known/existing opportunities and can be defined using terms such as 
refinement, efficiency, selection and implementation (March, 1991). The 
exploration/exploitation distinction is a particularly helpful way of 
distinguishing how firms differ in the core nature of their activities. The 
diagram below uses the drug development continuum to helps to understand 
the key differences in the nature of tasks that firms undertake in this sector 
and how the division of labour can be understood clearly using the 
exploration/exploitation framework.  
The discussions throughout this chapter have highlighted that firms in this 
sector display particular characteristics in terms of their operational focus on 
the exploration/exploitation continuum. The classical biotechnology firms 
have been discussed in terms of their exploratory focus while the large 
incumbent firms are portrayed as having the characteristics of both 
exploratory and exploitation related activities although undoubtedly the 
emphasis is placed on the latter.  
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Figure 4. Exploration and Exploitation as it Relates to the Drug Development Continuum  
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However, the particular focus of a firm on one set of activities over another 
can lead to problems. March notes that ‘Adaptive systems that engage in 
exploration to the exclusion of exploitation are likely to find that they suffer 
the costs of experimentation without gaining many of its benefits.  They 
exhibit too many undeveloped new ideas and too little distinctive 
competence.  Conversely, systems that engage in exploitation to the 
exclusion of exploration are likely to find themselves trapped in suboptimal 
stable equilibria’ (March, 1991). As a result, maintaining an appropriate 
balance between exploration and exploitation is a primary factor in system 
survival and prosperity (March, 1991). There is evidence to suggest that 
firms will change the balance of exploration and exploitation in their activities 
because ultimately, the external environment will change around the firm as 
demonstrated by the changes in this sector. This is evidenced by the case 
study presented here on Celltech. This case study is presented because the 
firm chose to concentrate its resources on exploratory driven activities in 
changing the balance of its activities (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 1999). 
While this reflects the orientation of many classical biotechnology firms in the 
sector, it is interesting to note that this is in contrast to what is typically 
expected from firms who are moving towards a more mature phase in their 
lifecycle. 
2.4.4.1. The Case of Celltech 
The case of Celltech presents an interesting story of how a biotech firm was 
able to change the balance of exploration and exploitation within the firm to 
its advantage but by focusing on exploration rather than exploitation. 
McNamara and Baden-Fuller illustrated that the issues that the firm faced 
throughout its life cycle were dealt with through a change in the balance of 
exploration and exploitation related activities (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 
1999). In its earliest days, the firm Celltech started off with two businesses: in 
house R&D of novel therapeutics (drugs) and contract manufacturing and 
research in Biologics in which it had developed a leading edge capability 
centred on recombinant DNA and hybridoma technologies:  The former 
representing the firm’s exploratory activities and the latter representing its 
exploitation related capabilities. The contract research and production 
 
64 
business was the major source of revenue for the firm and covered in-house 
R&D expenditures which initially only amounted to roughly 25% of turnover 
by 1987 but had risen to 50% of turnover by 1990. During this period, the 
majority of employees were based in the Biologics division.  
In 1990 the firm was split into two divisions and the expenditure on in-house 
R&D increased dramatically as the new CEO believed that the future of the 
firm lay in development of drugs because of the enormous revenue potential 
(McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 1999). During this two year period, the firm 
developed capabilities in activities related to drug discovery through to 
regulatory clinical trials. The company used collaborations to continue its 
drug development business model during the next four years and equal 
amounts of resources were devoted to both its drug development and 
contract manufacturing business. Then in 1996 a decision was made to sell 
the biologics contract manufacturing business and concentrate all resources 
on drug discovery and development. Revenues from contract manufacturing 
had been steadily declining and with an internal financial crisis, the pressure 
was on to devise a new strategic direction for the firm. Investments to 
develop a strong drug discovery and development business were made and 
the company acquired new scientific, technical and management capabilities 
to create an effective drug discovery and development organisation. The 
capital value of the company rose substantially over the following eight years 
and Celltech was taken over in 2004 by UCB. UCB paid over £1.5 Billion for 
the company reflecting that the change in business model turned out to be a 
profitable one especially for a company that was only 21 years old. For firms 
during this period, the focus on exploration activities was key. 
2.4.4.2. The Cycle of Discovery   
The evidence from the literature suggests that in fact exploitation of current 
knowledge tends to dominate over exploration of new knowledge, over time 
(March 1991, Levinthal and March, 1993). The reasoning behind this can be 
understood as follows; ‘exploitation generates clearer, earlier and closer 
feedback than exploration. It corrects itself sooner and yields more positive 
results in the near term. As a result, the primary challenge to sustaining an 
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optimal mix of exploration and exploitation is the tendency of rapid learners 
and successful organisations to reduce the resources allocated to 
exploration’ (Levinthal and March, 1993).  
According to Levinthal and March, the gains to be made from exploitation are 
more readily visible and easily obtainable. However, more recent studies 
describe a more dynamic process of the movement between exploration and 
exploitation and then back to exploration and the reasons why this occurs.  
Nooteboom proposed a ‘cycle of discovery’ and described how exploration 
and exploitation are ‘mutually related and build on each other’ (Nooteboom, 
2000; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). Exploitation starts when ‘variety of 
content is reduced or consolidated into a dominant design’ resulting in 
reduced uncertainty, increased demand and new producers (Abernathy and 
Utterback, 1978; Bettis and Prahalad, 1994; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). 
Eventually there is an increase in specialisation and novelty is ‘consolidated’ 
in dominant designs and overall, knowledge becomes more codified enabling 
more rapid diffusion as firms progress through the ‘generalisation’ phase into 
exploitation (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). In order for firms to progress to 
exploration once again, they must work to open up a new variety of contexts 
of application. Minor adjustments are made to products (and processes are 
also adjusted for efficiency) and firms then progress through a process of 
‘differentiation’ which then leads to the reciprocation phase. This 
reciprocation phase involves a greater degree of configuration of 
‘experiments conducted with novel elements with hybrids of new and 
established elements’ based on new or existing insights gained from the prior 
processes and leads back to the exploration phase (Gilsing and Nooteboom 
2006). 
Celltech divested its contract manufacturing business in response to 
declining revenues from that business and so its business model was 
reconfigured to take advantage of a market that still promised opportunity; 
that of the drug discovery and development business. There were both 
internal and external pressures on the company to change its business 
model and much of the evidence from this case study points to the influence 
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of various sorts of financial pressures on the company. The cycle of 
discovery study illustrates an interesting model that helps to understand how 
as well as why firms can move along the exploration/exploitation continuum. 
This is important for the purposes of this research as this evidence (and that 
from the Celltech case above) reinforces the idea that firms will continue to 
adapt to their market circumstances and this is reflected in both changes to 
the models of new start up firms and changes to the business models of 
existing firms.   
2.4.4.3. The Future Sustainability of the Exploration Focused Firm 
The evidence presented in this chapter illustrates the exploratory focus of the 
classical biotechnology firm which has been in existence for over 30 years. 
The evidence also suggests that different waves of new entrants have 
experimented with new types of knowledge as well as organisational 
arrangements which have included some incorporation of exploitation related 
activities in their business model. However, the arguments put forward by 
March and later by Levinthal and March clearly define a risk in the singular 
focus of firms on one approach versus another i.e., exploration focused 
versus exploitation focused hence the explicit need for a balance of activities 
is cited (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993). The classical 
biotechnology firms have almost exclusively focused on exploratory activities 
but the evidence suggests that this is not sustainable. Evidence presented in 
the following chapter suggests that changes are already taking place and 
that the exploratory focus might not be sustainable for the sector. The 
evidence above suggests that the logical next step for the sector is to 
progress to an exploitation phase.  
2.5. Conclusions 
The previous sections of this chapter have presented an overview of a 
dynamic sector that has witnessed many changes to both industrial structure 
and internal structure of firms. Biotechnology discoveries profoundly changed 
the pharmaceutical sector. This new knowledge created new opportunities 
for firm creation and a division of labour emerged as a result which also 
created opportunity and pressure for firm adaptation. The discussions on 
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business models and the changes already observed within the 
pharmaceutical sector would suggest that firms’ business models will change 
over time and potentially the division of labour will also change. The 
evidence above suggests that this is usually in response to changing 
knowledge.  These trends in the evolution of business models of all firms 
also illustrate that firms have to adapt to various sector conditions around 
changing technologies and resource availability.  
Given the dynamic nature of the sector, it would seem necessary to ensure 
that an up to date understanding of the potential changes to firms and the 
division of labour is undertaken and that this includes an understanding of 
the key influences on these changes. Changing business models and 
changes to the division of labour are crucial to the ongoing commercial 
viability of the sector and an economic inevitability (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). As Pisano notes in the closing chapter of his review of the need for 
changing business models in the sector, ‘Scientific revolutions like 
biotechnology are only partly about science. Inextricably linked to the science 
are experiments in institutional arrangements, organisational forms, business 
models and management practices’ (Pisano, 2006). The co-evolution of 
science, technology and institutions can only be understood in precisely that 
way – as a co-evolution whereby changes in all of these areas profoundly 
impact each other (Nelson, 2005). The goals of this research are to further 
understand and validate the potential existence of new experiments in 
institutional arrangements, business models and management practices in 
the pharmaceutical sector. The following chapter presents the key arguments 
that will form the research questions for this research on the evolving 
pharmaceutical sector.   
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Chapter 3. Identification of Further Changes in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector 
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to develop an analytical framework for studying 
more recent changes in the pharmaceutical sector to fully understand the 
claims that are being made (based on the literature reviewed) that form the 
basis of this research and subsequently, the research questions. The 
previous chapter discussed four key issues: the changing nature of firms and 
thus the division of labour in the sector, the changing nature of the sector’s 
knowledge base and thus the role of knowledge in the division of labour in 
this sector, the role of finance in the changes in the division of labour and the 
role of markets for technology that enabled the changing division of labour. 
The pharmaceutical sector over the last decades of the twentieth century has 
been impacted by developments in biotechnology and other disciplines. In 
particular, the prior chapter discussed the changing nature of the large and 
small firms that are the key players in this sector reflecting that this is a truly 
dynamic sector that responds to changes in the knowledge base. This 
discussion also reflected that new knowledge has had a profound impact on 
the sector dynamics. It also examined the role of finance in this sector 
because of the unique product development pathways and timelines that 
create enormous financial pressures on firms.  And finally, a discussion of 
the literature on the markets for technology was also included because of the 
critical importance of these markets for the division of labour in this sector. 
However, the purpose of this chapter is to propose that there have been 
further changes in the division of labour and that the sector has continued to 
evolve due to changes in knowledge and financial considerations. The 
growing importance and complexity of markets for technology is also 
proposed. The characteristics of how the sector has evolved have yet to be 
analysed and documented in the literature.  This chapter proposes that there 
are significant gaps in the literature with respect to these four issues and 
proposes that there are new associations to be made based on existing 
evidence in the literatures as presented, to try to answer some questions that 
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have arisen from a review of the literature in conjunction with a review of the 
trade literature. The following four sections discuss these claims in greater 
detail.  
3.2. Changing Division of Labour 
The following section discusses the proposed ways in which the division of 
labour has changed. There is evidence to suggest that a new type of firm has 
emerged that does not focus on the same part of the drug development 
continuum than was previously understood. The section also discusses how 
this is not only the entry of new types of small firms but the adaptation of 
existing firms.  
3.2.1. A New Type of Firm 
The previous chapter of this thesis has presented an overview of a dynamic 
sector that has witnessed many changes to both the overall industrial 
structure and the internal structure of firms. Biotechnology discoveries 
significantly impacted the pharmaceutical sector and thus the development of 
drugs for human therapeutic use. This integration of knowledge into the 
pharmaceutical sector created new opportunities for firm creation and also 
created both opportunity and pressure for firm adaptation. The discussions 
on business models in the sector would suggest that firms’ business models 
will change over time and usually in response to various 
pressures/opportunities.  
There is evidence to suggest that regulatory and financial pressures 
particularly impact the current industrial climate in this sector and so existing 
and new firms must experiment with different types of business models 
(McKelvey, 2008). Some authors have speculated on the potential types of 
business model that may emerge in the future. McKelvey notes that various 
types of business models will likely emerge between the two dominant 
models of the large firm and the small classical biotechnology firm and 
differentiates these based on a continuum that changes focus based on 
whether or not the firm is competing on technology or on market/customers. 
She also speculates that financial issues related to the availability of venture 
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capital will make it increasingly difficult to obtain finance and consequently 
the classical biotechnology business model will likely become less popular as 
a mode of start-up firm (McKelvey, 2008).  
Pisano has also described potential changes that are needed to both the 
vertically integrated (large firm) and classical biotechnology business models 
and advocates changes to the classical biotechnology business model in 
order for these types of firms to realise their commercial and economic 
potential (Pisano, 2006). He points out that only a tiny fraction of these types 
of firms have actually become profitable enterprises (Pisano, 2006). Pisano 
also notes that some classical biotechnology firms have moved from ‘the 
frontier to less risky ventures’ with firms ‘retreating’ from the radical and risky 
end of the R&D spectrum (Pisano, 2006) but this was not further discussed, 
described nor analysed. So while there has been some speculation on 
potential changes to business models, there has been no definitive 
discussion in the academic literature on the potential business model that 
has possibly already emerged, that of the No Research Development Only 
(NRDO) firm.  
Conversely, there is evidence in the trade literature to suggest that more 
recent changes have already occurred to the business models of firms that 
were discussed in the previous chapter. It appears that some companies are 
opting for a business model that seeks to focus on products that are in the 
later stages of clinical development. Lahteenmaki and Baker reviewed the 
biotechnology sector in 2003 and noted that some companies ‘got rid’ of 
more speculative, early stage research programmes for ones closer to the 
market and abandoned early stage drug development programmes’ 
(Lahteenmaki and Baker, 2004). Hodgson  described the investor popularity 
of ‘no-research, development only’ companies in 2004 and most importantly 
noted that these companies received the most equity in 2004. Hodgson also 
described business models of some firms that use innovative technology 
platforms but to re-engineer compounds that had already been in the clinic, 
adding that this model proved popular with investors also (Hodgson, 2006).  
 
71 
Lahteenmaki and Baker described variations of what they called a ‘Specialty 
Pharma’ business model.  Some companies, from their inception, may be 
‘Speciality Pharmaceutical Companies’ created to develop a product that 
was obtained from another company rather than a product that was the result 
of internal application of discovery technologies and development 
(Lahteenmaki and Baker, 2004). Then there are those companies that may 
have started out with a promising new and innovative technology platform 
but the technology was not successful in producing a drug candidate for 
clinical testing and they dispensed with scientists and scientific capabilities 
and opted to in-license drug products to pursue clinical development.  
There may be a range of reasons for the emergence of these new firms and 
changes to existing firms. However, reasons for the emergence and 
existence of these new firms have not been well discussed in the literature 
with only summary observations on the role of finance and financial 
pressures. This evidence suggests that a new type of firm is emerging that is 
concentrating on downstream, exploitation focused activities. There is also 
the suggestion that this new type of firm may be emerging as a result of 
financial pressure. Academic literature certainly shows that new firms 
emerge to follow opportunities (as in Chapter 2) and sections 3.2 and 3.3 will 
follow up on this discussion as it relates to proposing the reasons for a new 
type of firm but the evidence from the trade literature points to a changing 
division of labour with new small firms shifting their focus away from research 
and exploration.  
3.2.2. Changes in the Activities of Existing Firms – The Traditional 
Classical Biotechnology Firm 
The evidence from the discussion on the evolving nature of the sector in the 
academic literature has indicated that changes to existing firms can also be 
expected.  The question is how existing (classical biotechnology business 
model) firms may have changed. The traditional classical biotechnology 
business model is characterised as an exploratory based business that is 
concerned with highly scientific, early stage drug discovery and limited 
clinical development. These firms were always responsible for generating 
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their own new drugs internally. The following table illustrates the types of 
business models apparent in the drug development sector to date (discussed 
in Chapter two) together with their perceived core competencies/capabilities 
based on the literature reviewed:  
Business Model Time Period Generally Understood Capabilities 
Classical 
Biotechnology Firms 
(Large Molecules 
and FIPCOs15)– 
Focus on Genetic 
Engineering and 
Hybridoma 
Techniques 
1st Wave (1976 – 1985) 
! Acquiring university/academic 
knowledge 
! Alliances 
! Out-licensing 
! Discovery Research  - genetic 
engineering, hybridoma 
technology 
! Specialised Protein 
Production 
 
Classical 
Biotechnology Firms 
– Focus on Gene 
Therapy, Cell 
Therapy, Tissue 
Engineering, 
Antisense 
2nd Wave (1986 – 1990) 
! Acquiring university/academic 
knowledge 
! Alliances 
! Out-licensing 
! Discovery Research  - 
Specific diseases, structure 
based drug design, small 
molecules 
 
Classical 
Biotechnology Firms 
– Focus on 
Genomics, Platform 
Technologies 
3rd Wave  (1991 - 2000s) 
! Acquiring university/academic 
knowledge 
! Alliances 
! Development of platform tools 
and technologies 
! Out-licensing 
! Discovery Research  - 
Genomics 
 
Large Integrated 
Firms - 
! Clinical development 
! In-licensing 
! Marketing/Distribution 
! Regulatory Affairs 
                                            
15 Definition from Pisano, 2006 
 
73 
Business Model Time Period Generally Understood Capabilities 
! Research (Discovery) 
The idea of ‘core competencies’ was expounded by Prahalad and Hamel in 
1990 when they discussed the idea that it was a corporation’s ability to 
identify, realise and nurture core competencies and then capitalise on those 
specific competencies that fostered success (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
The terms core competencies, competencies (in general) and capabilities are 
used interchangeably. A competence is essentially a skill or strength in a 
particular area (usually in production or a technology) that a company 
possesses that allows it to successfully pursue its strategy and goals.  Core 
competencies should provide potential access to a wide variety of markets, 
make a significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end 
product and be difficult to imitate (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Most 
importantly, the authors proposed that companies needed to understand 
their competencies and capabilities in order to then successfully capitalise on 
these capabilities.  
Later literature has expanded on the notion of competencies and capabilities. 
Teece and Pisano noted that competences and capabilities are intriguing 
assets as they typically must be built because they cannot be bought (Teece 
and Pisano, 1994). Their discussion on ‘dynamic capabilities’ in particular 
expounded the view that firm competencies/capabilities must be responsive 
and adaptable if the firm is to survive in a rapidly changing environment. It is 
important for the context of this research to illustrate these perceived 
competencies and capabilities of the classical biotechnology firms as they 
are currently understood because it provides a foundation and a potential 
contrast to any changes that might become apparent from the research 
findings pertaining to a new type of firm (NRDO).  For the classical 
biotechnology companies during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, these 
competencies included the ability to obtain technologies from academic 
settings, create an environment to foster research and discovery of new 
products and to work with large companies on development (alliances and 
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out-licensing). However, it is possible that changes in the relative importance 
of these competencies/capabilities may be evident.   
However, changes to traditional firms have been described in the trade 
literature in relation to how these firms’ conduct product discovery and 
development. Firms who pursue ‘internal scientific endeavours’ may also in-
license products (Hodgson, 2004; McCook, 2005; Silverman, 2006). In other 
words, small firms who discover their own products may also still supplement 
their pipeline with external products from other companies despite their own 
internal capabilities. The key point is that these firms will buy in other firms’ 
products which have been discovered elsewhere. They are no longer solely 
reliant on internally generated drugs. While this well discussed ‘open 
innovation’ approach will not be new to many firms in different industries, it 
has not been discussed in terms of the small traditional classical 
biotechnology firm as an intermediate technology (drug candidates in this 
case) ‘purchaser’ in the pharmaceutical sector. This type of behaviour was 
always discussed and observed in terms of the large firm. But this evidence 
points to the fact that the roles may be changing and critically, that changes 
have occurred in the markets for technology, as discussed below. 
However, it has been suggested in the trade literature that the existence of a 
new type of firm has invoked a positive response from financiers and thus 
provokes speculation that this firm has evolved partly in response to financial 
pressures. These will be financial pressures that are present in the system 
and these have been summarily mentioned by McKelvey and discussed 
more by Pisano however, discussion of a ‘no research development only’ 
firm model has not taken place (Pisano, 2006; McKelvey, 2008). The actual 
issues relating to the influence of finance are discussed more below but 
there may also be consequences for the traditional classical biotechnology 
firm who may have had to adapt their activities due to the same pressures. 
As a result, this suggests that an important change in the activities of 
traditional classical biotechnology companies may also be taking place but 
again, no definitive discussion nor systematic empirical evidence exists that 
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can deny or support this claim despite speculation present in the trade 
literature. 
The proposed change in the division of labour is important to acknowledge 
and thus empirically prove. The small traditional classical biotechnology firm 
(as discussed in the previous chapter) has consistently been described as a 
research intensive organisation that discovers products and in some cases 
goes on to develop them. All small firms in the pharmaceutical drug 
development sector, usually under the banner of the classical biotechnology 
firm, have been ‘credited’ with being the lifeblood of discovery of new 
products. Conversely, the role of the large firm has always been 
acknowledged as the ‘buyer’ and developer of these products discovered by 
these small research intensive firms. These research activities conducted by 
small firms were considered of paramount importance to the dissemination 
and generation of new knowledge in the sector. What has been described 
here with respect to the NRDO firm turns things around. NRDO firms focus 
specifically on development and not discovery. The extent to which these 
firms exist is now a key question for the sector moving forward. The 
existence of a new firm as well as proving and understanding changes to 
existing firms has to be explained.  
3.2.3. Summary 
Overall, this evidence related to new firms as well as changes to traditional 
classical biotechnology firms illustrates a gap in the academic literature.   
These so called ‘no research development only’ (NRDO) companies appear 
not to have drug discovery capabilities of their own. The sector literature 
speculated that this approach may have emerged as a new business model 
(Silverman, 2006; McCook, 2005; Hodgson, 2004).  This evidence also 
suggests important changes in the activities of existing firms, the traditional 
discovery and development (DD) firm. These important observations indicate 
a change in the division of labour in the sector that warrants empirical 
investigation due to an apparent gap in the current academic literature.  
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3.3. Surplus of Unexploited Knowledge and Changes in the 
Division of Labour  
The evidence above with reference to explaining potential changes in the 
division of labour points to the influence of finance on these important 
changes that are taking place. However, there is a complementary aspect to 
this explanation that also represents a gap in the current literature and this is 
related to the current level or ‘surplus’ of unexploited knowledge in the 
sector. As just discussed, the firm’s need for finance and conversely the 
financier’s need for a return on investment is potentially influencing the 
changing division of labour in the form of a new type of firm focused on 
downstream exploitation activities. But these changes are predicated on one 
important aspect: The ability to obtain products from other firms that are in an 
advanced stage of development. Therefore, as in the case of the NRDO firm, 
there has to be products available that other firms are willing to sell to these 
firms in order for them to exist in the first place. As they have no research 
capabilities, they buy in drug candidates from other firms who have decided 
not to develop these particular drug candidates.  
Surplus, by its very definition, implies that there is extra available, or excess 
of something. In this case, the point is that there are more drug candidates 
being generated by firms than they can develop and thus they are willing to 
sell this ‘surplus’ to other firms for development. But the origin of this surplus 
must be examined for the purposes of supporting this argument. A number of 
important and interlinking developments in biology, chemistry, process 
technologies and informatics resulted in the development of industrialised 
high-throughput screening (HTS) platforms (Nightingale, 2000). Together, 
these enabled generation and rapid screening of extensive chemical libraries 
against a greater number of new targets created by significant 
advancements in fields such as genomics and information technology 
(Hopkins et al, 2007). The new developments also created a more significant 
focus on quantity over quality (Hopkins et al, 2007; Pisano, 2006).  
As a result, a larger number of potentially clinically active compounds have 
been identified. This is reflected in changes in the total number of patents 
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granted in the US16 over the period 1978–2002 (these are patents for 
therapeutically active compounds). Essentially, this can be used as an 
indicator of the number of compounds considered ‘attractive enough to 
warrant patent protection, but not necessarily viable enough to enter 
development’ (Hopkins et al 2007). During this period, the number of patents 
rose from less than 2,500 in 1978 to over 20,000 in 2003 representing an 
800% increase in the number of patented compounds, however, the most 
significant increase has taken place over the last 10 years. This is the result 
of a significant increase in exploration that was a characteristic feature of 
both the second and particularly third epochs of the sector. 
This evidence in Chapter Two discussed the move by pharmaceutical 
incumbents to acquire competencies in the new technologies (not just 
biotechnologies). These firms had the financial ability to assimilate these new 
developments in discovery technologies and therefore generate many new 
compounds (Gambardella, 1995). It is therefore feasible that many 
compounds may have been developed but not all were deemed worthy of 
further development through human clinical trials thus creating a surplus of 
unexploited knowledge in the form of drug candidates. Yet this has not been 
discussed in any detail by authors in this field. A direct reference in 
Mazzucato and Dosi provides a tenuous key link between this argument for a 
surplus of unexploited knowledge (and the follow on assumption that this 
knowledge is then sold) as they refer to the actual sale of these ‘surplus’ 
products by large firms (Mazzucato and Dosi, 2006). The question that then 
arises is why these products are being traded. It points to a ‘surplus’ of 
potentially useful knowledge that instinctively firms should hold on to and yet 
they are not.  
This knowledge represents more opportunities than firms can or are willing to 
develop into viable drug candidates themselves and this has profound 
consequences for the sector as a whole. This represents an interesting line 
of inquiry simply because most discussions of knowledge in this sector are 
                                            
16 This was in patent classes 424 and 514 for potentially therapeutically active compounds 
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about newly discovered knowledge that is bought by large firms but no real 
discussion of the potential for surplus unexploited knowledge has taken 
place.  The question then becomes what do firms do with this knowledge. 
Trade in products and knowledge in this sector is by no means a new 
development, as discussed in Chapter Two. However, the products being 
traded were usually newly discovered drug candidates generated by small 
classical biotechnology firms. The products in question here that are being 
bought by small firms are either being generated by other small firms or large 
firms.   
However, this also has consequences for the overall balance of exploration 
and exploitation in the sector and suggests that a surplus of unexploited 
knowledge may mean that the overall stock of knowledge from exploratory 
activities may have reached a critical mass. The balance may be shifting 
towards exploitation as firms try to maximise value from the vast stock of 
knowledge that already exists which would also explain the changing division 
of labour. The argument that the surplus of unexploited knowledge may 
partly help to explain why a new division of labour has taken place becomes 
more compelling when placed in the context of the financial argument. These 
two explanations become interrelated. A division of labour may have arisen 
because of the existence of excess knowledge/products in the system but 
equally, pressure for better financial performance may have driven the trade 
of these products. These associations and arguments have not been 
previously made in the academic literature surrounding this sector and 
represent a new line of inquiry that propels this research.  
3.4. The Role of Finance and Changes in the Division of 
Labour 
This research proposes that there is further evidence to suggest that new 
firms may be emerging that are not focused on research and some firms may 
be changing their business model and cutting back on the development of 
early stage technologies (such as those that may be useful in discovering 
new drugs). This is therefore a change in the currently understood division of 
labour that has been extensively discussed and analysed. However, this 
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research seeks to go a step further and propose that this is closely related to 
financial issues and pressures from capital markets. While the literature has 
focused on the issue of overall firm survival and the need to finance, 
particularly for young firms, the particular focus here is linking the discussion 
on finance and capital markets to new types of firms and thus the changing 
division of labour. This implies that VC firms, the public stock markets and 
financing from large firms have a role to play in the changing division of 
labour which needs to be understood in greater detail.   However, this 
research also proposes that the changes in the division of labour are a result 
of a surplus of unexploited knowledge and that the role of finance in 
conjunction with this are two important explanatory factors for the changes. It 
is not suggested that these two factors are the only reasons that may explain 
the changing division of labour but it is proposed that these two factors are 
interrelated and associated with a changing division of labour.  
As noted in the previous chapter, it has been possible for smaller firms to 
concentrate on some parts of the drug development process. In this sense, 
the division of labour was around the discovery of products which was 
undertaken by new small firms (classical biotechnology firms) that entered 
the sector. However, this concentration on one part of the drug development 
continuum was also a reflection of the extensive financial requirements that 
the full research and development cycle of human therapeutic product 
development requires. Therefore, it could be argued that the division of 
labour that has already taken place has potentially been influenced by the 
limitations of the availability and willingness of capital to fund the entire 
development process. However, this explicit link has not been made in the 
academic literature.  
Following on from this theory, this research proposes that there are 
fundamental links between the more recent developments in terms of the 
emergence of NRDO firms (and therefore the division of labour) and capital 
markets. This is based on a couple of observations. The first is that there is 
some evidence to suggest that the current business model that is evident 
(that of the classical biotechnology firm) is not sustainable in its current form 
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due to disappointing performance overall throughout the third epoch of the 
sector (Pisano, 2006; McKelvey, 2008). This disappointing performance 
ultimately challenges the financial models that had been hitherto dominant in 
the sector. It is therefore possible that there is now less demand for 
discovery stage assets and results and increasing demands for drugs that 
are more developed with better defined safety and efficacy profiles.   In terms 
of the response of capital markets, the evidence has shown that the IPO 
market has decreased considerably for firms in this sector (Lerner et al, 
2003) and this in turn compromises the exit strategy for VCs and thus their 
reason to invest.  
The trade literature has already made reference to these links in an explicit 
manner and suggests that these sorts of changes to firms are warranted to 
ensure the flow of capital resources into the firm (Silverman, 2006; McCook, 
2005). This literature makes it clear that the requirements for speedy product 
development and profitability can prove extremely difficult for companies in 
the drug development business and this may account for further changes in 
the division of labour – NRDO firms and existing firms buying in more 
advanced drug products. Ultimately, buying in products that have already 
passed through almost 7 years of discovery and pre-clinical testing reduces 
the time it will take to become closer to the market and thus potential sale of 
the product. This is the allure of this type of firm for investors. These firms 
should not take as long to develop products for sale or license thus providing 
a quicker return for investors. 
While it has been acknowledged that finance is important for firm growth, 
there has been limited discussion of finance (and the resulting corporate 
governance) and how it may exert an influence on changes to firms and their 
core activities which would seem to be a large gap in the innovation 
literature. However, some key authors on this sector have made reference to 
the role of financial pressures facing firms and discussed changes to the 
core activities of firms. As noted earlier, Pisano has discussed the poor 
performance of smaller firms in this sector and has explicitly stated that the 
current business model of the traditional classical biotechnology firm is not 
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sustainable. The overall performance of small firms in the sector has not 
been ‘particularly healthy’ providing only ‘lacklustre rewards for investors’ 
(Pisano, 2006). McKelvey also noted that firms will be more diverse in 
response to serious problems of profitability as well as changing 
technologies, medical knowledge and demand. But she also notes that this is 
a combination of factors that together, will exert pressures on firms to adapt 
and change (McKelvey, 2008).  
However, there is another discussion related to the ‘biotechnology revolution’ 
and the disappointing impact of advances made in the sector that may also 
provide an important context for this argument. Hopkins et al (among others 
including Nightingale and Martin, 2004 and Arundel and Mintzes, 2004) 
reviewed the ‘biotech revolution’ and concluded that the translation of 
advances in biosciences into new technology has been far more difficult, 
costly and time consuming than has been widely promoted (Hopkins et al, 
2007). This in turn has impacted expectations of both governments and 
financiers who have been widely led to believe that the developments in 
biosciences would rapidly transform pharmaceutical innovation when in fact 
this has yet to occur (Hopkins et al, 2007). It may therefore form part of the 
explanation for the division of labour as it relates to finance. While this 
discussion has not been previously associated with any claims related to this 
new proposed division of labour, it does provide a potentially powerful 
argument in support of these claims.  
It is therefore possible that this slow progress may have resulted in changes 
in some investors’ behaviour who may have already responded to the 
unfulfilled promises and ultimately slow performance and disappointing 
impact of the new technologies. Significant investments have already been 
made and 35 years later many of these have not resulted in the returns that 
were promised because the so called ‘revolution’ is in fact a slower 
incremental pattern of technological change and ‘creative accumulation’ 
(Hopkins et al, 2007). Investor response to this disappointing performance 
may now be manifested as a change in the investment model to fund firms 
that are following a different business model, i.e., the NRDO business model 
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with no scientific/exploratory research taking place but instead the focus is 
on exploitation and product development.  
When this view is taken in conjunction with the claims made with respect to 
the existence of the NRDO firm and why it may have emerged, the role of 
finance would seem to warrant greater attention as a potential explanatory 
factor for the new division of labour in this sector. As technology appears to 
be proceeding at a slower and continually unpredictable pace, more 
investors may now, more than ever, (35-40 years after the discoveries made 
in the 1970s) be wary of the potential success rate as well as the length of 
time required for classical biotechnology companies to become profitable 
through the discovery and development of their own products. In addition, 
the key discussions on how business models have changed in the trade 
literature as well as academic references to why they will need to change 
provides an important platform for this research. Together, these claims 
related to poor performance of firms and of the sector as a whole support the 
need to further examine the potentially more recent changes to the division 
of labour that have taken place and more specifically, why they have taken 
place. The pharmaceutical sector provides an excellent case study of how 
finance influences firms because of the financial requirements and difficulties 
associated with product development. This research therefore seeks to 
understand in greater detail the interaction of finance, a surplus of 
unexploited knowledge and changes to the division of labour. 
3.5. Changes in the Markets for Technology  
An excellent, succinct description of the markets for technology in the 
pharmaceutical sector has been provided by Arora et al who remark that 
‘…we see a market for technology with a well defined division of innovative 
labour, involving DBFs (dedicated biotechnology firms) as technology 
suppliers and established pharmaceutical and chemical companies as 
buyers.’ (Arora et al 2001). This also implies a close association between all 
of the three issues discussed above: the division of labour, the surplus of 
unexploited knowledge and finance. However, given the evidence discussed 
above (the division of labour and a new type of firm as well as the surplus of 
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unexploited knowledge), part of the purpose for this research has to 
understand how the existing market relationships have actually become 
more complicated because the division of labour has changed and the 
exchange of products and knowledge. The previous chapter provided the 
detail around these markets for technology and how and why they had 
arisen. Most importantly the key flows/sale of information/products in the 
sector was modelled. However, the discussion in the previous three sections 
in this chapter has pointed out that there is evidence to suggest changes in 
the sector in the division of labour, changes in the level of unexploited 
knowledge and the importance of finance in these issues. One remaining 
factor will complete these argument and this is that markets for technology 
have changed and become more complex. It must be pointed out that 
changes in the markets for technology will impact the changing division of 
labour and enable the changing division of labour but it in turn will be 
impacted by the division of labour, knowledge and finance. 
This research proposes that changes in the markets for technology lie in 
changes in the flows of technology/products and changes in the volume of 
these flows. The markets for technology must have become more complex 
than previously described if there is a changing division of labour and a 
surplus of unexploited knowledge. Therefore, a gap in knowledge of the 
sector exists that must be updated. Changes in the flows of knowledge will 
be connected to the role of the new NRDO firm, the changing role of the 
existing traditional classical biotechnology firm and the changing role of the 
large firm as discussed above. It has been proposed that the new NRDO firm 
is essentially a buyer of products. This represents a new ‘player’ in the 
markets that is not currently reflected (nor validated yet) but this research 
seeks to prove this changing complexity. The complexity lies in the fact that 
existing flows of technology still hold true but new flows of 
technology/products and new players must be added to the model. If there is 
a surplus of unexploited knowledge, as is proposed by this research, then 
this explains the changes in the flows of technology and products and 
illustrates a changing role of large firms as suppliers of these products. 
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Although much has been written about the transfer of knowledge from small 
biopharmaceutical firms to larger vertically integrated firms, this transfer of 
products and knowledge from large firms to small firms has not been as well 
discussed and is only dealt with on the surface in terms of the academic 
literature. According to Mazzucato and Dosi, larger fully integrated 
companies are now more than ever, making a thorough evaluation of their 
technology portfolio, and therefore considering licensing as a 
commercialisation strategy to generate additional revenue at almost no 
additional cost (Mazzucato and Dosi, 2006). This is supported by Kollmer 
and Dowling in their licensing study of US firms who found that fully 
integrated firms out-license non-core products due to a misfit with their 
overall strategy before the marketing and sales phase (Kollmer and Dowling, 
2004) providing the intellectual assets to these firms. The extent of licensing 
activities that are occurring in the opposite direction (larger vertically 
integrated companies to smaller companies) is not discussed to any extent in 
the pharmaceutical sector literature and determining the extent of this activity 
creates an opportunity for further research. Licensing is an important 
knowledge and technology acquisition channel for a company, especially 
those who are fully integrated (Kollmer and Dowling, 2004) and has become 
a well established strategy in which to achieve a transfer of knowledge. 
There are existing mechanisms set up by which relationships are managed 
with small firms so it is possible that large firms are utilising this experience 
or capability to sell their products. 
3.6. The Need for Further Empirical Research 
The previous four sections above have discussed key areas for further study 
that form the basis for this thesis. The model below, Figure 5, is a 
diagrammatic representation of the interplay of these arguments. 
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Figure 5. Association of all Factors – The Division of Labour - Surplus 
of Unexploited Knowledge - Finance - Markets for Technology 
 
Part of the purpose of this research is to develop a novel analytical 
framework which combines insights from several bodies of knowledge 
(innovation literature, finance literature, trade literature) to help make sense 
of the changes occurring in the sector. This representation of the four areas 
as discussed is intended to show the associations between these various 
aspects of the research based on the evidence presented above. Each of the 
four areas can now be said to represent four key dimensions that are closely 
related and impact each other. Each dimension is impacted by and impacts 
upon the other illustrated by the presence of two way arrows between each 
dimension. These relationships are not unidirectional and the aim of this 
model is to clearly show that all four areas are interrelated. This research will 
aim to analyse these associations in greater detail. Given the dynamic nature 
of the sector, it would seem necessary to ensure that an up to date 
understanding of the changes to the sector is undertaken.  
 
86 
3.7. Summary 
This research proposes four important claims: 
1 A changing division of labour 
a A new type of firm has emerged – the No Research Development 
Only (NRDO) firm 
b Fundamental changes to the business models of existing firms 
have taken place 
2 A surplus of unexploited knowledge exists in the sector and forms a 
key explanation for these changes and is explained by other changes 
3 The interplay of finance on the changing division of labour is 
significant and forms part of the explanation for these changes 
4 There have been significant changes to the markets for technology 
impacted by (and impacting upon) the changing division of labour, 
finance and the surplus of unexploited knowledge 
The basis for these claims has been discussed above. As there is some 
evidence to suggest that a new firm exists, this has created an important 
academic research opportunity to examine the extent of the existence of this 
firm. It has been pointed out that serious problems exist with current 
business models in the sector where the returns to R&D investment have 
decreased (Pisano, 2006; McKelvey, 2008).  The evidence presented in the 
prior chapter indicates that firms in the pharmaceutical sector of drug 
development have evolved and will continue to evolve. Changing business 
models are crucial to the ongoing commercial viability of the sector and an 
economic inevitability. Now there may be another emerging firm, the No 
Research Development Only Firm. This business model is one where 
companies have no exploratory research capabilities in house and may be 
buying drugs from other companies to develop them. This is in marked 
contrast to the typical classical biotechnology business model suggesting 
that large pharmaceutical companies are becoming providers of potential 
new products. But changes in the classical biotechnology business model 
may also be evident as these firms also may buy in products for 
development. These developments influence a whole new pattern of 
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technology/knowledge exchange and thus the markets for technology.  
Taken together, it is hoped that research on these factors will provide the 
evidence required to ensure a thorough understanding of changes that have 
occurred in the sector and why. The following chapter discusses how the 
research strategy will aim to achieve these goals. 
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Chapter 4. Methodological Approach 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the pharmaceutical sector and discussed 
how the sector has evolved particularly focusing on the third epoch and the 
impact of biotechnology on the organisation of the sector.  The division of 
labour that has taken place with respect to the role of classical biotechnology 
firms was analysed and an important discussion related to the role of 
finance, knowledge and markets for technology was also presented. Chapter 
3 then presented the arguments for further changes in the sector with 
respect to the division of labour, the role of finance, a surplus of unexploited 
knowledge and markets for technology. Evidence was presented to provide a 
foundation for the claim that a new division of labour has taken place and 
that this is related to changes in the availability of knowledge well as financial 
considerations. Evidence for changing markets for technology was also 
discussed. The purpose of this chapter is to present the research questions 
and the associated methodological approach that was used to address these 
questions to provide a context and background for the choice of research 
methods.  
4.2. The Research Questions 
There were several important goals of this research. The first of which was 
the identification of a new type of firm and a corresponding division of labour. 
The evidence presented in Chapters two and three suggest that there may 
be a new division of labour in the sector. The analysis of the emergence and 
development of the classical biotechnology firm indicated changes to firms 
and their activities throughout the last several decades. The literature on 
industrial dynamics and evolutionary economic theories also provide strong 
evidence that changes in the division of labour can be expected. In addition, 
anecdotal evidence from the trade literature has suggested that a new type 
of firm exists, the NRDO firm, with distinct differences in its scope of activities 
in comparison to the much discussed classical biotechnology firm.  This firm 
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is focused on exploitation activities. The following key research question was 
identified as an important starting point for the research: 
1. What changes have occurred in the division of labour in the 
pharmaceutical sector?  
This question has been posed to understand whether or not there has been 
a change in the division of labour reflecting a change in the balance of 
exploration and exploitation in the sector. The trade literature also suggested 
more pervasive changes in the sector related to existing firms and so this 
question directs the research toward a number of specific questions that will 
be addressed including the following:  
!  Is there a new type of exploitation focused NRDO firm? 
!  What are their origins? 
!  What are the characteristics of this new type of firm? 
Evidence presented in Chapter three noted that there were changes to the 
Discovery and Development (DD firms) firms traditionally involved in 
exploration based discovery and to a limited extent in exploitation based drug 
development.  The anecdotal evidence suggested that DD firms were no 
longer solely relying on their own internal discovery efforts to populate their 
drug pipelines and sourcing drugs externally for development. Understanding 
the extent of this activity is also a primary goal of the research and so the 
following research questions are posed: 
!  Are DD firms also sourcing products externally for development? 
These four questions illustrate the need for a quantitative approach to 
ascertain the answers to these questions on a scale large enough to impart 
meaning to the results.    
The second part of the research goals was to ascertain (if a change was 
discovered) why these changes had occurred, hence a comparative case 
study methodology was the preferred methodology for this overall question of 
why changes have occurred. The literature presented in Chapter two and the 
evidence suggested in Chapter three pointed to a need to have a specific 
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focus on the role of a surplus of exploitation knowledge and capital markets 
both of which have played in important role in the prior division of labour. 
This framework was extended to understand the interaction of both of these 
factors on a new division of labour. The resulting overarching research 
questions are posed to understand the contextual situation that impacted the 
division of labour: 
2. What was the role of finance in the new division of labour? 
The role of finance and capital markets is questioned as part of this research 
because prior evidence from the literature and evidence from the trade 
literature suggest that this may have a significant role to play in the new 
division of labour.  
3. What was the role of a surplus of unexploited knowledge in the 
new division of labour? 
The role of new knowledge is clearly fundamental to the division of labour 
that has occurred in the sector to date as discussed in chapter two. However, 
it is not yet known what role a surplus of unexploited knowledge plays in the 
proposed new division of labour. This question is posed to ensure that the 
role of knowledge is adequately addressed in this research. The following 
questions will form part of the inquiry directed by questions 2 and 3: 
 
For NRDO firms: 
!  Why was the firm formed as an NRDO organisation? 
!  How have these NRDO firms developed? 
!  Why is this new type of firm emerging? E.g., What is prompting the formation of 
these types of firms? Is it related to firm origin, opportunity, finance? 
!  What factors are influencing the development trajectory of the NRDO firms? 
For DD firms:  
!  Why was the firm formed as a DD organisation? 
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!  How has it developed? 
!  Why did out source products externally? 
!  What factors are influencing the development trajectory? 
!  Why are these changes in strategy taking place within DD firms? What is influencing 
these changes?  
The role of the markets for technology have been discussed in Chapter two 
and the discussion in Chapter three has also illustrated that changes in the 
markets for technology can be expected. This research will examine these 
changes. The following question is proposed: 
4. What is the nature of changes in the markets for technology? 
The role of the different types of firms in the markets for technology will be 
examined to understand the nature of trade in intermediate technological 
inputs (Drug candidates) and knowledge and how that may have changed in 
response to the changing division of labour.  
4.3. Research Approach – Mixed Methods: Quantitative and 
Qualitative Methodologies 
Historically, distinctions have been made between these two broad 
descriptors (quantitative and qualitative) of the range methodological 
approaches that can be employed in social sciences research. This has 
generally been attributed to the proposition that each methodological type is 
associated with separate and unique paradigmatic perspectives that are not 
reconcilable (Reichardt and Cook, 1979). According to one observer, ‘the 
adherence to one paradigm as opposed to another predisposes one to view 
the world and the events within it in profoundly different ways’ (Rist, 1977).  
The broad distinctions can be described as follows: Quantitative methods 
have been described as ‘thin’, ‘narrow’ but ‘generalizable’ (McClintock and 
Greene, 1983). Examples of quantitative techniques include randomized and 
quasi-experiments, multivariate statistical analysis and sample surveys. The 
major benefits of quantitative research are generalisable results, reduction in 
bias etc. Formulated hypotheses can be tested through controlled 
experiments or statistical analysis.  In this respect this methodological 
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approach lends itself well to the initial questions that this research seeks to 
answer which concerns the extent of a division of labour in the sector. 
According to Reichardt and Cook, quantitative methods have been 
developed most directly for the task of verifying or confirming theories 
(Reichardt and Cook, 1979).  
Qualitative research, however, has been described as having a ‘long, 
distinguished and sometimes anguished history’ and many methods and 
approaches fall into this category (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). However, 
while qualitative research may encompass a wide range of approaches it can 
be broadly described as follows: qualitative research is a situated activity that 
locates the observer in the world and consists of a set of interpretive 
practices that make the world visible. It involves the studied use and 
collection of a variety of empirical materials – case studies, personal 
experience, introspection, life story, interviews to name but a few (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2003). It can yield data from which process theories (and richer 
explanations of how and why processes and outcomes occur) can be 
developed (Marcus and Robey, 1988). Qualitative strategies emphasise an 
interpretive approach that uses data to both pose and resolve research 
questions (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988). Once again, the benefits from the 
qualitative approach that seek to understand and explain research findings 
make it another suitable component of the research methodology. 
The goals of this research have meant that different types of questions form 
the basis of inquiry.  The questions that were asked fell into two categories 
as a result: Those that required a statistical approach to provide an 
acceptable set of answers and those that required a far more detailed and 
contextual analysis that were best answered through a qualitative approach.  
Ultimately, the nature of the questions has prompted the need for a dual 
approach that maximises the value inherent in both qualitative and 
quantitative methods.  According to Jick, ‘there is a distinct tradition in the 
literature on social science research methods that advocates the use of 
multiple methods’ (Jick, 1979). Also known as ‘convergent validation’ or 
‘triangulation’ (Campbell and Fiske, 1959; Webb 1966) the use of multiple 
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methods is believed to maximise the complementary nature of both 
approaches given the strengths and weaknesses inherent in single method 
designs (Jick, 1979). Jick also goes on to note that triangulation through 
mixed methods can allow the researcher to be more confident in his/her 
results (Jick, 1979). 
The approach used therefore, was twofold: Descriptive Statistics and Multiple 
Case Studies. A random sample of companies in the pharmaceutical sector 
was compiled that facilitated the identification of NRDO firms. The creation of 
a database of firm descriptors was generated to enable this interpretation. A 
qualitative multiple case study review combined with interviews of a selection 
of firms from that database was used to determine a. why changes in the 
division of labour occurred as well as b. what there the changes in the 
markets for technology and c. to understand the role of capital markets and 
knowledge in those changes. An important foundation of this research has 
been the ability to characterise a random sample of firms and examine why 
changes have occurred in this sector (drug development) and to look at this 
sample as a representative cohort of the sector based on the quantitative 
sampling approach. 
4.3.1. Quantitative Analysis – Determining the Existence of the 
NRDO Firm 
As discussed above, the approach of random sampling was determined to 
be most appropriate to the research questions that addressed the prevalence 
of the NRDO firm. Desk based research to create a database of a random 
sample of 100 companies in the US and the UK that captured data related to 
the firm was created. 
4.3.1.1. Data Collection - Cohort of Firms Selected 
Drug Development Firms With Ownership of Product(s) 
There are thousands of firms that are involved in the pharmaceutical sector 
and their businesses cover the full range of service provision and product 
development. Many companies call themselves biopharmaceutical firms or 
biotechnology firms and this covers a multitude of businesses and business 
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models. This sample is restricted in order to obtain a specific cohort as the 
focus is only on firms that owned and developed drug products for human 
therapeutic use, at the time of sampling. In other words companies that 
develop drugs/therapeutics that are placed inside the human body.  The 
anecdotal evidence presented in Chapter three indicates that the division of 
labour that is taking place specifically concerns firms involved in developing 
drugs hence this research intends to focus on this cohort only.  
Discovery and Development (DD) and No Research Development Only 
(NRDO) Firms 
McNamara and Baden-Fuller have characterised the sector’s R&D process 
into six stages while authors such as Pisano have characterised them even 
further into nine stages to accurately reflect the four different stages within 
the exploratory research and five stages of exploitation development and 
approval stages (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 1999; Pisano, 2006). The 
early stages of the process, patenting and preclinical trials can be 
understood primarily as the exploration phase of this R&D continuum 
(McNamara and Baden-Fuller 1999). Human clinical trials and the 
submission of the New Drug Application (NDA) represent the latter five 
stages of R&D and can be characterised as exploitation related activities.   
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Figure 6. The Drug Development Continuum  
 
Source: Pisano, 2006  
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Firms that are engaged specifically in drug development face a particularly 
unique product development, financial and regulatory environment.  The 
development of drugs for therapeutic human use is heavily regulated and the 
development pathway is particularly specific and costly. The product 
approval process for human health drug products is contingent on the 
conduct of a series of animal, clinical and manufacturing tests that 
demonstrate product safety and efficacy and are unique in their requirements 
for companies in this sector. This dramatically influences the product 
development process for firms involved in this sector: it can take between 8-
15 years to actually develop a product and bring it to market successfully. It 
is the strictness of the regulatory approval system that is a big factor 
influencing the strategic approach for firms in the human health drugs sector 
(Luukkenon, 2005; Pisano 2006) and an important reason for examining the 
firms that operate in this subsector as an exclusive cohort. Ultimately these 
firms face vastly different development times and costs than diagnostics 
firms, firms involved in developing platform technologies (that usually do not 
intend to develop therapeutic drugs) and service based firms that may 
provide other inputs to these human therapeutic product development firms. 
These firms do not face the same regulatory environment or challenges and 
there are many of these firms that are involved in the human therapeutics 
sector but cannot be analysed as part of this research because of these 
fundamental differences in their business. The focus of the research is on a 
division of labour that concerns drug development firms. In summary, for 
these reasons noted, all of the following types of firm have been excluded in 
this sample: 
• Firms that provide services only: 
o Firms providing drug discovery based services only including firms that 
generate targets or biomarkers. This includes those firms that may be 
developing therapeutics but have only reached micro stage 4 and 5 (Lead 
optimization and preclinical).  
o Contract Research Organisations (CROs) – These firms perform services 
only and usually these firms do not own products. 
• Diagnostics focused firms 
• Firms that are primarily involved in providing what would be classed as inputs into 
the therapeutic development process such as reagents, machinery, etc. 
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• Large incumbent pharmaceutical firms17 
Note on Large Firms 
The sample cohort outlined above technically includes large pharmaceutical 
firms. However, this research is trying to understand the division of labour 
and changes to small firms that have evolved during the third epoch.  
4.3.1.2. Data Collection – Sampling and Sources 
Population of Drug Development Firms 
It was determined that a random sample of 100 US and EU drug 
development firms would be identified for further analysis. The idea of 
randomness in sampling specifically in statistics, however, has definite 
significance closely related to probability (Kendall and Babington Smith, 
1938). A table of random sampling numbers was used to select 50 
appropriate firms from each of the total sector lists generated for the US and 
the EU. The main benefit of simple random sampling is that it guarantees 
that the sample chosen is representative of the population.  A random 
number table is a list of numbers. Numbers in the list are arranged so that 
each digit has no predictable relationship to the digits that preceded it or to 
the digits that followed it. In short, the digits are arranged randomly to allow 
the sampling of a population to also be random. This ensures that the 
statistical conclusions will be valid (www.stattrek.com).  The random 
sampling table of figures was generated based on the overall size of the 
master list and the required number of firms (100) utilising a random number 
table generating website (www.random.org). 
It was expected (based on the numbers below) that 100 firms would 
represent at least 20% of the entire segment: 
• In the 1999 Biotechnology Guide USA, 421 ‘Biopharmaceutical’ firms (all drug 
development human therapeutics firms) were identified (the latest available data).  
                                            
17 IMS Health data on the top 20 pharmaceutical companies by drug sales was utilised to distinguish 
large firms and remove them from the sample. www.imshealth.com 
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• Kasch and Dowling estimated that there were 114 human therapeutics firms that 
were publicly listed on the US Securities and Exchange Commission online 
database EDGAR in 2005. Their search was based in the Standard Industrial 
Classification Codes of 2834 (Pharmaceutical Preparations) and 2836 (Biological 
Products, excluding Diagnostic Substances). However, this only represents those 
firms who are publicly listed.  
By selecting 100 firms, it was also anticipated that a manageable range of 
firms could be selected and analysed from a qualitative perspective.  
Identifying and Selecting Drug Development Firms  
A range of information was gathered related to firm origin, products, finance 
and alliances (12 points of information in all – see Table 1 below) and 
descriptive statistics were identified and used to gather and organize 
information on the firms. While the technique of random sampling was used 
to select firms initially, a further review of each selected firm was necessary 
to ensure that the firms matched the criteria as discussed above in terms of 
their activities and to ensure that they were in fact drug development firms. 
This was done by first examining their overall company description available 
on their website (including a review of any description of their technology 
platform) and this was then verified in using the Thomson One or AMADEUS 
description. A review of their product pipeline and the stage of development 
of their drug products was then conducted to further ensure that they had 
drug products in development. Again, company websites together with 
analyst reports and descriptions found in databases such as the Thomson 
One and AMADEUS databases were also utilised to verify drug development 
activities.  
These firms represent three different types of companies: those that are 
focused on small molecule drugs; those companies involved in the 
development of biopharmaceuticals (recombinant products, vaccines and 
monoclonal antibodies for example) and those companies that use both 
approaches. This meant that the sample had to be restricted to only these 
companies operating in this segment of the sector. There is no definitive list 
of these companies available and so it was necessary to pull together a 
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unique list (Meta sample) utilising a range of sources to ensure that the 
entire list of possible companies operating in the segment could be compiled. 
This was done utilising data from a range of sources for both regions to try to 
compile a complete meta list of firms operating in the segment of drug 
development. The main sources were organisations of firms (www.bio.org, 
www.fiercebiotech.com. www.PhRMA.org www.biotechnology-europe.com) 
and lists provided by financial databases including Thomson One Banker 
and AMADEUS.  
Sector membership lists were utilised in addition to the financial databases 
because it was determined that the standard industrial classification (SIC) 
code was not perfect and it was possible that it may not include all relevant 
firms (Guenther and Rosman, 1994). However, SIC codes were also utilised 
to obtain a list of companies from these financial database sources. SIC 
codes are commonly used in empirical research to identify a homogenous 
cohort of firms that includes certain firms and excludes others. In other words 
the classification produces groupings of companies with homogenous 
members (Guenther and Rosman, 1994). The main three digit code (sector 
group for drugs) is 283. This included the following four digit codes for drug 
development:  2834 (Pharmaceutical Preparations) and 2836 (Biological 
Products, excluding Diagnostic Substances).  
Sources Utilised for Identification of Firms for the Sample 
AMADEUS 
This database is a comprehensive, pan-European database that contains 
financial information on over 11 million public and private companies in 41 
European countries. It combines data from over 30 specialist regional 
information providers.  Data available within AMADEUS includes including 
detailed financial reports, details on business activities and other information 
including subsidiaries, director and shareholding data. The list was created 
using SIC codes 2834 and 2836. 
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Sector Membership Lists 
Lists of firms from two industry membership sources were also used to 
compile the meta sample of firms and these include the following: 
www.biosector.org and www.fiercebiotech.com which were two of the largest 
publicly available lists of companies. BIO is the world's largest biotechnology 
organization, providing services for more than 1,200 members worldwide. 
BIO members are involved in the research and development of innovative 
healthcare in addition to agricultural, industrial and environmental 
biotechnology technologies. Corporate members range from entrepreneurial 
companies developing a first product to Fortune 100 multinationals. These 
lists also include traditional pharmaceutical companies reflecting the 
integration of biotechnology into the pharmaceutical sector. These lists were 
considered the largest publicly available without any required subscription.  
Thomson One Banker 
The sample of firms was supplemented by creating a dataset of firms using 
the Thomson One Banker website. This database provides detailed financial 
analysis for over 65,000 UK/European and Internationally quoted companies. 
Data includes up to 10 years annual filings, archived annual reports and 
company filings, share price/estimates data and international deals. The list 
of firms from this source was selected based on the SIC codes 2834 and 
2836.  
4.3.1.3. Data Gathering - Quantitative Research and Presentation  
These lists of firms were then put together for each region and the random 
sampling table was generated based on the list size. The random sampling 
tables were then used to select a firm from the list. However, a further 
process of verification then had to take place to ensure that the company 
was in fact a drug development organisation. This was done using a dual 
information review approach whereby verification was sought by looking at 
the company information provided by the financial database and the 
company website. 
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There were twelve data points (types of information) captured for each firm in 
the sample. Each of these data points were selected based on the available 
evidence in the literature that characterised small firms in the sector. Once a 
company had been selected for inclusion in the database, a process of 
information review then took place to capture the relevant information on the 
company (as listed below). The data and information collected also acted as 
a basis of comparison between any new type of firm identified and existing 
firms whose characteristics have been discussed and analysed.  The 
following table summarises the way the data was captured and when 
appropriate, why the data point was selected:  
 
Table 1. Categories and Descriptions of Data Collected on Firms 
Data Points Descriptions 
1. Technology platform 
(NRDO - Y/N) 
Used to capture the type of technology the 
firm is utilsing in the discovery and 
development of its products. This was also 
used to verify the presence of exploratory 
activities (discovery) in which the firm is 
engaged. 
! Used to determine if the firm is an 
NRDO or DD firm 
2. Age In order to determine if a new type of firm 
was emerging, the focus was ultimately on 
firms formed in the last 35 years.  This 
variable is important to try and understand 
when new types of firm were formed and 
the length of time over which firms have 
been forming. 
3. Origin of firm – Corporate 
Spin Out (CSO) or Public 
Institution 
(University/GOV) spin out 
(PSO) 
Captured to ascertain where the firm came 
from i.e., who formed it (public 
institution/academic spin out or corporate 
spinout), to try and understand the potential 
variety in the origins of firms. 
4. Place on the drug 
development continuum 
(NRDO – Y/N) 
To fully understand the range of activities 
that the firm is conducting by using the 
drug discovery - development continuum of 
activities. Again this helps to ascertain the 
nature of the firm and its core activities. So, 
if a firm is listed as Discovery – Phase II, 
this means that it presently conducts 
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Table 1. Categories and Descriptions of Data Collected on Firms 
Data Points Descriptions 
activities in drug discovery and in Phase II. 
This also indicates how far the firm has 
progressed along the drug discovery – 
development continuum.  
! Used to determine if the firm is an 
NRDO or DD firm 
5. Number of drug 
candidates - # 
This is the total number of drug candidates 
that the firm has indicated it has in 
preclinical development and clinical 
development. Products listed that are in 
any stage prior to pre-clinical development 
are not included.  
i.  Note: Products being tested for 
more than one indication are 
counted as one product. 
6. Number of marketed 
products 
This is the total number of products that the 
firm has on the market. Helpful to ascertain 
the extent to which companies are 
engaging in activities at this end of the drug 
development continuum. 
7. Current financial status – 
Public or Private  
To indicate if a firm was public or privately 
owned (stock market traded or not). Used 
to determine any further relationship 
between the firm type (NRDO/DD) and 
financial status. 
8. Finance history To understand the firm’s funding history 
and variety of sources of funding:  
! CV – Other firm took an equity stake 
in the firm 
! De – Firm used debt financing 
! Gr – includes government grants, 
other agencies such as 
Charities/Foundations and 
government contracts 
! PF- Firm founders used personal 
finance 
! VC – Venture Capital 
9. Revenue Stream Captures the firm’s other income gained 
from revenue generating activities 
including: 
! P – Product sales where the 
company retains the product rights 
! L – Revenue from licenses granted 
including royalties from licenses 
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Table 1. Categories and Descriptions of Data Collected on Firms 
Data Points Descriptions 
granted 
! R – Revenue for various research 
collaboration agreements. 
10. Did the firm in-license 
technology from non-
university sources?  
Y/N 
Given the focus on the division of labour 
and markets for technology and the 
anecdotal evidence presented in Chapter 
three, this activity was an important 
indicator to discern to what extent this 
activity was taking place.  
11. Does the firm have 
product development 
partnerships with other 
firms? 
Y/N 
Partnerships and alliances are a significant 
aspect of innovation strategies of firms in 
this sector so it was deemed interesting to 
ascertain to what extent the new type of 
firm was also engaging in this sort of 
activity.   
Note: partnerships for manufacturing or 
other enabling technologies are not 
counted. 
12. Did the company 
experience any major 
strategic changes?  
Y/N  
This important point indicated if a company 
has experienced any of the following: 
! Discovery Activities Discontinued  
! Discovery Activities Added  
! Development Activities Increased  
! Significant lay-offs 
! Buy out 
! Merger 
! Acquired other companies 
Methodology – Analyze and review press 
releases and analyst reports to discern 
major strategic changes. 
The range of data gathered has provided the basis for identifying and 
characterising the new type of NRDO firm and updating the characteristics of 
the existing DD firm. It was then possible to compare key differences and 
similarities between the two types of firms (who all share the common 
characteristic of having one or more products in clinical development which 
they own) from the data collected. 
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4.3.2. Qualitative Approach – Multiple Case Studies 
As discussed, the research questions were also focused on understanding 
important contextual issues to help answer the central questions of why 
changes in the division of labour may have taken place as well as changes in 
the markets for technology. A different type of information and insight was 
required that was not obtainable from an analysis solely on the information in 
the database. In addition, the results from the database of information in turn 
prompted more research questions that could only be answered from 
conducting in-depth studies on a further cross section of these firms. 
Therefore, it was determined that a series of case studies was the best way 
in which to obtain in depth information about a subset of firms. In general, 
case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are 
asked (Yin, 2003). In terms of the suitability of case studies over other 
methods such as surveys or histories, if the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (which 
are explanatory in nature, usually dealing with operational links that have to 
be traced over time) are being posed, case studies are an appropriate form 
of research (Yin, 2003). The form of the question (in this case ‘how and 
‘why’) should drive the appropriate research strategy. In order to answer the 
particular research questions posed for this research, neither surveys nor 
simple stand-alone ‘histories’ were adequate in addressing the type of 
feedback and information required to try to answer these questions.   
4.3.2.1. Case Study Selection 
The evidence from the multiple case design approach is often considered to 
be more compelling and the overall study is usually regarded as being more 
robust than simply focusing on one case study (Herriott and Firestone, 
1983). Selection of cases is an important aspect of building theory from case 
studies (Eisenhardt, 1989). Yin notes, ‘every case should serve a specific 
purpose within the overall scope of the inquiry’ and therefore the inclusion of 
a case within the design approach should follow a replication logic (Yin, 
2003). Cases chosen can attempt to duplicate the findings of the initial cases 
or they can look to identify diversity. Overall, the ability to look at a number of 
companies in detail was considered of primary importance for the study and 
for conducting a multiple case study approach.   
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The selection of firms for inclusion in this research was systematic and 
deliberate and the table below summarises the companies chosen and the 
key criteria used in the decision making and selection process. The case 
study firms were selected based on criteria to ensure that there was variety 
in the firms and their experiences. Firstly, it was determined that an equal 
number of DD and NRDO firms would be selected. In terms of DD firms, that 
meant a choice of four companies out of 73 firms and for the NRDO firms, 
the choice was four companies out of a possible 27 firms.  The next criterion 
pertained to the their location and therefore two US and two EU firms were 
required from the DD and NRDO firm lists. The next criterion was related to 
whether or not the firm had experienced any key changes in their business 
related to their focus on drug development or discovery. This is the 
‘Adaptation’ criterion and was interesting in relation to both types of firms and 
so two DD firms and two NRDO firms that had undergone changes in their 
business model were selected. Firm age was also considered and where 
possible, firms of differing ages were selected. Once eight firms were 
selected, they were contacted to determine if they would be willing to 
participate in interviews. Out of the initial eight chosen, the following firms did 
not respond:  
Table 2 Selected Case Study Firms - No response 
Case Study 
Firm Age Location Type of Firm 
Adaptation 
Y/N 
Elusys 11 USA DD N 
Minster 9 EU: UK NRDO N 
Silence 
Therapeutics 
15 EU: UK DD N 
Biotie 
Therapies 
15 EU: Finland DD N 
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The following sets of companies were thus identified and agreed to participate in the study:  
Table 3. NRDO Firms – Both Regions – No Changes to Firms 
Case Study 
Firm Age Location Type of Firm 
Adaptation 
Y/N 
Employees Turnover Products 
Actinium 
Pharmaceuticals 
17 USA NRDO N N/A N/A 3 Products 
Pre-clinical – 
Phase II 
PanGenetics 5 EU: The 
Netherlands 
NRDO N 11 $51m 
Venture 
Finance 
received 
4 Products 
Preclinical – 
Phase I 
Table 4. NRDO Firms – Both Regions – Changes to Firms 
Case Study 
Firm Age Location Type of Firm 
Adaptation 
Y/N 
Employees Turnover Products 
ViroPharma 15 USA NRDO Y 115 $135m 
(Income) 
4 Products 
Phase I - 
Marketing 
ProStrakan 15 EU: UK NRDO Y 259 £79m 
(Income) 
10 Products 
Phase II - 
Marketing 
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Table 5. DD Firms – Both Regions – Changes to Firms  
Case Study 
Firm Age Location 
Type of 
Firm 
Adaptation 
Y/N 
Employees Turnover Products 
Pharmacopeia 16 USA DD Y 169 $21.4m 
(Income) 
13 products 
Discovery  - 
Phase II 
Pharming 22 EU: The 
Netherlands 
DD Y 81 !1.1m 
(Income) 
4 Products – 
Discovery – 
Phase III 
Table 6. DD Firms – Both Regions – No Changes to Firms 
Case Study 
Firm Age Location 
Type of 
Firm 
Adaptation 
Y/N 
Employees Turnover Products 
Cara 6 USA DD N N/A $28.7M 
Venture 
Finance 
2 Products 
Discovery – 
Phase II 
Actelion 13 EU: 
Switzerland 
DD N 2,493 !1.4B Income 12 Products 
Discovery - 
Marketing 
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4.3.2.2. Data Collection 
Overall, the case study approach was utilised to gather, review, analyse, 
question and present a range of information obtained on eight firms. This 
was partly in order to understand the emergence of a new type of firm 
involved specifically in drug development and to understand changes to 
existing firms but also to look at how markets for technology were impacted. 
It was also important to examine firms that displayed a different focus on 
exploration and exploitation, some of which were stable but some of which 
were experiencing a process of change. This provided interesting diversity in 
the cases. This approach necessitated the use of several different sources of 
evidence without which an invaluable advantage of the multiple case study 
strategy will be lost (Yin, 2003). This included documentation, archival 
records, interviews and direct observation (which includes both primary and 
secondary data). The following sources were utilised in this process: 
Company Web Sites (Secondary Source) 
The exponential rise of the internet as a means of communication of 
important information about companies and the specifics of their business is 
indisputable. As a result, this was the first source of information reviewed. 
Many companies have several sections on their websites providing 
information in the following categories: 
!  Company Overview 
!  History and Origins 
!  Management Team 
!  Board of Directors 
!  R&D and Technology 
!  Pipeline and products 
!  Alliances and Partnerships 
!  Financial Information for Investors and Members of the Public 
!  Annual Reports and Other Publications 
!  News and Press Releases 
A review of all of the available information in every category was undertaken 
to put together initial profiles on each of the companies which was expanded 
based on other available information that was gathered over time.  
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Trade Literature (Secondary Source) 
As noted in the prior section on company websites, the rise in the availability 
of information from a range of sources via the internet has been exponential. 
This is particularly true in terms of the pharmaceutical industry where there is 
a proliferation of information available. This trade literature includes 
BioWorld, FierceBiotech, Nature Biotech, Pharmaceutical Executive, 
Pharmaceutical Technology, The Pink Sheet, Scripintelligence.com and 
various blogs including InVivo and Pharmalot. A range of business journals 
as well as various newspapers also report on the industry in particular, the 
Boston Globe, The Economist, the Financial Times, The New York Times, 
the Philadelphia Business Journal, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and the San 
Diego Union Tribune  
This literature provided some impetus for the initial thrust of this thesis as 
much as it provided some speculative insight into the companies, what they 
were doing and why. These sources and the information they offered 
provided some key insights into the reasons why companies were doing 
what they were doing and provided rich contextual background for the case 
studies and the interviews that followed. Speculation and information 
provided in the trade literature (but not always available in press releases or 
analyst reports) offered a way in which to initiate key discussions with some 
companies and verify information that was utilised from these sources. 
However, for the purposes of this research and indeed any research, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the types of information and literature 
reviewed. The distinction being made here is necessary because trade 
literature is not peer reviewed and in many cases nor is it a primary source 
hence the designation as a secondary source.  
Thomson Research – Secondary Source 
Thomson Research is a comprehensive data collection system that includes 
Investext®, Disclosure® and other industry leading databases. It offers a 
wide breadth of company research includes global filings, annual reports and 
market research studies. This was utilised to review analyst reports on each 
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of the companies and the appropriate/relevant information was then added to 
the company profiles.  
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – Secondary Source 
The SEC provides a free search system primarily for publicly listed 
companies on the US stock exchange utilising the EDGAR database. The 
laws and rules that govern the securities sector in the United States derive 
from the concept that all investors, whether large institutions or private 
individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment 
prior to buying and so long as they hold stock in that company. To achieve 
this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and 
other information to the public. This provides a common pool of knowledge 
for all investors to use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a 
particular stock. This promotes the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and 
accurate information can people make sound investment decisions 
(www.sec.gov). One of the most useful documents available to researchers 
is the public company ‘10K’ document which is an annual requirement 
whereby companies must publicise pertinent activities that have taken place. 
All 10Ks were reviewed for the publicly listed companies in this study to 
ensure that the relevant information was captured.  
Factiva – Secondary Source 
Factiva is a business information database covering about 10,000 business 
and news publications, many in full text, including business magazines, trade 
journals, newspapers, newswires, media programs and company stock 
reports. This provides a valuable central source of articles on companies. A 
search for each company was also conducted using this database to ensure 
pertinent information about the company was captured.  
Google – Secondary Source 
With the advent of the 'read/write web' - Web 2.0 (Achterman, 2006), 
applications such as the Google suite and Wikipedia have become the 
standard service for information seekers and creators. Google indexes 
billions of web pages so that users can search for the information they desire 
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through the use of keywords and operators. According to Google, they have 
increased both size and freshness in recent months indexing more quality 
content. Google is arguably the fastest and most effective search engine and 
is useful when used as an adjunct to other forms of research to ensure that 
any additional information that may be contained in other sources not noted 
above can be accessed. A search for each of the firms was conducted to 
ensure that any additional information relevant to the company and the 
profiles being created was captured. 
4.3.2.3. Semi Structured Interviews 
The success of this research is also rooted in understanding why changes 
are taking place with respect to small firm development and how these are 
influenced by other factors such as capital markets and the source of 
knowledge. Through analysing these firm development trajectories, these 
influences can be reviewed and the critical questions asked – is this the case 
and why?  The need to have a longitudinal view of the company and its key 
milestones in terms of origin, business model, finance and product 
development strategy is necessary to support this goal. A valuable way in 
which to achieve these goals is through a related set of insights from its 
executives to capture the rationale behind why certain decisions were made 
and why events took place the way they did from the firm’s perspective. 
Miller and Glassner argue that ultimately, information about social worlds is 
achievable though in-depth interviewing and that it is possible to achieve 
authentic accounts (Miller and Glassner, 2004). Yin notes that ‘well informed 
respondents can provide important insights into a situation (Yin, 2003). The 
type of knowledge that was obtained from interviews as part of this approach 
would not have been obtainable from information gathered from secondary 
sources alone because what was required from the interview approach was 
insight.  
While the case study approach allowed more information to be gathered with 
respect to various details, this approach was not just about gathering more 
detail. Insight into why firms made the decisions they did and what 
specifically prompted those decisions was a key output that was required 
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from this research and the only way to gain that type of insight was through 
case studies with interviews. In addition, it was necessary to gain access to 
the top executives who would be privy to the decision-making processes in 
effect at the firm and thus the influences on various decisions that were 
made.  The following interviewees participated in the research: 
Table 7. Participants in Company Interviews 
Company Name Title 
Actinium Howard Wachtler! CEO 
Actelion Walter Fischli Former Founder and 
VP 
Cara Derek Chalmers CEO 
PanGenetics Kevin Johnson CEO and VC Partner 
Pharming Rienk Pypstra VP R&D 
Pharmacopeia David Kimball VP R&D 
ProStrakan Nigel Atherton VP R&D 
ViroPharma Tom Doyle VP Strategy 
4.3.2.4. Further Interview with GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 
The evidence from the database and the case studies indicated a very 
interesting issue with respect to the behaviour of large firms. The findings 
illustrated what appeared to be extensive out-licensing activities and spin out 
activities being undertaken by large firms who were exercising options to 
trade or spin out products in the form of drug candidates to small firms. It 
was decided to conduct an interview with a representative from a large firm 
to understand more about these findings. The individual selected was a 
director of the firm in drug discovery transactions. The remit of this group 
was not only to bring in products but to sell products also. The following key 
questions were asked at the interview:  
1. Discuss the role of portfolio management at GSK 
2. When did the company start out-licensing? 
3. Why did the company start out-licensing? 
4. Why is the firm cutting back on its work in certain therapeutic areas? 
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5. How does the firm decide between a spin out or out-licensing a 
particular drug?  
4.4. Evaluation of the Research Methodology 
The purpose of this research was to ascertain the emergence of a new firm 
(and thus a new division of labour), understand the reasons why this has 
happened as well as characterise the changes in markets for technology. 
The research approach was a mixed methods approach utilising quantitative 
methods to fulfil the first part of the research objectives and qualitative 
methods to fulfil the latter research objectives. However, the application of 
both of these methodologies involved a substantial amount of work. A great 
deal of data was collected on 100 firms and then further detailed research 
was conducted on the eight case study firms. 
4.4.1. Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods 
The approach to constructing a database of information on firms was a 
classic attempt to address both the limitations of quantitative and qualitative 
research approaches. It involved the collection of over 1,500 pieces of data 
and information about firms. During this process a variety of sources were 
consulted as discussed. The use of a survey may have somewhat reduced 
the data collection required by the author however, the concerns were that 
the response rate would be poor and that the quality of information received 
back from firms would be substandard and incomplete. There was the added 
concern that information would have to be double checked, resulting in more 
work overall. While the process was extremely time consuming, it was a 
success providing a richly detailed picture of a range of firms operating in the 
sector. 
The production of multiple case studies was also excessively time 
consuming and the constant concern that there was more information 
needed was always present. So much data on the firms was reviewed to try 
to create a complete picture in relation to the firm and its activities (in line 
with recommendations in the methodology literature) and again, some of this 
information was conflicting which then involved an iterative process of trying 
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to uncover which source was correct. This information gathering exercise 
was necessary prior to every interview in order to ensure that certain points 
of information could be verified and also to ensure that the various 
information provided by respondents could be corroborated as far as 
possible through the available data. While the use of multiple case studies is 
very valuable, the amount of effort required to duplicate the information 
gathered for more than one firm was extremely daunting. 
4.4.2. Issues With Previous Research Samples – Focus on ‘Biotech’ 
Firms 
The specific sectoral characteristics (high costs, length of development time 
and regulatory framework) make the study of the how these firms develop 
products in this sector particularly interesting (Bertoni et al, 2004; Mazzucato 
and Dosi, 2006; Pisano, 2006;  McKelvey 2008). Yet much of the analysis 
and discussion concerning this sector has been conducted on a collective 
group of firms operating in a range of industries that together make up what 
has been traditionally been known as the biotechnology sector which is 
problematic. Biotechnology can no longer be described as a sector because 
it refers more to a set of technologies that profoundly affect a range of 
existing industries including the pharmaceutical sector (Powell et al, 1996; 
Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). Much of the literature does not single out this 
particular sector for analysis in its own right despite the important evidence 
as noted above, that would seem to point to the necessity of this type of 
cohort analysis. This research seeks to address this issue by focusing on 
companies in drug discovery and development.  
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Chapter 5. Evidence for the Changing Division of Labour and 
Markets for Technology 
5.1. Introduction 
An examination of the existence and prevalence of a new type of No 
Research Development Only (NRDO) firm in both the US and the EU and 
thus a new division of labour was a major driver for this research.  A strategy 
was devised to distinguish firms based on the presence of exploratory (early 
stage research products prior to pre-clinical development in animals) 
activities and the presence of an identifiable technology platform. This was a 
way to distinguish firm activities based on their exploration/exploitation 
orientation. Two databases of firms were initially created, one database for 
each region. These databases were then combined when the same split of 
NRDO and DD firms was determined for each region. In order to be selected, 
a firm had to have a least one product in the clinical development stage and 
to have ownership of that product. Each database captured the same 
specific set of variables that have been analysed in this chapter related to 
firm origin, pipeline, finance, trade of products and alliances.  
5.2. Evolution of the Sector – A New Type of Firm and a New 
Division of Labour 
It was apparent that there was a key difference between the firms in the 
sample reinforcing anecdotal evidence from the trade literature: Not all firms 
had activities in discovery (evidenced by the fact that they had no potential 
products that were in these early stages) nor an exploratory technological 
platform pointing to the absence of product generating exploration activities.  
These key differences enabled the identification of a new type of firm and 
ultimately a new division of labour - The NRDO firm. This firm does not 
conduct any early stage exploratory/research/discovery activities to discover 
its own drug products. Previous studies related to drug development firms 
have primarily indicated two overall types of firms: Fully integrated large 
pharmaceutical firms and classical biotechnology firms (it should be noted 
that discovery only firms have historically been included in this overall 
category but not sampled in this study as discussed). This research, 
 
116 
however, introduces another specific type of firm: the No Research 
Development Only (NRDO) firm. The newly identified NRDO firms represent 
27 % of the firms sampled which was unexpected. The sample can be 
divided as follows: 
Table 8. Summary of Major Types of Firms in the Sample 
Number of 
Firms Type of Firm 
US EU 
ALL 
Discovery and Development 70% (35) 
76% 
(38) 73% 
No Research Development Only  30% (15) 
24% 
(12) 27% 
The NRDO firm and how its activities map onto the drug development cycle 
relative to the other major types of business models of firms is illustrated 
using the drug development continuum, in Figure 77. 
NRDO firms do not have a business model based on a technological 
platform that would allow them to discover their own products or work on 
exploratory activities around early stage research related to discovering 
drugs. This was a surprising finding given that the literature on these 
companies and the development of this sector clearly discuses the research 
intensive nature of these small types of (hitherto classical biotechnology) 
firms. As noted above, one of the key differentiating facts in describing the 
small firms present in this sector and their business models is the presence 
of ‘discovery’ activities within the firm. These activities can be described as 
exploration-based activities (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; 
McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 1999; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). They 
are generally resource intensive and will have a profound impact on the 
ability of the firm to develop products for its pipeline. This differentiating 
characteristic of the NRDO firms marks a key difference in the business 
models of these firms and a further notable change in the division of labour. 
However, it also follows that if these types of small firms are not generating 
products they are acquiring them from other firms. This indicates a change in 
the markets for technology.  
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Table 5. DD Firms – Both Regions – Changes to Firms  
Case Study 
Firm Age Location 
Type of 
Firm 
Adaptation 
Y/N 
Employees Turnover Products 
Pharmacopeia 16 USA DD Y 169 $21.4m 
(Income) 
13 products 
Discovery  - 
Phase II 
Pharming 22 EU: The 
Netherlands 
DD Y 81 !1.1m 
(Income) 
4 Products – 
Discovery – 
Phase III 
Table 6. DD Firms – Both Regions – No Changes to Firms 
Case Study 
Firm Age Location 
Type of 
Firm 
Adaptation 
Y/N 
Employees Turnover Products 
Cara 6 USA DD N N/A $28.7M 
Venture 
Finance 
2 Products 
Discovery – 
Phase II 
Actelion 13 EU: 
Switzerland 
DD N 2,493 !1.4B Income 12 Products 
Discovery - 
Marketing 
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4.3.2.2. Data Collection 
Overall, the case study approach was utilised to gather, review, analyse, 
question and present a range of information obtained on eight firms. This 
was partly in order to understand the emergence of a new type of firm 
involved specifically in drug development and to understand changes to 
existing firms but also to look at how markets for technology were impacted. 
It was also important to examine firms that displayed a different focus on 
exploration and exploitation, some of which were stable but some of which 
were experiencing a process of change. This provided interesting diversity in 
the cases. This approach necessitated the use of several different sources of 
evidence without which an invaluable advantage of the multiple case study 
strategy will be lost (Yin, 2003). This included documentation, archival 
records, interviews and direct observation (which includes both primary and 
secondary data). The following sources were utilised in this process: 
Company Web Sites (Secondary Source) 
The exponential rise of the internet as a means of communication of 
important information about companies and the specifics of their business is 
indisputable. As a result, this was the first source of information reviewed. 
Many companies have several sections on their websites providing 
information in the following categories: 
!  Company Overview 
!  History and Origins 
!  Management Team 
!  Board of Directors 
!  R&D and Technology 
!  Pipeline and products 
!  Alliances and Partnerships 
!  Financial Information for Investors and Members of the Public 
!  Annual Reports and Other Publications 
!  News and Press Releases 
A review of all of the available information in every category was undertaken 
to put together initial profiles on each of the companies which was expanded 
based on other available information that was gathered over time.  
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Trade Literature (Secondary Source) 
As noted in the prior section on company websites, the rise in the availability 
of information from a range of sources via the internet has been exponential. 
This is particularly true in terms of the pharmaceutical industry where there is 
a proliferation of information available. This trade literature includes 
BioWorld, FierceBiotech, Nature Biotech, Pharmaceutical Executive, 
Pharmaceutical Technology, The Pink Sheet, Scripintelligence.com and 
various blogs including InVivo and Pharmalot. A range of business journals 
as well as various newspapers also report on the industry in particular, the 
Boston Globe, The Economist, the Financial Times, The New York Times, 
the Philadelphia Business Journal, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and the San 
Diego Union Tribune  
This literature provided some impetus for the initial thrust of this thesis as 
much as it provided some speculative insight into the companies, what they 
were doing and why. These sources and the information they offered 
provided some key insights into the reasons why companies were doing 
what they were doing and provided rich contextual background for the case 
studies and the interviews that followed. Speculation and information 
provided in the trade literature (but not always available in press releases or 
analyst reports) offered a way in which to initiate key discussions with some 
companies and verify information that was utilised from these sources. 
However, for the purposes of this research and indeed any research, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the types of information and literature 
reviewed. The distinction being made here is necessary because trade 
literature is not peer reviewed and in many cases nor is it a primary source 
hence the designation as a secondary source.  
Thomson Research – Secondary Source 
Thomson Research is a comprehensive data collection system that includes 
Investext®, Disclosure® and other industry leading databases. It offers a 
wide breadth of company research includes global filings, annual reports and 
market research studies. This was utilised to review analyst reports on each 
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of the companies and the appropriate/relevant information was then added to 
the company profiles.  
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – Secondary Source 
The SEC provides a free search system primarily for publicly listed 
companies on the US stock exchange utilising the EDGAR database. The 
laws and rules that govern the securities sector in the United States derive 
from the concept that all investors, whether large institutions or private 
individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment 
prior to buying and so long as they hold stock in that company. To achieve 
this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and 
other information to the public. This provides a common pool of knowledge 
for all investors to use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a 
particular stock. This promotes the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and 
accurate information can people make sound investment decisions 
(www.sec.gov). One of the most useful documents available to researchers 
is the public company ‘10K’ document which is an annual requirement 
whereby companies must publicise pertinent activities that have taken place. 
All 10Ks were reviewed for the publicly listed companies in this study to 
ensure that the relevant information was captured.  
Factiva – Secondary Source 
Factiva is a business information database covering about 10,000 business 
and news publications, many in full text, including business magazines, trade 
journals, newspapers, newswires, media programs and company stock 
reports. This provides a valuable central source of articles on companies. A 
search for each company was also conducted using this database to ensure 
pertinent information about the company was captured.  
Google – Secondary Source 
With the advent of the 'read/write web' - Web 2.0 (Achterman, 2006), 
applications such as the Google suite and Wikipedia have become the 
standard service for information seekers and creators. Google indexes 
billions of web pages so that users can search for the information they desire 
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through the use of keywords and operators. According to Google, they have 
increased both size and freshness in recent months indexing more quality 
content. Google is arguably the fastest and most effective search engine and 
is useful when used as an adjunct to other forms of research to ensure that 
any additional information that may be contained in other sources not noted 
above can be accessed. A search for each of the firms was conducted to 
ensure that any additional information relevant to the company and the 
profiles being created was captured. 
4.3.2.3. Semi Structured Interviews 
The success of this research is also rooted in understanding why changes 
are taking place with respect to small firm development and how these are 
influenced by other factors such as capital markets and the source of 
knowledge. Through analysing these firm development trajectories, these 
influences can be reviewed and the critical questions asked – is this the case 
and why?  The need to have a longitudinal view of the company and its key 
milestones in terms of origin, business model, finance and product 
development strategy is necessary to support this goal. A valuable way in 
which to achieve these goals is through a related set of insights from its 
executives to capture the rationale behind why certain decisions were made 
and why events took place the way they did from the firm’s perspective. 
Miller and Glassner argue that ultimately, information about social worlds is 
achievable though in-depth interviewing and that it is possible to achieve 
authentic accounts (Miller and Glassner, 2004). Yin notes that ‘well informed 
respondents can provide important insights into a situation (Yin, 2003). The 
type of knowledge that was obtained from interviews as part of this approach 
would not have been obtainable from information gathered from secondary 
sources alone because what was required from the interview approach was 
insight.  
While the case study approach allowed more information to be gathered with 
respect to various details, this approach was not just about gathering more 
detail. Insight into why firms made the decisions they did and what 
specifically prompted those decisions was a key output that was required 
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from this research and the only way to gain that type of insight was through 
case studies with interviews. In addition, it was necessary to gain access to 
the top executives who would be privy to the decision-making processes in 
effect at the firm and thus the influences on various decisions that were 
made.  The following interviewees participated in the research: 
Table 7. Participants in Company Interviews 
Company Name Title 
Actinium Howard Wachtler! CEO 
Actelion Walter Fischli Former Founder and 
VP 
Cara Derek Chalmers CEO 
PanGenetics Kevin Johnson CEO and VC Partner 
Pharming Rienk Pypstra VP R&D 
Pharmacopeia David Kimball VP R&D 
ProStrakan Nigel Atherton VP R&D 
ViroPharma Tom Doyle VP Strategy 
4.3.2.4. Further Interview with GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 
The evidence from the database and the case studies indicated a very 
interesting issue with respect to the behaviour of large firms. The findings 
illustrated what appeared to be extensive out-licensing activities and spin out 
activities being undertaken by large firms who were exercising options to 
trade or spin out products in the form of drug candidates to small firms. It 
was decided to conduct an interview with a representative from a large firm 
to understand more about these findings. The individual selected was a 
director of the firm in drug discovery transactions. The remit of this group 
was not only to bring in products but to sell products also. The following key 
questions were asked at the interview:  
1. Discuss the role of portfolio management at GSK 
2. When did the company start out-licensing? 
3. Why did the company start out-licensing? 
4. Why is the firm cutting back on its work in certain therapeutic areas? 
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5. How does the firm decide between a spin out or out-licensing a 
particular drug?  
4.4. Evaluation of the Research Methodology 
The purpose of this research was to ascertain the emergence of a new firm 
(and thus a new division of labour), understand the reasons why this has 
happened as well as characterise the changes in markets for technology. 
The research approach was a mixed methods approach utilising quantitative 
methods to fulfil the first part of the research objectives and qualitative 
methods to fulfil the latter research objectives. However, the application of 
both of these methodologies involved a substantial amount of work. A great 
deal of data was collected on 100 firms and then further detailed research 
was conducted on the eight case study firms. 
4.4.1. Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods 
The approach to constructing a database of information on firms was a 
classic attempt to address both the limitations of quantitative and qualitative 
research approaches. It involved the collection of over 1,500 pieces of data 
and information about firms. During this process a variety of sources were 
consulted as discussed. The use of a survey may have somewhat reduced 
the data collection required by the author however, the concerns were that 
the response rate would be poor and that the quality of information received 
back from firms would be substandard and incomplete. There was the added 
concern that information would have to be double checked, resulting in more 
work overall. While the process was extremely time consuming, it was a 
success providing a richly detailed picture of a range of firms operating in the 
sector. 
The production of multiple case studies was also excessively time 
consuming and the constant concern that there was more information 
needed was always present. So much data on the firms was reviewed to try 
to create a complete picture in relation to the firm and its activities (in line 
with recommendations in the methodology literature) and again, some of this 
information was conflicting which then involved an iterative process of trying 
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to uncover which source was correct. This information gathering exercise 
was necessary prior to every interview in order to ensure that certain points 
of information could be verified and also to ensure that the various 
information provided by respondents could be corroborated as far as 
possible through the available data. While the use of multiple case studies is 
very valuable, the amount of effort required to duplicate the information 
gathered for more than one firm was extremely daunting. 
4.4.2. Issues With Previous Research Samples – Focus on ‘Biotech’ 
Firms 
The specific sectoral characteristics (high costs, length of development time 
and regulatory framework) make the study of the how these firms develop 
products in this sector particularly interesting (Bertoni et al, 2004; Mazzucato 
and Dosi, 2006; Pisano, 2006;  McKelvey 2008). Yet much of the analysis 
and discussion concerning this sector has been conducted on a collective 
group of firms operating in a range of industries that together make up what 
has been traditionally been known as the biotechnology sector which is 
problematic. Biotechnology can no longer be described as a sector because 
it refers more to a set of technologies that profoundly affect a range of 
existing industries including the pharmaceutical sector (Powell et al, 1996; 
Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). Much of the literature does not single out this 
particular sector for analysis in its own right despite the important evidence 
as noted above, that would seem to point to the necessity of this type of 
cohort analysis. This research seeks to address this issue by focusing on 
companies in drug discovery and development.  
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Chapter 5. Evidence for the Changing Division of Labour and 
Markets for Technology 
5.1. Introduction 
An examination of the existence and prevalence of a new type of No 
Research Development Only (NRDO) firm in both the US and the EU and 
thus a new division of labour was a major driver for this research.  A strategy 
was devised to distinguish firms based on the presence of exploratory (early 
stage research products prior to pre-clinical development in animals) 
activities and the presence of an identifiable technology platform. This was a 
way to distinguish firm activities based on their exploration/exploitation 
orientation. Two databases of firms were initially created, one database for 
each region. These databases were then combined when the same split of 
NRDO and DD firms was determined for each region. In order to be selected, 
a firm had to have a least one product in the clinical development stage and 
to have ownership of that product. Each database captured the same 
specific set of variables that have been analysed in this chapter related to 
firm origin, pipeline, finance, trade of products and alliances.  
5.2. Evolution of the Sector – A New Type of Firm and a New 
Division of Labour 
It was apparent that there was a key difference between the firms in the 
sample reinforcing anecdotal evidence from the trade literature: Not all firms 
had activities in discovery (evidenced by the fact that they had no potential 
products that were in these early stages) nor an exploratory technological 
platform pointing to the absence of product generating exploration activities.  
These key differences enabled the identification of a new type of firm and 
ultimately a new division of labour - The NRDO firm. This firm does not 
conduct any early stage exploratory/research/discovery activities to discover 
its own drug products. Previous studies related to drug development firms 
have primarily indicated two overall types of firms: Fully integrated large 
pharmaceutical firms and classical biotechnology firms (it should be noted 
that discovery only firms have historically been included in this overall 
category but not sampled in this study as discussed). This research, 
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however, introduces another specific type of firm: the No Research 
Development Only (NRDO) firm. The newly identified NRDO firms represent 
27 % of the firms sampled which was unexpected. The sample can be 
divided as follows: 
Table 8. Summary of Major Types of Firms in the Sample 
Number of 
Firms Type of Firm 
US EU 
ALL 
Discovery and Development 70% (35) 
76% 
(38) 73% 
No Research Development Only  30% (15) 
24% 
(12) 27% 
The NRDO firm and how its activities map onto the drug development cycle 
relative to the other major types of business models of firms is illustrated 
using the drug development continuum, in Figure 77. 
NRDO firms do not have a business model based on a technological 
platform that would allow them to discover their own products or work on 
exploratory activities around early stage research related to discovering 
drugs. This was a surprising finding given that the literature on these 
companies and the development of this sector clearly discuses the research 
intensive nature of these small types of (hitherto classical biotechnology) 
firms. As noted above, one of the key differentiating facts in describing the 
small firms present in this sector and their business models is the presence 
of ‘discovery’ activities within the firm. These activities can be described as 
exploration-based activities (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; 
McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 1999; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). They 
are generally resource intensive and will have a profound impact on the 
ability of the firm to develop products for its pipeline. This differentiating 
characteristic of the NRDO firms marks a key difference in the business 
models of these firms and a further notable change in the division of labour. 
However, it also follows that if these types of small firms are not generating 
products they are acquiring them from other firms. This indicates a change in 
the markets for technology.  
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Figure 7. Types of Drug Development Firms in the Pharmaceutical Sector
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5.3. Characterising the New Firm and the Changing Division 
of Labour 
The combined database was then split into two cohorts of DD firms and 
NRDO firms for further analysis through a comparison of key firm 
characteristics. By comparing newly identified NRDO firms to the well 
defined DD firm, it was possible to gain a greater understanding of how firm 
characteristics differed (or were similar) between these two types of firms.  
Table 9, All Companies – Comparison of DD and NRDO Firms, presents key 
information about the two cohorts of firms based on the newly identified 
NRDO and DD models. The table highlights some interesting differences 
between these two types of firms but also illustrates the similarities where 
they might not have been expected.  
The NRDO firm appears to be roughly the same age as the DD firm with a 
relatively similar number of products in development but the NRDO firms 
have higher numbers of marketed products. NRDO firms have considerably 
less development partnerships than their DD counterparts. In terms of their 
origins, NRDO firms are predominantly classified as Corporate Spin Outs 
(discussed further below) as many of them were not formed based on the 
traditional academic (public spin out – PSO) mode. In terms of the financial 
status of NRDO firms as public or private, the split is relatively even with a 
small majority of public firms. But more NRDO firms are public than DD firms. 
Table 9. All Companies – Comparison of DD and NRDO Firms 
Dimension for Comparison DD Firms 
NRDO 
Firms 
Age (Average) 9.94 9.03 
No. of Drug Candidates (Average) 4.31 3.81 
% of Firms with Marketed Products 4% 33% 
% of Firms with Alliances  80% 37% 
% of Firms Origin – Public Spin Out (University and 
Government Laboratories) (PSO) 58% 37% 
% of Firms Origin – Corporate Spin Out (CSO) 41% 63% 
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Dimension for Comparison DD Firms 
NRDO 
Firms 
Financial Status – Private Co. 61% 44% 
Financial Status – Public (stock market) Co. 39% 56% 
5.3.1. Firm Similarities 
There were only two key dimensions where firms were broadly similar: Age 
and number of drug candidates in development. A new type of firm would 
suggest that they might be younger than the previously identified DD firms. 
However, the information gathered on firm age does not indicate a significant 
difference between the two cohorts of firms. The average age of both sets of 
firms is surprisingly similar possibly indicating that although a different type of 
firm is evident, these NRDO firms are not necessarily new. The classification 
is new but not the firm itself. This is discussed further in Section 5.4 on 
explaining the origins of firms discussing why this may be the case.  
The number of drug candidates identified in each firm’s pipeline is not 
significantly different between the two different types of firm.  This indicates 
that the lack of discovery capabilities does not necessarily mean that the 
NRDO firms have less products in their pipeline. It is possible that the 
number of drugs in development might be explained by the firms’ origins as 
well as their ability to buy in new products. Further analysis on firm origin 
indicated that some of these firms had in fact adapted their business model 
to change from being a DD firm to a NRDO firm.  This might partially explain 
the similarity in the number of drugs in clinical development for the NRDO 
firm (18.5% of these firms which are NRDO firms were once DD firms). 
Hence the broadly similar numbers of products needs to be explored further 
to explain the similarity (discussed in Section 5.4). 
With the discovery of the prevalence of the NRDO firm, analysis was 
extended to understand if the DD firm also obtained drug candidates from 
other corporate sources. The results indicated that a subgroup of these firms 
also in-licenses products from other organisations despite the presence of 
internal product generating capabilities. Surprisingly, 56% of all DD firms 
 
120 
obtain drugs for development from external sources indicating an interesting 
new development in the activities of these firms and thus changes in the 
markets for technology are also evident where the DD firm is concerned. 
This means that traditional research intensive DD firms are also changing 
their business models to acquire products from external sources to 
complement existing pipelines. Taken together, this represents a major shift 
in our understanding of the flow of knowledge, products and technology in 
this sector as well as a changing division of labour where over a quarter of 
small firms drug development firms are only concentrating on drug 
development and exploitation rather than drug discovery and exploration.  
5.3.2. Firm Differences 
The findings indicate differences in the business model of the NRDO and DD 
firm in a number of different areas related to: Marketed Products, 
Partnerships, Firm Origin and Firm Finance. 
Marketed Products 
There is a pronounced difference when it comes to marketed products. Over 
33% of NRDO firms have marketed products compared to only 4% of DD 
firms. This finding in relation to DD firms is not wholly surprising as this 
business model was not focused on getting products to market for a range of 
reasons related to issues such as finance and capabilities. However, the 
focus of small firms on marketed products by NRDO firms overall is 
surprising given that this was not a focus of any small firms traditionally in 
this sector. It would appear that marketed products play a key role in the 
business models of NRDO firms and may provide evidence of the viability of 
this business model, particularly as these products are used to fund the 
operations of firms (who have historically faced financial constraints). This 
might also explain the ability to obtain development stage drug candidates if 
there is revenue available for purchasing products from marketed products. 
Alliances 
The role of alliances and collaboration with other firms has been widely 
discussed in the literature as an important feature of the way in which all 
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firms in this sector conduct their business (Powell et al,1996; Powell, 1998). 
So, information related to firm alliances (for the purposes of product 
development only) was gathered and used to try to find out if NRDO firms 
were engaged in the same level of alliance activity as DD firms.  The data 
shows a very interesting difference in the extent of alliances between the two 
models. 80% of DD firms were involved in alliances compared to only 37% of 
NRDO firms. As discussed earlier, the DD firms’ business model is one 
where there is an internal organisation that includes discovery activities and 
provides new products for the firm’s pipeline. Historically, the generation of 
these products has provided the traditional basis for collaboration in the 
sector as acknowledged in the literature, forming the basis for prolific 
networks, particularly between large pharmaceutical companies and smaller 
newer companies (Orsenigo, 1989, Powell et al, 1996; Henderson et al, 
1999; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001). Therefore, it could be argued that 
there would be a reduced basis for alliances with those firms that do not 
possess a technological platform to generate new products.   
Firm Origin 
The data above on the origins of both the DD and NRDO firms illustrate 
some interesting key differences between these two types of firms. When 
gathering the data on these firms, it was deemed important to understand 
exactly where the NRDO firm had come from given the new business model 
and absence of research focus. The majority of NRDO firms (63%) were 
formed as corporate spin outs (CSO) and not formed as public spin outs 
(PSO – 37%).  Firms formed as academic spin outs (based on academic or 
publicly funded discoveries) was traditionally understood as a fundamental 
aspect of the formation of new firms in this sector. If firms were not formed in 
this way this indicates that there are obviously new explanations for the 
origins of these firms and thus this business model and division of labour. 
However, it is interesting to note that 41% of DD firms were also formed as 
CSOs and this makes the search for the alternate origins of these firms more 
compelling. The DD firm has been described as an academic spin out, 
exploratory research based business model with associated research 
capabilities but the evidence shows that there are other ways in which firms 
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are formed in this sector that have not been discussed in great detail. This is 
further explored in Section 5.4. 
Firm Financial Status 
There are also differences between the firms in terms of their financial 
operating status. The majority of DD firms are privately financed while the 
majority of NRDO firms are publicly financed through stock markets.  The 
private/public finance split among the NRDO firms is less pronounced than 
that of the DD firms. Possible explanations are discussed in Section 5.5.  
Revenue Generation 
There are also important differences in the sources of revenue which 
generate income for the two types of firm. The table below illustrates the 
percentage of firms in the sample that were in receipt of revenue from one or 
more of the three major sources noted in Chapter four: 
Table 10. Revenue Sources for Firms 
Corporate Finance 
Source 
DD 
Firms 
NRDO 
Firms 
Revenue – Marketed 
Products 
4% 33% 
Revenue – Licenses 61.5% 37% 
Revenue – Research 64% 3% 
The data indicated that 33% of NRDO firms are receiving revenue from 
marketed products which is surprising.  Historically, the descriptions of the 
small firms in this sector have emphasised and illustrated their exploratory 
upstream product focus and yet a third of NRDO firms are engaging in 
downstream exploitation activities.   However, if the NRDO firm is focused on 
the development stage with no research focus then this is perhaps to be 
expected that it would focus more on marketed products. It indicates that this 
is one of the key sources of revenue for these NRDO firms. As expected, the 
NRDO firm does not receive any revenue from research because it does not 
have exploratory capabilities. A third of NRDO firms receive revenue from 
licensing products. This is interesting because this indicates the essence of 
the new division of labour: the small firm only concentrates on clinical 
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development of drugs and so it must out-license or sell those products to 
obtain revenue. These firms are buying products, conducting clinical 
research and then out-licensing these products to generate revenue. This 
also points to a new set of capabilities of these firms given their focus on 
development rather than research, the former typically the realm of the large 
incumbent firm. This will be explored further in the following chapter through 
case study research and again in Chapter seven. 
5.4. Firm Origin and Knowledge - Explaining the Division of 
Labour 
Understanding the emergence of the NRDO firms, i.e. where they have come 
from, is a fundamental part of explaining their existence and how this new 
division of labour has taken place. It is necessary to understand how and 
from where firms are acquiring knowledge and products if they are not 
academic in origin nor internally discovering their own products. 
Understanding the origins of DD firms may also help to understand their 
behaviour in terms of their external product acquisition activities.  
Traditionally, classical biotechnology firms (DD) were formed as a result of 
collaboration between scientists and venture capitalists (Kenney, 1986; 
Orsenigo, 1989; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; Pisano, 2006). Firms in this 
sample with a similar origin were classified as Public Spin outs (PSO). 
However, analysis of information on company history and formation of the 
firms sampled revealed that not all firms had been formed as Public Spin 
outs (PSO). The diagram in Figure 88 shows how firm formation in the last 
35 years in this sector can be understood and proposes how changes in our 
understanding of firm formation might be better understood moving forward. 
The top section of the diagram shows the dominant explanation of firm 
formation that has been historically utilised in the literature – that of PSO 
firms. The bottom part of the diagram illustrates that there are now two 
important ‘origins’ of firms – the PSO and the CSO, i.e., firms that have been 
founded as a result of spin out opportunities that are non-academic in origin 
and may be as a result of either actual spin outs or product divestment by 
other companies. 
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Importantly, the findings indicated that only 33% of NRDO companies could 
be classified as PSO firms compared to 58% of DD firms. What is surprising 
is that a significant proportion (48%) of all firms in the sample were not 
formed in the traditional manner as depicted in the top part of the diagram 
i.e., they were formed as CSOs. 41% of DD firms were formed as CSOs and 
this is in marked contrast to the existing literature and conventional 
understanding. The emergence of firms formed as a result of CSO activity 
represents a less well documented and understood explanation for the 
origins of firms in this particular sector. This suggests that there may be an 
important relationship between large firms, knowledge and the formation of 
firms for both NRDO and DD firms. It is possible to speculate that large firms 
have products and knowledge that they are willing to sell pointing to a 
possible surplus of unexploited knowledge. But the reasons why large firms 
are engaging in this type of activity must be understood. There are 
implications for the markets for technology and capital markets that will be 
further explored in Chapter 7.   
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Figure 8. Firm Origin  
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Overall, the picture that has emerged is a far more intricate and nuanced 
explanation for the origins of all small firms in the sector, NRDO firms in 
particular, which are not currently reflected in the literature. The more 
detailed review of firm origin indicates that there are a series of pathways 
that account for firm origin and adaptation patterns. The diagram below 
presents a summary of the various origins of NRDO firms that have been 
identified based on the two primary origins – PSOs and CSOs. 
Figure 9. Variety in Firm Origin – NRDO firms 
 
There are four potential ways in which NRDO firms may have been formed. 
While the majority of firms were formed directly as NRDO firms, both as 
either PSOs or CSOs, some were also formed as a result of a process of firm 
adaptation. Overall, 18% of NRDO firms were formed as a result of DD firms 
that discontinued discovery related operational activities as illustrated in the 
diagram above for both types of origin.  
The process of firm adaptation and the reasons why firms change their focus 
and their business is a fascinating part of the story of the changing division of 
labour. As noted above, not all firms began as purely NRDO organisations. 
Some firms started out as DD firms but chose to stop their early stage 
activities. So, these firms morphed into NRDO firms from the DD business 
model. An example of firm in the sample that did precisely this was 
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ViroPharma. The firm was formed as a traditional DD firm but due to the 
failure of one of its major research programmes, abandoned all research 
activity and laid off personnel to focus on developing clinical stage 
compounds and marketing drug products. The rationale for these decisions 
warrants further inquiry and is addressed in Chapter six on case studies.  
The origins of 41% of DD firms were also highlighted in the data presented 
above as they were not associated with academic or government (PSO) spin 
outs and this data was surprising because the origins of DD firms in this 
sector have been well documented. The surprising finding overall was the 
large number of firms that were formed as CSOs. However, it would appear 
that important changes are taking place in the sector with respect to firm 
activity in terms of product and knowledge acquisition. It is therefore 
necessary to understand more about these changes and how they may 
explain changes in the DD firms’ origins and their source of products and 
knowledge. This in turn has important implications for changes in markets for 
technology as well as the division of labour. This is explored further through 
case studies presented in the next chapter and discussed in Chapter seven. 
5.5. The Role of Capital Markets in the New Division of 
Labour  
One of the key differences between the two types of firms, DD and NRDO, is 
their financial status as illustrated in the table below: 
Table 11. DD and NRDO Firm Finance 
Corporate Finance Source DD Firms NRDO Firms 
Finance – Public /Private 38%/62% 56%/44% 
Understanding the extensive financial requirements of firms in this sector has 
made it is possible to speculate that financial considerations impacted the 
initial division of labour observed during the third epoch.  It is also possible 
that one of the reasons for the emergence of the NRDO firm may be related 
to capital markets and funding drug R&D. The timelines are long in both the 
exploratory research stage as well as the development stage. Therefore, if 
firms are potentially shortening their whole product cycle by cutting out a 
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fairly significant proportion of it (discovery) this reduces the risk overall 
because the exploratory work has already been undertaken and that 
investment made but critically, by someone else. These NRDO firms are 
overtly focusing all of their available resources on the development phase 
rather than having to allocate some of that finance to the earlier exploratory 
stage activities.  It may be that they believe this makes them more financially 
attractive to potential investors. The absence of the ability to generate 
research revenue on the part of NRDO firms and the sheer costs of drug 
development would also suggest that these firms need greater access to 
significant sources of funding such as that provided by public stock markets. 
The role of finance may also potentially explain the type of in-licensing 
activity observed by traditional DD firms who normally would not need to buy 
in products to supplement their own discovery activities. This implies that 
while these firms possess the capability to develop their own products, they 
still engage in external technology/product acquisition and this raises 
questions around why internal generation of products is not sufficient for 
some firms and what might be driving this. However, these products may be 
further along the drug development continuum which would put the firm in 
better strategic position overall and would potentially have a positive impact 
on its ability to obtain more investment from either VCs or indeed an IPO. 
This is because having products that are further advanced in their 
development may make them more attractive to investors as the closer the 
product is to significant milestones, the more likely it is to succeed and firms 
are more likely to be rewarded for this.  
This is particularly interesting when viewed in terms of the disappointing 
performance of firms in the last decade (Pisano, 2006). It may be that firms 
are searching for ways to make themselves more attractive to potential 
investors. The role of finance in this respect also warrants closer 
investigation to understand why this type of activity is occurring and why 
sources of finance support these activities in the firm. If significant resources 
are required for in-licensing, an increase in this type of activity suggests that 
financial support would be a pre-requisite given the evidence presented in 
 
129 
Chapter two related to the pervasive influence of the sources of finance, 
particularly venture capital and the speculations in Chapter three based on 
anecdotal industry information. These speculations warrant closer 
investigation which will be done through case study comparisons in the next 
chapter and the discussion in Chapter seven. 
5.6. The Role of Markets for Technology 
These findings from the database have prompted further questioning related 
to the markets for technology: if products18 are not discovered and developed 
internally by both the new type of NRDO firm as well as some DD firms, as 
was traditionally understood to be the case, then from where are they 
sourced, how are they sourced and why? The findings above with respect to 
firm origin and Corporate Spin Outs suggests that products are coming from 
either large pharmaceutical firms or other small firms both of which are 
unexpectedly ‘spinning off’ products and related knowledge. It was also 
unexpected that 50% of DD firms were externally sourcing products for 
internal development. This also implies that ‘buyer’ firms (NRDOs and DD 
firms) are able to capitalise on this availability of unexploited knowledge 
(Drug candidates) and bring these in-house. This is in complete contrast to 
our prior understanding of the flow of technology and products between large 
and small firms in this sector. The diagram below suggests how the markets 
for technology may be represented currently: 
 
 
 
                                            
18 The term ‘Product’ is used throughout this thesis to denote drug candidates. 
 
130 
 
 
Figure 10. Changes in the Markets for Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This reveals a greater complexity in the markets for technology than has 
been previously described. Large firms may have become suppliers of 
unexploited knowledge and products in contrast to their previously 
understood role solely as recipients of early stage products and knowledge. 
In addition, small firms are also trading unexploited products and knowledge 
between themselves, again in contrast to the current understanding in the 
literature. This change in the flow of knowledge and products also represents 
a key change in the relationships between large and small firms. It would 
seem that the availability of ‘surplus’ unexploited knowledge has caused a 
corresponding change in the markets for technology and technology and the 
reasons why this has happened warrant further investigation.  Case studies 
are utilised to understand and explain this in greater detail in the following 
two chapters.  
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5.7. Summary  
A new firm has been identified – the No Research Development Only firm 
(NRDO) and the business model is based on product development but does 
not involve exploratory research activities resulting in internal product 
generation. These NRDO companies are opting for a business model that 
seeks to focus on products that are in the later stages of clinical development 
or already marketed. Prior descriptions of the extant role of small firms solely 
as suppliers of upstream knowledge may no longer be entirely applicable in 
this sector given the finding that 27% of small firms sampled are no longer 
working at the early stage research end of the drug discovery and 
development spectrum. This provides evidence for a new division of labour in 
the sector. But as discussed in Chapters two and three, the changing nature 
of these firms is not wholly unexpected nor is the existence of a new division 
of labour. This new type of firm coexists in a system that has already 
witnessed changes in the division of labour. 
The prevalence of firms that were formed with origins related to other 
companies (CSOs) was unexpected given prior evidence in the literature that 
illustrates the importance of the academic spin out (PSO). This new evidence 
suggests that a number of firms are formed based on products, knowledge 
and capabilities from other companies both large and small and this 
represents a change in the complexity of the markets for technology in this 
sector.  
Nilsson noted that the main success factor for firms in this sector, regardless 
of the model chosen, is the ability to rapidly identify the latest research from 
academia and commercialise it (Nilsson 2001). However, it seems that while 
this may have been true for many firms’ business models in this sector in the 
past, it is not necessarily the case for all firms operating in the sector today. 
New firms that have developed during the last 35 years were traditionally 
characterised as a new breed of exploratory research focused high 
technology firms that were known for their embodiment of new knowledge 
and the generation and development of new products as a result of this 
knowledge (the classical biotechnology firm or DD firm). The evidence has 
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shown that this may no longer be applicable to over a quarter of firms 
operating in the sector. The reasons why this has happened will be explored 
further in the following chapter. 
This research also presents new information on the innovation/product 
development strategies of Discovery and Development (DD) firms. The 
research illustrates that these firms also source products and knowledge 
from external corporate sources and not just academic sources as 
traditionally understood. The exchange of products and knowledge in this 
sector has become more complex than previously acknowledged.  A closer 
examination of the changing complexity in the markets for technology is 
necessary to understand how and why markets are changing.  
We must update our understanding of the pharmaceutical sector and 
particularly the small firms that operate within it as the evidence has shown a 
division of labour has taken place as well as changes in the markets for 
technology which are integral to the division of labour. However, the reasons 
why these changes have taken place will be explored further in the following 
two chapters.  A series of case studies that examine both DD and NRDO 
firms to address the questions noted above around knowledge and origin, 
finance and markets for technology are presented.   
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Chapter 6. Case Studies 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents information on eight selected firms that formed the 
cohort for further case study analysis. Cases are presented to better 
understand and therefore explain the following: why and how the new 
division of labour has taken place with respect to the newly identified No 
Research Development Only (NRDO) firm; what has caused the changes in 
the division of labour and changes to existing firms; what is the role of a 
possible surplus of unexploited knowledge and finance in these changes and 
how have the markets for technology changed. Selected information on the 
case study firms is presented to focus on the relevant information on the 
firms’ history and actions that helps to explain these issues. This includes 
major events in the firms’ history that were fundamental to their origin and 
operations and help to explain their business model orientation and activities. 
Case studies were selected as a research mode because the nature of this 
type of research methodology is most commonly used to answer ‘why’ 
questions (Yin 2003). By conducting in-depth reviews of company histories, 
achievements, activities and pipelines the case study approach with 
interviews provided a rich context for understanding those issues and 
answering those questions posed by the research.   
This chapter is divided into two sections. The key aim of Section 6.2 is to 
present the pertinent case study data on NRDO firms as follows: 
!  To understand where NRDO firms have come from and why this particular business 
model has emerged – What prompted the formation of the firm? Why has it 
emerged? 
!  To understand what influences their product development and how this relates to 
knowledge and financial markets.  
These case studies have been grouped to examine two pairs of NRDO 
companies. The first pair of companies presented are two NRDO companies 
that were formed as NRDO companies from inception and did not implement 
any changes to their business model orientation. Actinium Pharmaceuticals 
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Inc. and PanGenetics are discussed first and reviewed in terms of the aims 
outlined above. The PanGenetics case study provides insight into the birth of 
a young NRDO firm (only 5 years old) and illustrates how financial sources 
can play a key instrumental role in firm formation, determination of the 
business model and determining the innovation strategy of a firm through 
their involvement in corporate governance. The Actinium case study provides 
a contrasting story of a much older NRDO firm formed as a corporate spin 
out in the 1990s and tells a different story of how large pharmaceutical firms 
and financial sources can play a key role in firm formation, determination of 
the business model and the implementation of the innovation strategy within 
a firm.  
The second two case studies presented are of two older firms that both went 
through changes to their business model but are currently NRDO firms. 
ProStrakan was formed as an NRDO firm but changed its business model for 
a short period during its history incorporating discovery activities into its 
business, only to return to the NRDO business model once again. The 
second firm in this pair, ViroPharma is also an interesting story of a firm that 
started off as a classical biotechnology firm with discovery activities but has 
since divested those activities and has become a NRDO firm. 
Section 6.3 presents four case studies on selected US and EU small firms to 
better understand key changes that may have occurred in the traditional 
classical biotechnology firm (Discovery and Development) business model. 
These case studies enable the closer examination of why these changes 
have taken place in order to understand how these firms are different with 
respect to our prior knowledge in this area. Specific aspects of the firms’ 
origins and the subsequent operational characteristics with respect to the 
implementation of their product development strategies are reviewed. These 
aspects of the firms have been carefully selected in order to examine the role 
of the influence of finance and knowledge as well as the changing markets 
for technology.  
The companies have been presented as two groups of two firms based on 
some common elements of their origin and formation. The first pair of 
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companies presented are two DD companies that were formed as academic 
spin outs. Pharmacopeia and Pharming are discussed first and reviewed in 
terms of the aims outlined above. The next two case studies presented are a 
pair of DD companies that were formed by scientists who had left other 
companies. But these two firms were formed based on compounds that they 
had obtained from large pharmaceutical companies. Cara Therapeutics and 
Actelion are also reviewed in terms of the key points mentioned above and 
again provide an interesting contrast in terms of why these firms consider 
discovery activities to be critical to their business in addition to obtaining 
external products.  
6.2. No Research Discovery Only (DO) Firms  
6.2.1. Actinium Pharmaceuticals, Inc.19 
Actinium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Actinium) was formed in 1993 by a 
pharmaceutical company called Organon20. Actinium was formed to develop 
an idea to combine Alpha Emitting Isotopes (AEIs), Actinium and Bismuth, 
with Monoclonal Antibodies (MAbs) and then to test this combination in 
clinical trials.  A group of Organon scientists helped to set up and run the 
company and Organon financed the company for the first seven years of its 
lifespan. However in 2000, Organon, as the company’s sole financial source, 
forced Actinium’s management team to look for new sources of financing to 
fund the company’s operations. A private equity group, General Atlantic, 
provided funding for the company for the next 10 years. The focus on the 
radioisotope/MAb product combination was sustained for that time period of 
the company’s history despite having been unable to publicly demonstrate 
the efficacy of these products over the combined period of 17 years since the 
company’s formation.  
Actinium was chosen as part of this research because it is an NRDO firm 
and also because it was formed over 17 years ago and sustained operations 
                                            
19 Note: Efforts to contact the company for an updated summary of operations were not successful and 
all contact numbers for the company were not in use as of July 2010.  
20 Organon was a mid size pharmaceutical company itself part of a larger Dutch company, Akzo Nobel 
was Specifically set up to produce insulin in 1923. 
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until 2010 despite a lack of proven clinical success with its products. 
Therefore, it illustrates that this particular business model is not necessarily 
new and it also illustrates the key role of finance and large pharmaceutical 
company influence in the formation and operation of a company such as this. 
The following key findings with respect to Actinium are discussed in more 
detail in this section: 
1. Organon spun-out Actinium specifically to develop Radioisotopes 
rather than develop the idea in-house. Organon funded the activities 
of the company for 7 years. 
2. New private equity financing supported the continuation of product 
development activities despite a lack of proven or published clinical 
success. This is in marked contrast to commonly received wisdom of 
the role generally played by financiers particularly in terms of time 
commitments. 
1. Actinium’s Formation as a Corporate Spin out 
Actinium was formed to develop a product.21 Organon’s therapeutic focus 
during that time was on reproductive medicine, contraception, psychiatry, 
hormone replacement therapy and anesthesia; it did not have any oncology 
programmes. Therefore, the creation of Actinium was the result of a decision 
to form a new company rather than develop a product to treat cancer, in-
house. This suggests that the Alpha Particle therapy platform was not a 
strategic fit for the company nor part of the its current in-house research 
agenda at the time.  Consequently, for Organon, the corporate spin out was 
the preferred mode of product development; something not well discussed in 
the literature covering this period in the sector’s history.  
                                            
21 This was considered a unique approach utilising a platform called Alpha Particle therapy. The 
company was formed based on an idea, put forward by the Head of R&D at Organon, that using 
Alpha Emitting Isotopes and attaching them to a Monoclonal Antibody which targets cancer cells 
would allow the isotope to get into a cell and facilitate the obliteration of that cell with minimal 
peripheral damage to the surrounding cells. Technically, this represents a huge leap in the world of 
cancer treatment where the effects of chemotherapy and radiation are known to have hugely 
damaging effects on the surrounding tissue. The discovery work had already been done at 
Organon. 
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Actinium’s business model presents an interesting contrast to what is known 
about new firms that were formed during this period of the sector’s history. It 
did not focus specifically on new product generation (discovery of new 
pharmaceutical products) utilising new technologies generated at an 
academic centre and therefore it has been classed as a NRDO22 firm. The 
company was formed based on an idea generated at a larger established 
firm. This type of transfer of knowledge is also in contrast to the commonly 
received wisdom from this period that new innovative ideas were passed 
from small companies to large companies.  Clearly in this case, the discovery 
activities were conducted at a large firm, Organon, and then these products 
transferred to a small firm, Actinium, specifically set up to conduct further 
development of these products.  
Organon was the sole financier of the company for the first seven years of its 
lifespan.  Organon’s influence on the company’s development during this 
seven year time period was important because it provided financial and 
strategic support to the company which is longer than the traditional venture 
capital (VC) timeline of 3-5 years. During those seven years the company 
was able to remain committed to its approach to develop the 
radioisotope/MAb product because of Organon’s backing. During that time, 
Actinium conducted preclinical studies, worked on developing processes to 
manufacture the isotopes (AEIs) and began to conduct a proof of concept 
clinical trial (Phase II). However, after seven years, Organon made a 
decision that Actinium had to obtain a new source of funding and the 
company was forced to seek new financial backing.  
The company’s problems in retaining Organon’s funding may have been 
related to the founding management team’s ability to run the company. 
According to the CEO that eventually took over: 
‘These founding scientists had no real business experience and did not have 
a good understanding of the amounts of drug product required to treat 
                                            
22 No discovery capabilities were part of the firm’s operation so the company was formed as a NRDO 
company – No Research Development Only company. 
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patients and no understanding of how material would be obtained to run 
large scale trials.’  
It is worth noting that it was Organon that created the company with its own 
scientists and while the idea was new and exciting the operational and 
development skills of those scientists were questionable. Organon put in 
place a management team that were strong in their scientific capabilities but 
not in their company management, manufacturing or operational capabilities. 
Therefore the level of support that was required to help run the company was 
significant. This support had been provided for seven years and Organon 
recognized that a different set of skills were required to help the company in 
its operational goals that were better provided by a new set of financiers. 
Traditionally, VC support is not just financial in nature but also includes 
managerial, operational and strategic advice which may explain why the 
company were looking for new finance.  
2. Sustaining operations and the role of private equity 
In July of 2000, the management team approached a private equity group 
General Atlantic, primarily funded by Charles Feeney23, and were successful 
in obtaining funding from this group on a long term basis. However, although 
the new financiers implemented changes to the management team, they did 
not fundamentally change the orientation of the firm in terms of its business 
model. After a review of Actinium’s accomplishments, the new financiers 
acknowledged that the technology was potentially very exciting. However, 
the sentiment expressed was that:  
‘The company was being run by a group that couldn’t deliver.’  
This signaled that the new financiers had problems with the management 
team’s ability to run the company and while Actinium agreed to the new 
financier’s terms and conditions24 this ultimately included implementation of 
changes to the company’s management team.   The management team had 
                                            
23 Known as the fourth largest philanthropist of the 20th century. 
24 No funding amounts were disclosed 
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noticeably failed to make any progress with respect to the product 
development milestones.  
However, despite these changes in financial management and support, the 
company has still not been able to demonstrate any notable clinical success 
since the new financiers took over which makes General Atlantic’s 
commitment to Actinium quite interesting and intriguing. Their commitment 
has lasted for almost 10 years despite no published clinical progress. 
Sources within the firm have suggested that General Atlantic’s commitment 
to the company was related to the attitude of one of its lead investors, 
Charles Feeney, 
 ‘The funding process was made easier by the fact that the main financier 
believed in the product. Charles Feeney is behind this company as an 
individual.’  
During this time period, there were no real changes to the overall focus of the 
business model (the company has remained a NRDO company throughout 
its lifespan). Actinium in-licensed two monoclonal antibody (MAb)25 products26 
the second of which was acquired in 200527 in an effort to supplement its 
pipeline. The new MAb would be used for clinical trials related to gastric 
cancer and solid tumours. Importantly, prior to this, the firm had only 
concentrated on the indication of Acute Myeloid Leukemia for the previous 
12 years.  
What is unusual is that the company has managed to sustain its funding 
during the last 10 years, despite no clinical success. Again this is a 
timeframe not typical for private investors in this sector who usually look for 
returns or an exit in a 3-5 year timeframe (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). This 
timeframe is double that normal period. This illustrates the critical importance 
                                            
25 For use with their radiopharmaceutical drug products. 
26 The first MAb came from Protein Design Labs (PDL), a small biopharmaceutical company, and was 
in-licensed in 2003. 
27 It was discovered and characterized by researchers at the German National Research Centre for 
Environment and Health. 
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of the private equity investor in the role of financial and strategic support to 
this company in particular. 
6.2.2. PanGenetics 
PanGenetics was originally a firm first formed as a discovery and 
development (DD) firm in The Netherlands in 1996, focused on antibodies. 
However, the company was not successful in its development efforts and 
was in fact dormant when it was reinvigorated by Index Ventures, 9 years 
after its formation, in 2005. The firm was reformed as a no research 
development only (NRDO) firm by Index Ventures who were the primary 
force behind this reinvigoration.  PanGenetics concentrated on the 
development of two products (out of its four) one of which was in-licensed as 
the result of financial influence (discussed later). The firm went on to 
successfully develop and sell the in-licensed antibody to Abbot late last year 
when the product successfully passed Phase I trials.  However, the firm will 
be shut down following the closure of the successful Abbot deal (£170m) 
despite its success with this in-licensed product and the remaining 3 other 
products in the pipeline. 
PanGenetics was chosen as part of this research in order to understand 
more about the younger NRDO Firm including its formation and subsequent 
product development strategy. This research is concerned with knowing 
more about how and why this type of firm is formed, how the role of finance 
interacts with these activities in the firm and changing markets for 
technology.  The story of PanGenetics is a particularly interesting example of 
all of these research issues and so the following key findings related to 
PanGenetics are discussed: 
1. Index Ventures was the main driving force behind the creation of the 
business model for the newly reinvigorated ‘PanGenetics’ known as 
the ‘asset centric’ NRDO firm.  
2. Venture Capital financing imposed strict conditions for in-licensing that 
impacted the firm’s innovation strategy. 
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1. Index Ventures and the ‘Asset Centric’ Business Model  
Index had originally decided to form a new NRDO company and was 
searching for suitable antibodies with which to set up a new company. They 
found these in a dormant company in Holland called PanGenetics28.  Initially, 
Index considered buying the antibodies from PanGenetics and starting a 
fresh company. However, they decided that rather than forming a new 
company they would ‘restart’ PanGenetics with new management29 and new 
financing. A key reason for this decision to restart PanGenetics was related 
to finance. Index believed that the public markets in Holland were reasonably 
healthy at that time.  Only a few biotechnology companies were listed on the 
Amsterdam exchange which appeared to be well supported by local 
investors. The decision was made to reinvigorate this existing company so 
that they would have a trading record in Holland which the firm considered to 
be key to a Dutch public stock market listing at a later date. This suggests 
that the influence of capital markets in this case was significant in two ways: 
the role of the venture capitalists was key to the survival of a firm and the 
influence of favourable public stock markets also was factored into the firm’s 
survival.  
However, another critical aspect to this ‘experiment’ was that Index wanted 
to form the company around products; what they called an ‘asset centric 
model.’ They never intended to set up what they called a ‘technology based’ 
(discovery related activities) company and therefore, the premise of the 
formation of the company was based on the development of a product(s) and 
not the discovery of new products, 
 ‘The asset was the centre of our investment case. We were investing in a 
product and not in a company. We wanted to invest not in a technology but in 
                                            
28 Index’ involvement in PanGenetics was the result of an experiment. They wanted to set up a 
company alone  so that they would be the main thrust behind the formation of a company. Index 
wanted to know if it could successfully set up a company itself, get it financed, operational and to a 
point where it would make money. Usually venture capitalists invest in a company or set up a 
company in conjunction with a founder based on someone else’s idea for a product or technology 
but in this case Index was not approached by anyone to fund a business, rather, they decided to 
create a business and then find the product to base the business upon.  
29 The CEO was the only remaining management team member so new management was needed. 
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a specific product. All our due diligence would be around that product and its 
profile. There would be no technology component to that.’ 
This singular focus on a product rather than a technology platform for 
discovery was the most important facet of the business model and 
represents a new type of investment model30 for this sector. Historically, 
developments in technology have been the driving force behind the formation 
of many new firms and subsequent investment in those firms but in this case, 
it was purely the desire to develop products rather than the technology and 
discovery capabilities. This also meant that the company was only set up to 
develop products with a view to then ceasing operations once this had been 
accomplished. Therefore, this business model meant that the company was 
inherently transient and with a much shorter lifespan than is commonly 
acknowledged. The interesting aspect of this case is that this company was 
focusing on a later phase of product and clinical development than is 
commonly acknowledged for new small firms in this sector. 
2. Venture Capital Finance and Product Development: Influence of Financial 
Providers  
In March of 2006, less than a year after it was formed, the company raised 
!13 million through a new financing round including participation by Index 
Ventures as well as ABN AMRO Capital and Crédit Agricole Private Equity. 
However, this financing had a series of conditions attached that also 
impacted the ability of the company to implement its product development 
and innovation strategy: Kevin Johnson from Index Ventures had to take on 
the role of full time CEO31 (as this was a key condition of closing this finance 
round) and the company had to secure rights to an external product. As a 
result, the company entered into negotiations with Schering Plough in an 
attempt to secure new products for the company based on its contractual 
obligations to its financiers, despite the fact that it already had internal 
products in its pipeline. The company believed initially that these negotiations 
                                            
30  This exists in conjunction with other more established modes of investment. 
31 Who hadn’t intended on becoming the full time CEO but was to go back to Index and ‘do more 
investing.’ A search for another CEO had been conducted but nobody suitable was found.  
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would be successful as Schering Plough had a number of potentially 
interesting compounds that they were willing to discuss for out-licensing. 
However, issues in the negotiation process became time consuming and in 
the end, PanGenetics did not in-license any products from Schering Plough, 
‘The Schering Plough deal was a ridiculous condition imposed by the new 
investors who wanted us to prove that we could get assets in, they didn’t 
care what asset, they just wanted the company to prove that we could get 
assets in. We did that as a demonstration project. It wasn’t a particularly 
valuable thing to do. We were wasting our time. We never picked anything 
up out of Schering Plough. The deal was a bust.’ 
While the PanGenetics management team did not necessarily agree with 
these conditions to obtain products externally, this illustrates that the 
conditions had to be met and the innovation strategy therefore reflected the 
wishes of these venture capital investors. It also illustrates another 
interesting point related to the beliefs of external investors and the role of in-
licensing. Product in-licensing as both an exercise and a capability, was 
important to the new investors who believed that obtaining external products 
was critical to the firm’s success; enough to warrant a contractual obligation.  
However, the company had also entered into negotiations with another small 
company, LayLine Genomics in pursuit of one of their products, a nerve 
growth antibody. Initially PanGenetics entered into a licensing deal32 with 
LayLine but as LayLine’s future looked uncertain33, they converted the 
license to a full purchase of the antibody that became the PG 110 product 
(that would later form the successful deal with Abbot). LayLine had serious 
issues with financial corporate governance which contributed to their closure 
and the sale of the PG 110 product. However, the evidence here indicates 
that there is greater complexity in the markets for technology than perhaps 
                                            
32  The founder of this company was known by Kevin Johnson for a number of years and was a former 
colleague at Cambridge University (Laboratory of Molecular Biology). The historical personal history 
was a key part of the reason for this deal. 
33 The company was experiencing financial difficulties and could not pursue any further development 
of its products. 
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has been acknowledged as this case illustrates that small firms also trade 
products amongst themselves. 
Figure 11. PanGenetics and the Development of the NGF Antibody 
 
In 2009, PanGenetics publicised the success of a Phase I trial for PG 110, 
the nerve growth antibody that was purchased from LayLine. Abbott acquired 
the product in November 2009 for $170 million. Several companies bid for 
the product reflecting considerable competition and according to the 
company, the generous terms of this deal resulted from this competition for 
the product. PanGenetics had effectively undertaken a successful 
development programme which proved the worth of the product to potential 
buyers. Overall, the development of the PG110 product is interesting 
because of how it was passed from one company to another, each of which 
worked on a different aspect of its development. This particular type of 
product development pathway in this sector is not well documented in terms 
of the way in which multiple companies are involved in the iterative 
ownership and development process which is illustrated here. PanGenetics’ 
contribution was to effectively develop these products in readiness for their 
next stage of development, usually the remit of the larger firm. It is also 
interesting how the company was able to add value to a product where other 
companies had failed (LayLine).  
The reinvigoration and development of the new PanGenetics and its 
subsequent financial corporate governance illustrates an interesting story 
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related to the financial provider influences on firm formation and 
development in this sector where the emphasis appears to be on external 
product acquisition. The company will not pursue further product acquisition 
and there are no plans to develop the remaining products34. The company 
anticipates selling remaining products and assets while staff will look for 
other opportunities. PanGenetics will cease to exist in the relatively near 
future and will disappear into the history books of the Pharmaceutical sector 
making the story of this particular business model all the more interesting for 
its inherent transitory nature.  
6.2.3. ProStrakan  
The former CEO of Shire Pharmaceuticals and Professor John Kanis formed 
Strakan in 1995. The firm was based on a business model for developing 
generic products and it also in-licensed clinical stage products for 
development so it was a NRDO firm. Within four years the company had its 
first product on the market. For nine years Strakan operated as a NRDO firm 
initially focusing on generic products.  Then in 2004 the company decided to 
become publicly listed on the stock market and embarked on an IPO. As part 
of this process, it merged with ProSkelia to add discovery activities and an 
early stage pipeline to the firm’s capabilities and changed their name to 
ProStrakan. However, the expanded pipeline and the clinical testing 
requirements of existing products put financial pressure on the firm and two 
years later, ProStrakan divested these discovery capabilities in a move to 
focus financial resources on the development of clinical stage compounds. 
ProStrakan35 continues to pursue the development only business model and 
has a number of products on the market.  
ProStrakan is another interesting example of a NRDO firm but also illustrates 
how and why these types of companies may adapt and change their 
business model. While ProStrakan is now focused on achieving success 
                                            
34 The company never pursued the clinical development of its two other products PG 120 and PG140 
due to both financial constraints and inherent problematic product characteristics, but rather it 
concentrated its resources on its two most promising products, PG102 and PG110. 
35 Now calls itself a Specialty Pharmaceutical company. 
 
146 
through marketing and late stage clinical product development, there was a 
period in its history when it believed that this business model approach was 
not adequate. The following key points in relation to the origin of this firm, the 
changes to its business model and the role of trade in products and 
knowledge are discussed in greater detail: 
1. Strakan was formed as a generic36 company business model by an 
entrepreneur to develop and sell generic products as quickly as 
possible supported by in-licensing to fill the pipeline. 
2. The company merged with a discovery company (ProSkelia) based on 
financier recommendations to add discovery capabilities to its 
business model. 
3. The company’s acquired discovery subsidiary, Proskelia, was 
divested in order to fund investment in commercialisation resource 
needs and so the company became a NRDO firm once again. 
1. Origin of Strakan and the business model approach using in-licensing 
One of the founding principles was that Strakan would have the capabilities 
to develop products and get them approved and marketed. There were no 
discovery capabilities built for the company. The company wanted to focus 
on clinical development activities and in-licensing was the primary vehicle 
that the company used to build its product portfolio. This was certainly in 
contrast to the more widely acknowledged research and development model. 
According to the head of clinical development: 
 ‘Shire and Strakan and some other companies started the other way round. 
They focused on getting some products to market and then doing the 
complicated stuff later. Harry Stratford’s success with Shire meant that he 
knew this particular product market well so he founded Strakan on the 
                                            
36 In most cases, generic products are available once the patent protections afforded to the original 
developer have expired. Generic drugs are identical or within an acceptable bioequivalent range to 
the brand name counterpart with respect to pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic properties. By 
extension, therefore, generics are considered (by the FDA) identical in dose, strength, route of 
administration, safety, efficacy, and intended use (www.fda.gov) 
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principle that if there was an opportunity to establish a product quickly and 
generate revenues then these opportunities should be the company’s main 
focus rather than spending 15 years ‘in the red’ wondering if the product will 
make it to market or not.’  
For Strakan, this represented a less risky and less costly approach to drug 
development37 (in no small part because of the founder’s knowledge of the 
business) and due to the nature of generic product development regulatory 
requirements, these products did not require the complicated and extensive 
clinical trials associated with non-generic, New Chemical Entities (NCEs).  
The founders of Strakan made a conscious decision (initially) not to pursue 
discovery activities because of a more compelling belief in the need to first 
build a sound financial base for their company, which they did with the 
success of their first product and this is in marked contrast to the actions of 
many of its peers at the time. This approach, at the time, represented a very 
different business model characterised by the fact that it was not an 
academic spin out concentrating on research but a fully integrated small firm 
pursuing a generic and NRDO approach.  
In-licensing was a key part of this strategy and the company has in-licensed 
five key products38 in the last 15 years. The extensive in-licensing activity 
demonstrates the importance of this method of acquiring products to this 
type of firm. It is interesting to note that the firm continued to in-license 
despite a new internal source of potential products (ProSkelia) acquired later 
on. The company was very careful in the selection of a particular type of 
product in terms of its in-licensing and this may also be a key explanatory 
factor in the company’s ability to maintain this business model,  
‘We just keep a very simple focus on what we’re here to do. We are not here 
to win Nobel prizes for science we are here to come up with very suitable 
                                            
37 Clinical trials are not generally required for generics. Companies need to simply prove 
bioequivalence and manufacturing capabilities in terms of quality and safety. 
38 However, the rights to the sale of products in various markets have been obtained in separate 
licensing deals. 
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products for medical need and the simpler those products are the easier it is 
for me to develop them. If they’re more complex it adds risk into it. While that 
might not be very exciting – one of the rules is that products don’t have to be 
exciting or sexy to be good products.  A good drug is a good drug.’ 
2. The Role of the IPO in the Merger with ProSkelia  
The IPO was a critical funding mechanism to move the company forward in 
supporting and funding its development goals for the products that it had 
acquired. It was also critical for the company’s investors who had to have an 
exit strategy which the IPO provided (these were approaching their 3/5 year 
investment timelines). However, a year prior to the IPO, in 2004, Strakan 
was persuaded to merge with ProSkelia (an Aventis spinout formed in 2002). 
At the same time, ProSkelia was also being persuaded to merge in order to 
prepare for a public offering of their own. According to the head of clinical 
development, 
‘The various investors and analysts pointed out that the so called wisdom at 
the time was that we needed to be more of an integrated company; in other 
words do everything from wall to wall. From a development/R&D point of 
view it (Strakan) was effectively unproven. The idea was that by putting the 
two companies together, you would have a discovery pipeline, a larger R&D 
group, a larger portfolio and that made you more complete in making the IPO 
possible whereas as individual companies it wouldn’t.’ 
So based on the recommendations of their financial supporters, Strakan 
merged with ProSkelia in 2004 (to form ProStrakan), illustrating that financial 
influence was key in terms of the development and business orientation of 
this company. The company’s investors brokered the merger with ProSkelia 
as the key investors in ProSkelia were also key investors in Strakan. 
Ultimately the merger was designed to enhance the new combined 
company’s valuation prospects. This is interesting and suggests that the 
financiers’ believed in the need for the company to be fully integrated i.e. to 
have discovery capabilities and consequently viewed it as being critical to the 
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success of the company’s public valuation. These financiers believed that 
there was more value in being a DD firm than being a NRDO firm.  
3. Focus on Commercialisation  
However, the merger with ProSkelia meant that the company was in 
possession of a much larger pipeline and to date, had very little attrition in its 
own pipeline. This created a financial problem for the company as it then had 
to decide how to allocate the limited financial resources in terms of early 
stage (exploratory) or later stage clinical development (exploitation) projects. 
However, the big commercial plans that the company had in terms of their 
marketed products were ultimately not financially compatible with their new 
discovery and development business model. The company also realised that 
they could monetise considerable value in ProSkelia and at the same time 
retain selected commercialisation rights to some products.  
‘It’s important to be able to adequately support the launch of new products. 
It’s a big decision but it’s a very straightforward decision when you think 
about the pure business aspect. Clearly it then compromises your earlier 
stage pipeline but we all know that some of the earlier stage things in any 
discovery platform are going to be 12-15 years away from a product and the 
percentage chance of success is a small number. You wouldn’t compromise 
getting a new product to market to prioritise something that was in discovery.’ 
Two years later after the ProSkelia merger, the decision was made to 
prioritise financial resources and focus entirely on expansion and 
commercialisation of its later stage products that were hopefully due for 
marketing approval in the near future. Again, financial reasons played a key 
part in this next change to the business model which was for the firm to 
become a NRDO company once again. Reducing their spend on early stage 
clinical research would free up more financial resources that would be used 
for potential product launches (of which there were 5 hopefuls in Europe in 
the following 24 months and 3 potential product launches in the US in the 
following 30 months). The company recently received approval for a product 
in the US which resulted in a 20% gain in its share price. 
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6.2.4. ViroPharma, Inc. 
ViroPharma was founded in 1994 as a privately held drug discovery and 
development company by a group of scientists39 from a range of companies. 
About a year after its formation, ViroPharma obtained the US and Canadian 
rights to a Phase I product, Pleconaril40, from Eli Sanofi41 to supplement its 
discovery efforts. Pleconaril became the company’s lead product and full 
development efforts were made possible by an Initial Public Offering on the 
US stock market in 1997. During this time, the company had in-house 
generated compounds in late stage research for influenza, hepatitis C and 
viral pneumonia but Pleconaril was ViroPharma's first compound put into 
development and a primary indication for the common cold was ultimately 
pursued.  
However, in 2002, a year after the company submitted its New Drug 
Application (NDA) for Pleconaril, the US Food and Drug Administration 
rejected the application for the product’s approval. This caused substantial 
changes to be made to the company, the most notable of which was the 
discontinuation of ViroPharma’s discovery efforts and the reorientation of its 
business model to become a NRDO firm. It in-licensed products from Lilly 
(Vancocin – an antibiotic which was a marketed product) and 
GlaxoSmithKline (Maribavir - an oral antiviral drug candidate in Phase I) and 
sold its rights to Pleconaril in addition to discontinuing its discovery efforts in-
house. In 2009 the company reported 34% growth for the year in net product 
sales indicating that its recovery seems to be well on track.  
ViroPharma represents yet another interesting type of NRDO firm. In this 
case, the firm did not start out as an NRDO firm but adapted its business 
model from the classical biotechnology business model of a discovery and 
development firm to that of the NRDO firm with no discovery capabilities. The 
                                            
39 The founders were mainly experienced RNA virologists who had been laid off in the deal between 
Eli Sanofi and Eastman Kodak which saw the discontinuation of some discovery activities 
40 A novel compound that integrates into the capsid of picornaviruses, including enteroviruses and 
rhinoviruses, preventing the virus from attaching to cellular receptors and uncoating to release RNA 
into the cell. 
41  This product ultimately came into Sanofi’s pipeline via Eastman Kodak. 
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following key points related to ViroPharma’s origin, changing product 
development and innovation strategies, its adaptation and subsequent 
revitalization and their relevance to this research are discussed in greater 
detail: 
1. ViroPharma was formed by an independent group of experienced 
scientists who wanted to form their own discovery and development 
company. Scientists from large pharmaceutical companies and 
formed the basis of the company. 
2. ViroPharma in-licensed drugs to support drug discovery efforts almost 
from its inception and then throughout its lifespan.  
3. The firm made a deliberate decision to change its business orientation 
to ensure the survival of the firm by divesting its discovery capabilities 
and engaged in further in-licensing and acquisition efforts to support 
the development of the NRDO firm by obtaining marketed products 
and clinical stage products. 
1. Origin of ViroPharma  
ViroPharma’s formation by a group of entrepreneurial scientists with 
corporate experience represents an interesting type of small firm in this era. 
The formation of the company was inextricably linked to the changes taking 
place in other large companies. Eastman Kodak sold off their prescription 
drug business to Eli Sanofi as they had scaled back on their discovery work. 
Consequently, the founders of ViroPharma were able to obtain equipment 
and recruit scientists as a result of these actions and this change in strategy. 
This is interesting because firm formation of this type is not well documented 
in the literature and although the extensive changes in the strategies of large 
pharmaceutical firms during this period have been discussed, the impact on 
the formation and development of small firms has not.  
2. In-licensing to Supplement Discovery Activities 
ViroPharma supplemented its discovery capabilities with the purchase of 
Pleconaril within a year of its formation. Pleconaril was originally discovered 
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by the same scientists who had since moved to ViroPharma (via Sterling 
Winthrop that had become part of Eastman Kodak and then Eli Sanofi) and it 
was these scientists that were influential in obtaining the product and 
bringing it to ViroPharma. Pleconaril was also an important strategic fit for 
ViroPharma which was formed to develop antiviral pharmaceuticals42 and the 
company believed that the addition of a clinical Phase I product to its pipeline 
would be financially beneficial also43. This was related to their valuation in 
terms of raising venture capital. 
Pleconaril was in Phase I but what is interesting is this type of out-licensing 
activity from large pharmaceutical firms to small firms taking place in the mid 
1990s.  This type of knowledge exchange is not well documented in the 
literature on the related markets for technology in this sector and neither is 
the key role of scientists in the movement of these products between firms. 
Also, Eli Sanofi, (having just purchased Eastman Kodak’s prescription drugs 
business) was executing a product portfolio decision which meant that it did 
not consider Pleconaril a priority programme as it was willing to divest this 
product. This has implications for the markets for technology illustrating a 
different role played by both large and smaller firms; small firms as buyers 
rather than sellers of products of this type and large firms as sellers rather 
than buyers of this type.  
3. The Transition to Becoming a No Research Development Only Company 
In 2002, the FDA declared that the company had failed to show adequate 
safety for Pleconaril and the stock price fell dramatically (the stock price 
plunged from $22 a share to $.87 a share in 2002). Consequently the 
changes that the company had to make to its business as a result of the ‘not 
approvable’ decision were considerable. The firm implemented a series of 
new strategic decisions related to its product development effort. At this point 
in the company’s development, three key decisions were made: The first was 
to start the process of reducing and ultimately eliminating all early stage 
                                            
42 ViroPharma’s capabilities included molecular target selection and assay development technologies 
to enable the development of proprietary chemical inhibitors and a specialized chemical library. 
43 Pleconaril is active against viruses in the picornavirus family. 
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discovery activities and with that related capabilities in exploratory drug 
discovery, the second was to buy in drugs from other companies and the 
third was sell Pleconaril.  
The company scaled back on its discovery operations and reduced their 
overall workforce by 70%. This move was designed to save money for the 
company. Overall, the belief was that it was better to try and save the 
company and keep it operational but with a different approach and new 
products. The new business model would be based on late stage clinical 
development and product marketing but not product generation through 
discovery. The expectation was that this would be the way in which the 
company would recover financially because they would obtain greater 
support from the public stock markets for this change in business model 
orientation away from discovery efforts. According to their head of corporate 
development: 
 ‘We had to take into consideration the vagaries of the markets related to 
financing to keep us alive. We came to the conclusion that the market was 
simply not rewarding early stage research. We had to get ourselves closer to 
market and be perceived as a company that would likely be commercial 
sooner than we would otherwise have been. We changed ourselves around 
to be a late stage clinical development company.  It’s rare that you make a 
plan like that and it actually works but it did for us. Today we still do not 
invest in discovery stage assets.’     
Ultimately, this was done in response to a belief by the management team 
that the public stock market would support this decision (and thus the stock 
price would increase). The alternative was to retain discovery capabilities 
and with it the related expenditure and to also continue investment in 
Pleconaril. The company simply did not believe that continuing investment in 
its discovery assets would generate a suitable return in the timeframe 
required and wanted to free up financial resources to spend on other 
activities. This represents an unusual change in orientation for a firm such as 
this because their core capabilities and strengths are generally viewed in the 
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literature as lying in discovery based activities and not in later stage clinical 
development nor marketing. 
Maribavir was purchased for $3.5 million in 2003 (prior to the sale of 
Pleconaril) and Vancocin was purchased for $116 million in 2004. Maribavir 
was in-licensed from GlaxoSmithKline and the rights to Vancocin were 
purchased from Eli Lilly. This deal was therefore critical for the company 
because it represented the opportunity to obtain a marketed product that 
would generate revenue. The head of corporate development remarked that 
this deal was important in facilitating the recovery of the company: 
‘We went out and did a very complicated financing deal and were able to 
acquire Vancocin from Eli Lilly.  And overnight, it dramatically changed our 
company.’ 
Within two years of purchasing this product, it provided significant revenue 
for the company. The company was obviously willing to invest substantially 
to buy new products which is interesting given their stock price collapse and 
their decision to shutter discovery operations in the name of cost cutting. It 
appears that this was more a decision to reallocate resources to other 
projects such as Vancocin. But it illustrates the conviction that this product 
acquisition was critical for the success of the company. Vancocin was an 
approved product with relatively no uncertainty. This justified the substantial 
investment required. However, what was also notable about this transaction 
was that the company was able to procure the rights44 to an already 
marketed product from a large pharmaceutical firm. This implies that Lilly 
was also making a product portfolio based decision to sell a marketed 
product which is somewhat surprising given that marketed products generate 
revenue. GlaxoSmithKline was also making similar portfolio management 
decisions around its products when it sold Maribavir.  
                                            
44 In addition, the firm had access to manufactured product and ongoing manufacturing capabilities 
which was a bonus in terms of ease of production. 
 
155 
In November 2003, ViroPharma out-licensed Pleconaril to Schering-Plough 
for $10m. ViroPharma was ultimately not willing to make any further 
investment in the clinical development of Pleconaril and was able to convince 
Schering Plough to buy the rights to the product. ViroPharma ultimately 
made the same decisions that both Sterling, Eastman and Sanofi (see 
above) had made before it.  
Figure 12. Development of Pleconaril and the Role of ViroPharma 
 
 
The diagram shows the movement of Pleconaril from company to company 
illustrating how the development of a product can in fact be undertaken by 
more that one company and consequently how intricate the markets for 
products and knowledge can become in this sector. It also illustrates how 
products can represent value for some companies, but not for others and this 
value can and will change over time. ViroPharma made another substantial 
financial investment four years after the Vancocin purchase when they 
agreed to purchase another company for its product, Cynrize. This strategic 
decision to buy the company rather than the product was the preferred 
course of action for Lev Pharmaceuticals and ViroPharma agreed to the 
terms and conditions.  
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In February 2009, ViroPharma announced that the Phase III study for 
Maribavir failed to achieve its goal and development on this product has 
been halted. This has meant that the company no longer has any products in 
clinical development. ViroPharma is now concentrating its resources on its 
two main marketed products Cinryze and Vancocin focusing on expanding 
product markets abroad and conducting additional clinical trials as 
necessary. The reported growth and success of the company last year 
suggests that this business model and their particular focus on late stage 
development and product marketing have proved very successful for the 
company.  
6.2.5. Summary 
The case studies above illustrate a number of interesting issues associated 
with the NRDO firms. ProStrakan and ViroPharma illustrate the dominance of 
exploitation over exploration in terms of financial resource allocation. Both 
firms indicated that they discontinued exploratory discovery activities in 
favour of more certain outcomes from exploitation based activities. The 
formation of PanGenetics also illustrates the preference of financiers for the 
exploitation focused model while the Actinium story illustrates that this model 
was considered sustainable by its investors despite the lack of success. 
These case studies also provide compelling evidence for the changes in 
markets for technology and the role of surplus unexploited knowledge in their 
formation and development.  
6.3. Discovery and Development Firms 
6.3.1. Actelion 
Actelion was founded as a discovery45 and development firm in December of 
1997 by a group of scientists that had been working together at F. Hoffman 
La Roche (Roche). Soon after its formation, Actelion in-licensed Tezosentan 
from Roche which had been discovered by one of the Actelion founders.  A 
                                            
45 The discovery focus is the design, synthesis and optimization of small molecular weight drug-like 
molecules 
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successful IPO took place in April of 2000 and various co-promotion 
agreements strengthened the financial position of the company. The 
company continued to in-license products which it believed complemented its 
pipeline. It also spun out a company, Axovan, for the development of some 
products which was then re-acquired in 2003. The company remains a 
discovery and development firm and it has 3 marketed products as well as a 
range of products in various stages of discovery and clinical development. 
The following key points are discussed in relation to this case study: 
1. Actelion was formed was a DD firm by a group of ex Roche scientists 
but in-licensed a Roche product within months of its inception.  
2. Actelion has also continued to in-license products despite having a 
strong in-house research capability.  
3. Actelion spun out a company for which a Roche product was in-
licensed to supplement the spin out’s pipeline. 
1. Formation of Actelion – The Role of Roche  
The founders of Actelion were committed to forming their own organization 
and dissatisfaction with various decisions related to product development 
that had been made at Roche appears to have been a key factor in the 
genesis of the new company. The new company was specifically formed to 
be a DD firm as the new management team believed that discovery activities 
were critical to their success. About five months after its formation, Actelion 
acquired Tezosentan from Roche who had made a decision not to pursue 
the development of this product. Roche was unfamiliar with the nature of the 
product in question and this was one of the key factors which influenced the 
decision by Roche not to continue development of the product:  
‘If you have a new mechanism of action you are dealing with a lot of 
Intellectual uncertainty which is a key factor: If you have a lot of this, you 
have disagreement. Nobody can make a decision. You need not take ‘no’ 
from so called management. Make a proposal - that is what we did. We had 
already decided at the time that we wanted to create our own company.’ 
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The acquisition of the Roche product by a small company like Actelion is 
unusual and provides interesting evidence of the changes in the markets for 
technology, in terms of the role of small DD firms and large firms. The 
acquisition of the product (they in-licensed it) was contingent on both the 
personal relationships with Roche management and the experience of the 
Actelion management team. Actelion convinced Roche management that 
they could successfully develop the product. The founders felt that because 
of their working history together and their combined network of contacts they 
could make the new company successful, 
‘We got Tezosentan based on the fact that Roche thought that we were the 
best group to bring Tezosentan forward (it was discovered by Martine Clozel, 
a founding member of Actelion). Ultimately it is a people business. It’s 
knowing people and having the credibility with people. Obviously having 
inside knowledge and information with knowing the right people at Roche 
was important for this. This was not a normal in-license.’ 
The sale of the product by Roche to Actelion is unusual and represents an 
interesting mode of product development for large pharmaceutical 
companies also as well as a change in the markets for technology.  Roche 
was putting the development of their product into the hands of another 
company as they did not want to pursue the development of these products. 
Again, this flow of products and knowledge from a large company to a small 
company is unusual in this sector. 
2.  Further In-licensing to Support Product Development and Innovation  
The company has a mixture of products in discovery, pre-clinical and clinical 
development as well as marketed products. Its product development history 
is an illustration of an eclectic mix of strategies. These include in-house 
generated products in addition to in-licensed products, collaborative research 
programmes with other companies, acquisition of companies and products 
as well as out-licensing of products and a corporate spin out of its own. 
However, in-licensing has always been an important part of the company’s 
strategy and was also instrumental in the company obtaining venture capital 
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in its early stages. As noted earlier, Roche’s decision to discontinue 
development of two of its products played a key role in the development of 
Actelion. Actelion went on to successfully develop one of these products and 
later out-licensed the other thus profiting from Roche’s decision not to invest 
in the development of these products. In 2002, Zavesca (Gaucher’s disease) 
was in-licensed from Oxford GlycoSciences.46 .Actelion’s next in-licensing 
deal in 2008 was with Nippon Shinyaku for Selexipag, for pulmonary arterial 
hypertension; the same indication as its lead marketed drug, Tracleer 
(Bosentan). This deal was important for the company because this drug was 
a potential competitor. The extent of the in-licensing activity is unusual for 
firms of this type (small DD firms) and not well discussed in the literature but 
it is especially interesting because in-licensing products is not typical for 
firms that have in-house discovery capabilities like Actelion. 
Actelion has also engaged in a company acquisition to acquire a product 
which it believed was important for its product portfolio. Ventavis47 was 
acquired in 2006 through the acquisition of its license holder US company 
CoTherix.  The acquisition was necessary as in-licensing was not an option 
(the product was the sole asset of CoTherix). Again, this type of activity is 
interesting to observe in smaller DD companies particularly for products that 
have already reached the marketing stage. It is interesting that the company 
was able to develop products in-house to reach the marketing approval stage 
and provides evidence that these small companies have competencies in 
areas such as clinical development and regulatory affairs; not something that 
is usually associated with these types of DD firms. The current literature 
focuses on these companies as upstream providers of knowledge and 
generally not market focused entities. The ability of these small firms to 
successfully develop and market products is not widely acknowledged. 
                                            
46 A deal that was a result of networking and according to Dr. Fischli ‘…a golf course product’. 
47 This product was for the same indication as Actelion’s main product and represented an important 
strategic marketing acquisition for Actelion because of its focus on the Pulmonary Arterial 
Hypertension market. 
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3. Alternative Product Development Strategy – Corporate Spin outs (Axovan) 
In 2000, a group of Actelion scientists wanted to leave the firm and set up 
their own firm. Axovan was set up in 2000 and was formed by Actelion 
scientists with support from Actelion. The company was set up as a spin out 
of Actelion. In setting up the firm, Actelion had all the rights to those 
compounds put into the company. The creation of Axovan was viewed as a 
necessity in order to maintain important relationships with scientists who had 
expressed an interest in leaving the company, 
‘How do you respond to the innovative push of a group of scientists within 
Actelion? If we don’t do anything, we will probably lose these people. Instead 
of losing them we created Axovan and supported it very much, letting these 
people work on relatively unknown targets. We licensed in Clazozenthan 
from Roche (reasons not disclosed) then when the deal to buy Axovan was 
done everyone benefitted.’ 
Axovan was later acquired in 2003 because they had successfully developed 
one of their core products to Phase II and Actelion wanted to ensure full 
ownership of that product48.  This also suggests greater complexity in the 
markets for technology as the movement of products between Roche, 
Axovan and Actelion could be thus illustrated:  
                                            
48 This was an Endothelium Receptor Agonist product - an area in which Actelion was a leader. 
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Figure 13. Actelion and the Development of Clazozenthan 
 
This is an interesting example of how product development (and control over 
intellectual and human capital) can be managed – through the corporate spin 
out. In this instance, a new firm was formed to ensure that a core group of 
scientific personnel and their associated knowledge was not lost. The 
corporate structure of the spin out was constructed so that Actelion 
maintained exclusive rights to the products discovered. The role of corporate 
spin outs and the development of drugs is notable in the development of 
Actelion and it is remarkable how the company itself spun out a new 
organisation, 6 years later. Actelion’s development of the Roche products 
illustrates the changing markets for technology but the corporate spin out 
Axovan, illustrates the division of labour.  
6.3.2. Cara Therapeutics  
Cara Therapeutics (Cara) is a private company formed in 2004 by a group of 
scientists49 that had worked together at Arena. Cara was initially based on a 
                                            
49 These same individuals were among the founders of Arena Pharmaceuticals Inc, in San Diego 
which they left to form Cara. 
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molecule that was obtained from another company (Ferring 
Pharmaceuticals) but this was followed by the acquisition of discovery 
technology. The first lead product, the same product that was acquired from 
Ferring was out-licensed to Alza (a J&J subsidiary) in Phase I/IIa of its 
development within the first two years of the company’s formation. After out-
licensing this product, the company then developed a compound internally 
which it has successfully developed in Phase II (announced in May of last 
year). Cara recently obtained a new injection of VC finance (July 2010). Cara 
is another interesting case study because of its formation, based on a 
product from another large pharmaceutical company and also because within 
the space of two years the company had effectively out-licensed this core 
product to a different company. This company’s approach to financing and its 
experiences with financing also illustrate alternative perceptions associated 
with the role of VC finance and how this may impact discovery activities at 
the firm. These key points are discussed as follows: 
1. Cara was formed based on a molecule from another larger company 
but discovery technology was acquired after this initial product 
acquisition. 
2. Cara’s management team made deliberate decisions on how to 
mitigate the control of Venture Capital in their company.  
3. Cara has experienced negative perceptions of its some of its board 
members related to discovery activities perceived as a burden by 
some of these directors. 
1. Formation of Cara – Ferring Pharmaceuticals and Finance   
The company’s first (lead) product was obtained in a transaction with Ferring 
Pharmaceuticals; a company that the CEO had worked with at his last 
company. The founding members of Cara saw an opportunity to acquire a 
product through their relationship with Ferring Pharmaceuticals. This product 
was ready for Phase I clinical trials and this meant that Cara did not have to 
engage in any additional, research stage activities.  Ferring was prepared to 
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give them the molecule as part of an equity transaction (whereby they didn’t 
have to pay for the product).  
‘Ferring Pharmaceuticals put in the first molecule. They wanted a stake in a 
biotech company… We took in a molecule that had been developed all the 
way up to Phase I, in other words it was ready for Phase I. That was a 
cashless transaction for equity.’  
Cara was founded on a molecule that was obtained from another company. 
Generally, this exchange of products/knowledge has been described as 
taking place in the other direction i.e. from small classical biotechnology 
companies to large pharmaceutical companies. The evidence presented 
here again illustrates that this is not necessarily a uni-directional flow of 
products and knowledge. What is also interesting is that the originating 
company (Ferring) chose this particular mode of product development. 
Rather than develop this product in-house, they opted to exchange all of the 
related IP in an equity transaction whereby they acquired ownership of a 
percentage of shares in Cara. This illustrates the changing markets for 
technology once again and the different type of origin (corporate spin out). 
This is very interesting as the roles of the ‘licensor’ firms such as Ferring 
Pharmaceuticals have not been widely acknowledged in the literature. 
Ferring traded their product for equity in a new company and believed that 
they would obtain greater benefit from the product by investing it in a new 
company rather than investing in the product themselves. It would appear 
that Ferring considered this trade-off as one that best served their interests. 
Implicit in this transaction is the fact that Ferring believed that Cara was 
capable of being able to deliver something back to Ferring to make it worth 
their while to exchange the molecule for equity in the company. This type of 
transaction represents a new type of relationship in terms of both the flow of 
knowledge in this sector as well as the fact that large companies may choose 
to have another company develop their product.  
The intellectual property (IP) (drug compound) that was obtained from 
Ferring was  critical to adding value to Cara from the start and the presence 
of the compound immediately added value to the firm.  
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‘We started the company with that IP; we took over the whole IP scheme. 
That was important in that most of the valuation was related to the value of 
the compound that we obtained. If I didn’t have that, I probably couldn’t have 
raised any money.’ 
Ferring’s role in providing the first molecule was important. The trade-off for 
Ferring was that they got their stake in a new and upcoming biotechnology 
firm. This transaction was also viewed favourably by the board.  
‘The directors who don’t like the idea of enabling technology really like the 
idea that we ‘fished’ a molecule out of another company in a cashless sense 
and that someone else spent all the money on the research. So that’s the 
ideal model and you see more and more companies being funded along 
those lines.’  
This indicates the importance of a molecule that was already primed for 
clinical development.  From a financial perspective, this was very important 
for valuation and investment. Investors in the new company were willing to 
provide funding based on the acquisition of the drug from Ferring.  
The product obtained from Ferring was entered into phase I clinical 
development in the first year of Cara’s formation. Results were obtained from 
the Phase I trial of the product, CR66550, in early 2005, a year after the 
company was formed. CR 665 was then out-licensed at the beginning of 
2006. Cara entered into a worldwide licensing agreement with Alza 
Corporation, a Johnson & Johnson company and an unspecified sum was 
received in funding resulting from this transaction for CR 665. The following 
diagram depicts the product development path and illustrates the more 
complicated markets for technology: 
                                            
50 A pain drug candidate. 
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Figure 14. Cara and the Development of CR 665 
 
2. Financing the firm - Maintenance of Control and Venture Capital (VC) Fundraising 
at Cara 
In its start-up phase, the Cara management team funded the company 
without VC money51. This funding scenario using the founders’ own money 
was a conscious decision, 
‘It was deliberate. That was important for me from a control stand point. It 
was a question of making sure we could institute the business plan we 
started the company on without too much influence from VCs initially.’ 
Cara believed VC finance meant greater dilution of ownership and thus 
control and therefore this company made deliberate decisions on how to 
mitigate VC control within their company and the structure of the firm’s 
finances was the key way in which to do this. As the company chose not to 
initially finance with VC this indicates a couple of potential issues with 
respect to the prolific role of venture capital, particularly in this sector. The 
first is that VC as a funding mechanism might not necessarily be the most 
                                            
51 The Ferring transaction was cashless. The company acquired shares in Cara in return for the 
molecule. 
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favoured type of capital. The second is that it would appear that VC 
conditional attachments are seen as a barrier to some firms as these 
conditions can prohibit the company owners’ decision making abilities with 
respect to their products and development decisions. There are conditions 
attached to VC funding that act as a disincentive for some companies and 
this example shows that it can influence how they structure their company’s 
finances in terms of limiting VC involvement and influence. This is interesting 
because this example shows how small companies view the disadvantages 
of VC and what they can do to mitigate these issues which was to look for 
other ways to finance initially.  
3. Protecting Discovery Activities 
The preference of some board members for obtaining clinical stage products 
from external companies was evident at Cara. The benefits from this type of 
in-licensing are believed to be based on the fact that another company has 
already financed the research stage of the product’s development.  This 
means that these exploratory research activities don’t have to be financed 
internally making the product more attractive to investors in the licensee firm. 
Cara continues to pursue its discovery based activities but receives mixed 
support from its board on their discovery programme and as a result, has to 
defend the existence of these types of programmes;  
‘We do have a technology that I brought in deliberately for finding drugs in a 
new area. It fits nicely strategically. There are some directors on the board 
that love it. There are some directors that hate it and that’s a running battle. 
…We’re spending money on basic research and discoveries and not 
spending money on clinical trials. …We’re trying to cloak the technology in 
with clinical development to fund it. It’s a minimal amount of what we spend 
but they want to see their money go as far as it possibly can.’ 
The firm remains committed to the discovery programme: 
‘It’s worth having discovery because development does cost so much. The 
‘Fee for service’ model does not have enough of a return. The margins are 
usually too small.’  
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This suggests that there is pressure on firms in this sector not to pursue 
discovery related activities.  Overall it would appear that the company may 
struggle to continue to embed discovery related activities into their business 
due to resistance from board members on the value of such activities. This is 
where issues of control become critical for the company and the role of VC 
board members can result in an ‘anti research’ stance that may be translated 
into influential pressure to get rid of these types of activities. This suggests 
that certain types of financial influence may well be acting as a barrier to 
exploration based activities and potentially acting as a negative influence on 
the sector as a whole.  
6.3.3. Pharming  
The company was originally formed as Genfarm, a Dutch academic spin out52 
founded in 1988 formed to commercialise recombinant DNA technology, 
ultilised to create transgenic animals. It became public in 1998 and after the 
IPO, the company entered into a new phase of its development moving 
towards becoming more integrated and embarking on clinical development.  
Four years later, the company acquired another firm, DNage, in an effort to 
put renewed focus on earlier stage activities and to diversify its business. 
However, the ‘sale’ of DNAge was recently announced, four years after its 
acquisition, on the basis that the company’s finances have to be prioritised in 
favour of its commercialisation activities. This 22 year old company 
represents an interesting story of how the classical biotechnology business 
model is adapted in order for firms to survive and illustrates how financial 
pressures and changing financial fortunes can impact the firm’s product 
development and innovation strategy.  
The following key points are discussed in relation to how and why the firm 
changed its business model and the role of finance in these changes: 
1. Pharming adapted its business model to become both a discovery and 
development focused company, post IPO and it has re-orientated its 
                                            
52 Formed by Professor Herman De Boer 
 
168 
business model three times between 2002-2010 alternating between 
its identity as a research and development focused company and that 
of a development and commercialisation focused company.  
2. The most recent decision to divest DNAge has meant that the firm is 
focusing all of its efforts on becoming an exploitation oriented firm in 
the face of pending marketing authorisation of one of its products 
1. Changing Firm Orientation  
This company was formed as a new technology based research firm 
(GenFarm) in the classical biotechnology business model when the Rijks 
Universiteit of Leiden was given a subsidy from the government to research 
the production of proteins by transgenic cattle53. In 1995, a decision was 
made to restructure the firm once again54 and create a new separate 
company, Pharming, (the Dutch subsidiary). Ten years after the company 
was formed the new organisation conducted a successful IPO in 1998. 
Although the funds received from the IPO made the pursuit of clinical trials 
possible, the financial viability of the company was eventually destabilized.  
Clinical development activities were proving very costly and the firm was 
forced to make significant changes to its business model during 2001 and 
2002 due to the escalating costs of its operations.  
This restructuring began in 2001 and prompted the complete out-licensing of 
the lead product, Human Alpha Glucosidase55, to Genzyme in 2001. The 
number of research products in clinical development proved to be too much 
for the company and they eventually had to make major restructuring 
changes in a big effort to recoup operating losses and move forward in a bid 
to become a financially viable enterprise.  The company had been running at 
                                            
53 The Pharming scientists were/are able to breed animals that produce human-like proteins in their 
milk that were essentially used for enzyme replacement treatments. 
54 Financial needs forced the company to seek changes to its business a year after it was founded as 
there was no venture capital market in The Netherlands.  Once the restructuring took place, (two 
companies were formed, a US holding company GenPharm International, GPI and a Dutch 
subsidiary GenPharm BV. 
55 In 1998, the same year as the company’s IPO, they entered into a collaboration with Genzyme for 
the first human trials of their lead product, alpha-glucosidase (HAG), (produced in the milk of 
rabbits) a protein used in the treatment of a rare disease (Pompe’s disease). 
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a significant loss since its IPO in 1998 and its revenues were not enough to 
cover the various costs of operations including subsidiaries in various 
locations (Finland, Belgium).  
The company decided to scale down on its operations significantly. It 
refocused its efforts onto three of its remaining projects and made significant 
cuts to staff and operations. The company labelled its new focus as the 
‘Product Focused Business Model’ and this suggests that the firm was 
orienting itself towards the NRDO business model. Most of the projects that 
were de-prioritised were early stage projects. This was in direct response to 
financial pressure and clearly illustrates the impact of finance on the firm’s 
product development strategy, particularly their early stage assets.  The new 
‘product focused business model’ (NRDO) meant that the allocation of 
resources was not prioritised towards any exploratory/discovery stage 
projects. It illustrates that the balance of exploration and exploitation will 
change in favour of exploitation particularly when scarce financial resources 
have to be allocated among projects. 
Interestingly, once these changes had been made, 2 years later the 
company started obtaining a series of financial injections through additional 
stock offerings suggesting that the financial markets were rewarding the 
decisions made by the company.  Between 2004 and 2006, the company 
raised over !53 million representing significant injections of capital that 
coincided with a series of product and technology transactions as well as 
clinical development milestones. The most notable change during this period 
was the acquisition of DNAge, a research focused firm. DNage was founded 
as an academic spin out in 2004. Its early stage research capabilities 
provided Pharming with a more diverse portfolio of products in terms of 
therapeutic area and application. It also helped to shift the balance of 
exploration and exploitation back in favour of exploration. However, the 
acquisition of DNAge was seriously challenged by employees and caused 
substantial problems within the company. Most unusually, employee 
shareholders sued on the grounds that this was an unnecessary and poor 
decision for the company.  This was based on its expenditure on the 
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transaction which was not well received given that the firm had managed to 
turn around its financial situation by becoming more ‘product focused’ and 
thus oriented towards exploitation activities that would benefit the firm in a 
more timely fashion. Acquiring DNAge was seen as an immense setback for 
the firm. 
2. Becoming a Development Focused Company 
In May of 2010, four years after it acquired DNage, Pharming recently 
announced that it would ‘reduce its financial interest in this wholly owned 
subsidiary.’ In other words, it would no longer be the sole financial support to 
the company. The pending marketing authorization for their lead product 
Rhucin is a very important factor in this decision. Rhucin is the company’s 
oldest internally generated product for the treatment of Hereditary Angio 
Edema (HAE). The company’s regulatory filing for Rhucin was rejected in 
2007 and the company has spent the last 3 years working on resubmitting 
the regulatory package.  The company has invested in various activities to 
ensure its regulatory approval:  
‘We have to make this a priority. In a way, it’s like growing up. We are now a 
commercially focused company. You can’t fund everything.’ 
Pharming has indicated that it will refocus its business on the 
commercialization of this product in particular:  
‘We have spent 22 years in research and now we have the opportunity to 
market our own product, we have to ensure that our resources are aligned to 
this goal. The work that had to be done on the regulatory package was 
substantial and expensive but we knew we had to get there.’ 
In contrast, DNage projects are reaching the point where they require 
significant additional investments to fund clinical trials but Pharming 
management believes that they are no longer in a financial position to 
support the range of both early stage activities and pending clinical stage 
activities being undertaken by their DNage subsidiary.  
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DNage will require new sources of funding who will bear the risks while 
Pharming takes a financial step back. The funding required for the marketing 
of Rhucin will consume a great deal of resources but ultimately the company 
believes that this will lead to profitability and so early stage work and clinical 
programmes simply have to be put aside in favour of the product marketing 
finance needs.  In the 12 years since its IPO, the company has yet to make a 
profit but it believes that this is now possible with the marketing of Rhucin56. 
The decision to allocate funding away from DNage is inevitable and 
necessary, according to the management team as the company’s new focus 
has to be on the appropriate support of commercialization activities. For this 
company, this has meant that early stage research funding is cut in favour of 
the later stage marketed product as financial resources are allocated in 
favour of these commercial activities. Once again, this illustrates how the 
balance of exploration and exploitation will shift towards exploitation when 
firms face scarce financial resources.  
6.3.4. Pharmacopeia  
Pharmacopeia was initially part of a larger company formed in 199457. The 
company was spun out in 2002/3 when the parent company split. 
Pharmacopeia was spun out as a public company. Initially this was a 
discovery stage company dedicated to identifying compounds for larger 
companies. It conducted fee for service discovery activities but it moved into 
clinical development with the acquisition of clinical stage products which 
were in-licensed from a large pharmaceutical company, three years after the 
firm was spun out. The chief scientific officer championed an in-licensing 
deal with Bristol Myers Squibb which put the company into the clinical 
development sphere and substantially changed the range of activities. 
However, the number of products that required investment in clinical trials 
prompted the company to reduce its discovery capabilities (50%) in 2008 
                                            
56 Rhucin was approved late last year. 
57 The company’s discovery capabilities include ECLiPS® Technology which was licensed exclusively 
from Columbia University and Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in 1993.  ECLiPS® enabled the 
company to generate hundreds of thousands of small molecule compounds at a fraction of the cost 
of traditional chemical synthesis methods enabling the build-up of a library of over 500,000 small 
molecule compounds. 
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because of financial pressures. Then towards the end of 2008, they agreed 
to be bought out by Ligand Pharmaceuticals. 
The development of Pharmacopeia into a clinical stage firm is interesting 
because two critical changes took place for the company based on this 
change in business model and these are discussed in detail below: 
1. The orientation of the firm changed to incorporate clinical 
development but this was contingent on the in-licensing of two key 
products from a large pharmaceutical company and also contingent 
on the prior knowledge of these compounds by senior personnel at 
the company. 
2. The changing focus of the firm to include clinical development 
activities ultimately placed a large financial burden on the firm and 
forced the firm to reduce its early stage discovery activities by 50%. 
1. Becoming a Clinical Development Stage Firm – The Decision to in-License 
Collaborative working with large pharmaceutical companies in discovery 
based activities was the cornerstone of the company’s strategy for the first 2-
3 years of its life. However, in March 2006, the company entered into an 
exclusive licensing agreement with BMS and obtained the rights to two 
compounds discovered by BMS (including one product which was put into 
phase I trials in early 2007). This transaction did not involve any payment by 
Pharmacopeia to BMS; Pharmacopeia agreed to provide a set of compound 
libraries as well as milestone payments upon the achievement of successive 
clinical and regulatory events in the United States and certain other 
jurisdictions, and royalties on sales of products. This type of transaction 
would appear to be unusual for a company of this type that was so strong on 
discovery activities.  
However, there were several reasons why Pharmacopeia in-licensed two 
products. Pharmacopeia was a publicly funded company and having a 
clinical stage product meant that its chances of obtaining further financing 
through additional stock offerings would be greatly increased in addition to 
future revenue from the sale of the products. The company recognized that 
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speeding up its development timetable by in-licensing products would be 
rewarded by the public stock markets in terms of increasing its share price. It 
needed to do this because none of its products were close to the clinical 
development milestone. The head of research noted that: 
‘You go from being a discovery company and being 3 or 4 years from phase 
I, to all of a sudden you’re in phase I and if it’s in phase I and it’s been vetted, 
and could be in phase II in another year and then the company drops into a 
place where Wall street can recognise that value. 3% royalty is not a great 
business58. You don’t get rich, at least not quickly.’  
This meant that the company would move faster towards a point where the 
products would hopefully provide a better financial return either through out-
licensing or successful marketing authorization and sale.  The in-licensing 
strategy was intended to supplement the company’s own pipeline and 
illustrates the importance of this activity to a company which was a discovery 
stage company.  
However, the decision to in-license these products was not straightforward 
and there were extensive discussions at the company in terms of whether or 
not this transaction should take place. The head of research answered that 
there was a lot of persuasion needed: 
‘Yes it took a lot; an awful lot and I’m not sure that everyone is still 
persuaded. Before these two compounds the company had never done 
anything in development. The furthest we had gone was to hand off in lead 
optimization.’ 
The hesitation in terms of the decision to in-license appears more to do with 
concern over the company’s capabilities in conducting clinical trials rather 
than any belief that the company should be self-sufficient in terms of 
generating in-house products. The company were used to doing fee for 
                                            
58 They indicated that the business of providing compounds to other firms in early stages was not 
optimal in terms of revenue generation.  
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service discovery activities and consequently, clinical development wasn’t 
necessarily something that many felt comfortable doing. In addition, the 
business of in-licensing was no easy task: 
‘Most of the time if you go out and you look for packages, most of it is 
garbage. The good news is that 90% of it you can look at and see where it’s 
flawed. The real challenges are that the ones that are the 10% and you can 
still pick one that is flawed but you won’t figure out what’s wrong with it until 
you spend your money. There is almost nothing good out there. You don’t 
know what you’re buying.’ 
However, there was another aspect to the deal with BMS that played an 
integral part in Pharmacopeia’s decision to in-license these products. The 
company’s new executive Vice President (VP) of Research and Chief 
Scientific Officer was the head of Worldwide Chemistry at BMS and been in 
charge for 20 years and as a result he was familiar with the products in 
question: 
‘He knew that they had certain assets on the shelves (BMS) and so he was 
able to bring those into Pharmacopeia pretty cheaply.  So David brought in 
these things, he was the key influence because he had the information and 
he knew that these assets were there and he was able to lobby and win the 
day.’ 
It would appear that this prior knowledge of the new VP and his experience 
with these products was also a key factor in the decision to in-license and 
suggests that this was integral to the entire transaction. It was noted that the 
process of in-licensing any products from external sources is a difficult one 
because of lack of knowledge about the product but the discussion above 
illustrates that despite this prior knowledge, the company was still reluctant to 
embark on this transaction because of its lack of capabilities in clinical 
development.  
This connection between its senior executive and the newly in-licensed 
products was key for the firm and enabled the transaction to take place. 
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However, without the decision by BMS to sell the products, there would have 
been no transaction. BMS had shut down its endocrine and bone division 
and consequently there were products that would not be developed in-house 
any longer. BMS had made a strategic decision to discontinue development 
of any products related to endocrine and bone therapeutic areas and 
therefore any programmes related to these products was shut down. This 
created an opportunity for other companies to obtain these products. As the 
head of research noted,  
‘It’s sitting on the shelf so anything we give them for it is good. We could get 
it for a pittance…’ 
Pharmacopeia was able to negotiate terms that it was satisfied with and 
obtain two products in the clinical development phase directly resulting from 
another company’s prioritization and portfolio initiatives once again 
illustrating the changes in markets for technology. 
2. Financial Pressures – Changing Business Model Focus and the Reduction of 
Discovery Capabilities 
In early 2008, the firm determined that the cost of its clinical development 
programmes was having a serious impact on its financial circumstances. By 
2008, there were two programmes in clinical development with another 
programme pending clinical development and not enough available financial 
resources to fund these programmes. As a result, a decision was made to 
lay-off 50% of personnel and reduce spending on discovery during that year. 
In this case, Pharmacopeia had to make a choice between investment in its 
discovery stage assets or in its later stage clinical assets. Given that the firm 
is more likely to recoup costs from sales of a marketed product or out-
licensing, the choice was made to invest their limited financial resources in 
clinical development stage assets. As Pharmacopeia was a publicly listed 
company, its board and shareholders had input into this decision and 
therefore influenced the outcome which was to reduce investment in early 
stage research. Given that the firm was so strong in its discovery capabilities, 
this decision was surprising but it illustrates the influence of financial 
resources in terms of forcing firms to make decisions related to their product 
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development goals. It also illustrates once again that the balance of 
exploration and exploitation will shift in favour of exploitation particularly 
when financial resources have to be prioritised. Pharmacopeia was sold in 
late 2008 to Ligand Pharmaceuticals.  
6.3.5. Summary 
The case studies on the DD firms illustrate a number of interesting issues 
that challenge the current understanding of how firms in this sector operate: 
they provide evidence for a the role of finance in the changing balance of 
exploration and exploitation in the firm, the role of finance in these decisions, 
the role of a surplus of unexploited knowledge in the development of these 
firms and the increasing complexity of markets for technology. Three out of 
the four firms in-licensed products to bolster pipelines for financial reasons 
and despite in-house capabilities for drug discovery. Two of the four firms 
have sustained their discovery operations while the two other firms have 
announced plans to cut their exploratory operations illustrating that the 
balance between exploration and exploitation within some of these firms has 
shifted towards exploitation. 
6.4. Conclusion 
Chapter three outlined four key areas for research related to the following: 
The changing division of labour, the role of finance in the changing division of 
labour, the role of a surplus of unexploited knowledge in the changing 
division of labour and how the markets for technology have changed. The 
case studies were undertaken to learn more about these four key areas and 
how they impact upon each other and the essence of that interrelatedness. A 
selection of DD and NRDO firms were chosen because the trade literature 
suggested that changes were also taking place within traditional DD firms 
and that a new type of firm was evident, the NRDO firm. Chapter six 
provided evidence for the NRDO firm and outlined some key points with 
respect to the origins of these firms and the nature of these firms. Chapter 
six also provided supporting data related to key changes in DD firms.  
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These case studies have provided empirical evidence that changes to firms 
are indeed visible and that the role of finance and a surplus of unexploited 
knowledge play a key role in these changes to firms and the sector as a 
whole. The evidence indicates that financial pressures have caused firms to 
seek a different mode of operation, the NRDO firm and caused the DD firm 
to in-license clinical stage drugs. The evidence also indicates that this is 
related to a surplus of unexploited knowledge which is being traded by large 
and small firms. Details of product development indicate a deeper complexity 
in markets for technology as products are traded between two or more firms 
for development. None of these issues have been discussed to any great 
extent in the literature on the sector but this does reflect the literature on 
Distributed Innovation Processes and Open Innovation. The following 
chapter will analyse these findings in greater detail to complete the up to 
date picture of the sector.  
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Chapter 7. Understanding and Explaining the New Division of 
Labour and Changes in Markets for Technology 
7.1. Introduction  
Chapter two discussed the nature of the pharmaceutical sector and 
illustrated the roles of the two major types of firm in this industry: that played 
by the small, classical biotechnology firm and that of the large, fully 
integrated firm. The complementary roles played by these two types of firms 
illustrate the current understanding of the division of labour and the markets 
for technology in this sector. The rate of adoption of the new biotechnologies 
by large firms varied but their relationships with the smaller, new ‘classical 
biotechnology firms’ (operating in the industry as harbingers of new 
technologies, tools and processes) were prolific. Chapter two also reviewed 
studies that analysed adaptation of firms, in particular, the small classical 
biotechnology firms. It discussed the heterogeneity of firms within the 
overarching classical biotechnology firm business model indicating that 
changes to firms was an important part of the sector landscape. The primary 
aim of this research was to examine a potentially new division of labour with 
respect to the small classical biotechnology firm and to understand what 
were some of the major influences on that changing division of labour and 
the related changing markets for technology.  
The research design reflected the need to analyse the division of labour from 
a quantitative and qualitative perspective to be able to achieve the goals of 
ascertaining the extent of the division of labour, understanding the division of 
labour and understanding changes in the markets for technology. The 
research results from both types of analysis have been presented in 
Chapters five and six together with the initial responses to the findings. 
Evidence for the existence of the No Research Development Only (NRDO) 
firms is presented in Chapter 5 together with evidence of changes to the 
Discovery and Development (DD) firms and related changes to markets for 
technology.  Case study evidence in Chapter 6 provided explanations for the 
reasons behind the formation and development of these NRDO firms, 
changes to existing DD firms and changes in the markets for technology. The 
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purpose of this chapter is to now examine these changes in detail and 
explore the reasons why these changes in the division of labour have taken 
place and the major influences that are visible from the evidence presented. 
This chapter will also examine the changes in the markets for technology and 
discuss why these changes have taken place and their relationship to the 
division of labour. A discussion on the implications for the sector is also 
presented. 
This chapter is divided into a further seven sections.  Section 7.2 provides an 
overview of the main findings in relation to the changing division of labour. 
Section 7.3 discusses all evidence from the case studies and the database to 
illustrate the financial influences of capital markets on the changing division 
of labour. Section 7.4 discuses changes to DD firms specifically. Section 7.5 
discusses the availability of ‘surplus’ unexploited knowledge in the sector - 
the results of large scale exploration activities as a key factor that has 
influenced the changing division of labour and markets for technology but 
this section also discusses how this is closely aligned with the influence of 
capital markets (Venture Capital and Public Stock Markets). Section 0 
discusses changes in the markets for technology and how they are related to 
the changing division of labour in the industry and also examines the 
relationship between capital markets and the surplus of unexploited 
knowledge with markets for technology. Section 7.7 reviews the implications 
of all of these changes particularly on the changing balance of exploration 
and exploitation within the section. This section also reviews changing core 
competencies and capabilities within the firm that have resulted from the 
changes in the sector. The final section, 7.8 concludes the discussion and 
analysis. 
7.2. The Changing Division of Labour in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector  
The trade literature discussed the emergence of a new type of exploitation 
focused NRDO firm in addition to changes to existing firms also undertaking 
more exploitation focused activities (not evident in the academic literature).  
This research set out to ascertain the existence of this new type of firm and 
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therefore a new division of labour in the sector.  A quantitative analysis of the 
sector was undertaken and a random sample of drug development firms was 
compiled.  The firms were analysed based on their activities, their pipeline 
and their technological platforms.  The drug development continuum (see 
Figure 1515) was utilised to facilitate the appropriate identification of 
exploration and exploitation activities (as discussed in Chapter 4) and to 
divide the sample into two distinct cohorts: firms that were only focused on 
exploitation activities (NRDO firms) and firms that were focused on 
exploration and exploitation activities (DD firms).  The results showed that 
27% of firms in the sample were NRDO firms.  
This NRDO firm represented a new type of firm within a new division of 
labour precisely because of its focus on exploitation activities. The findings 
from the quantitative analysis showed that over 33% of the NRDO firms also 
had marketed products.  This is in contrast to its peer, the discovery and 
development (DD) firm that has activities in both exploration and exploitation 
(predominantly) activities. Only 4% of DD companies in the quantitative 
sample had marketed products.  Many small classical biotechnology firms in 
this sector were formed to commercialise new developments in the fields 
related to biotechnology and informatics. This was the essence of the 
division of labour that initially took place in the third epoch. New small 
classical biotechnology firms concentrated on new exploratory knowledge 
and technologies and formed extensive relationships with large incumbent 
firms in order to transfer this knowledge. Their contribution to the 
development of these new technologies and this exploratory research was 
critical to the wider dissemination of this new knowledge.  
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Figure 15. The Changing Division of Labour in the Pharmaceutical Sector – NRDO and DD firms 
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However, the role of these exploratory focused firms was contingent on their 
relationships with large firms in the sector who predominantly provided 
exploitation based activities and knowledge, their complementary strength. 
This was the basis for a symbiotic relationship and the resulting division of 
labour whereby the new small classical biotechnology firms focused on the 
exploratory activities on the drug development continuum related to target 
identification, target selection, lead identification, lead selection and 
incumbent firms focused on the exploitation focused pre-clinical and phase I-
III clinical trials. However, the situation has now changed with a new type of 
firm and a new division of labour. The new NRDO firms now concentrate on 
the exploitation activities, previously the bastion of the large incumbent firms. 
The questions that now must be tackled are as set out in Chapter 4: What 
has influenced this changing division of labour? Why has this change 
occurred? How has this impacted the markets for technology? 
7.3. The Role of Finance in the Changing Division of Labour  
The NRDO has been characterised as a firm that concentrates its activities 
on the development and/or marketing of drugs. The new division of labour is 
recognised because these firms do not engage in exploratory research as 
previously understood. Having established the existence and also the 
prevalence of the NRDO firm, it was necessary to understand why they were 
formed in this way and what influenced their formation. Questions related to 
the role of finance in emergence and growth of these firms is a central 
concern of this research and both the database and case study approaches 
were utilised to understand the role of finance in the division of labour and 
changes to existing firms. The findings from the quantitative analysis 
illustrated a key difference between DD and NRDO firms in terms of their 
financial status: 56% of NRDO firms were publicly listed firms while only 39% 
of DD firms were publicly listed. The findings also indicated that NRDO firms 
earned considerably less revenue from licenses than DD firms (37% - NRDO 
firms and 61.5% of DD firms) and as expected, almost no revenue from 
research. This section looks at how the origins and development of the 
NRDO firm has been impacted by financial considerations and sources of 
finance: 
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7.3.1. NRDO Firm Origin – The Role of Finance  
Understanding the origins of these firms and what they were set up to do 
makes it possible to understand more about why the division of labour has 
occurred. The case studies produced some interesting findings but most 
importantly they illustrated the heterogeneity of the origins of these NRDO 
firms. However, there were some important commonalities related to the role 
of finance and its influence on the formation and development of the NRDO 
firm (or in the case of ViroPharma, its orientation towards the NRDO 
business model).  Table 1212 examines this interaction of finance with the 
formation/adaptation of the firms. 
Table 12. Summary of NRDO Firms and the Role of Finance!
NRDO 
Firm 
Funding 
Type 
Origin  The role of 
finance 
Actinium 
Formed in 
1993 
PRIVATELY 
FUNDED 
Organon spun-out 
Actinium specifically to 
develop the 
Radioisotopes rather 
than develop the idea 
in-house. Organon 
funded the activities of 
the company for 7 
years. 
Organon was the 
sole funder for 7 
years. 
PanGenetics 
Re-Formed 
in 2005 
PRIVATELY 
FUNDED 
Index Ventures 
restarted ‘PanGenetics’ 
but specifically as an 
NRDO firm in contrast 
to its prior DD 
orientation.  
A VC firm, Index 
Ventures was the 
primary driving force 
behind the creation 
of the business 
model for the newly 
reinvigorated 
‘PanGenetics’ known 
as the ‘asset centric’ 
no research 
development only 
firm.  
ProStrakan 
Formed in 
1995 
PUBLIC – 
STOCK 
MARKET 
ProStrakan was set up 
as a ‘Generic’ company 
formed by the ex Shire 
CEO. No Products were 
spun out into the firm. It 
was not set up to 
research and explore 
the creation of new 
biologic or NCE 
The ability to be self 
sufficient financially 
was a key goal and 
influenced the way in 
which this firm was 
founded. The 
manufacturing and 
sale of generic 
products as quickly 
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NRDO 
Firm 
Funding 
Type 
Origin  The role of 
finance 
products.  as possible was at 
the core of the 
company’s business 
model.  
ViroPharma 
Formed in 
1994 as DD 
became a 
NRDO firm in 
2002  
PUBLIC – 
STOCK 
MARKET 
Scientists from other 
large firms came 
together and formed 
ViroPharma to discover 
and develop products. 
No products were spun 
out into the firm at the 
outset. 
However the firm 
adapted to become 
an NRDO based on 
financial pressures to 
allocate resources 
toward development 
and marketing 
activities for financial 
stability. 
Actinium’s formation was based solely around the development of a product 
that had already been discovered and no further research activities were 
deemed necessary within the firm for the generation of new products. In this 
respect, the source of funding (the parent company Organon) was the most 
influential factor in the genesis of this business model. This represented a 
corporate spin out firm. This is the only example of a NRDO corporate spin 
out where the firm was actually formed by another company based on one of 
their products. 
The evidence suggests that the role of Venture Capital (VC) in the case of 
PanGenetics is a particularly interesting example of the influence of VC in 
terms of the formation of the NRDO business model. As discussed in the 
case study, Index Ventures made an important strategic choice to invest in 
more NRDO firms because they believed that this model was more efficient 
and less costly than the traditional ‘technology’ centric firm that engaged in 
exploratory research. Index’ stance was that investment in ‘technology’ 
based firms did not produce an acceptable rate of return. This reflects a 
change in the balance of their portfolio of firms. Historically, the role of VCs 
as supporters of exploratory technology oriented firms has been 
acknowledged but this suggests that firms such as Index are making 
changes to the types of firms in their portfolio to balance the risk-return ratio. 
ProStrakan’s founding team also did not believe that discovery activities 
were part of their vision for a self sustaining financial business model and 
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chose not to have these activities as part of their business. They chose to 
focus on generic and development stage oriented business model as a way 
to become financially self sufficient.  
However, ViroPharma’s story of becoming a NRDO firm is in contrast to the 
others as it was formed as a DD firm. This firm adapted its business model to 
become a NRDO firm. It is an important example because it illustrates 
another way in which the role of finance provides an explanation for why the 
firm is currently a NRDO organisation. In the case of ViroPharma’s transition 
to becoming a NRDO firm the key issue was the regulatory failure of their 
lead product which caused the stock price to plummet and the value of the 
company to decline rapidly. ViroPharma indicated that they ceased discovery 
operations and chose to focus financial resources on later stage in-licensed 
products (including one marketed product) because it made more financial 
sense to prioritise its remaining financial resources towards development 
activities. Viropharma was formed with the expectation that it would discover 
and develop products, however, it had to change that focus and adapted to 
become a NRDO firm because financial pressure on the company meant a 
need to focus on later stage products for revenue generation. As a public 
company, they believed that the stock market would be more inclined to 
support exploitation activities and so the decision was made to shut down 
discovery and exploration in favour of development and exploitation. 
The findings certainly confirm the heterogeneity in the way in which these 
firms were formed but some common themes can be further explored. 
Undoubtedly, three out of the four firms examined were formed specifically 
with an exploitation focus that was to develop products rather than discover 
them using ‘academic’ science. The reasons why they were formed in this 
way are apparent for two of the firms: PanGenetics and ProStrakan. The 
case of ViroPharma also illustrates the preference for the NRDO business 
model based on financial constraints, similar to that of ProStrakan prior to its 
divestiture of Skelia. The evidence from these firms strongly suggests that 
financial considerations were a key influence and that the NRDO model was 
a financially desirable way in which to organise a company.   
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The ViroPharma case study also supports earlier research that exploitation 
activities will drive out exploration activities (Levinthal and March, 1993). 
However, this research adds more to this particular body of work and 
provides support for the notion that firms can survive and grow and prosper 
despite the absence of exploratory activities. This is in contrast to the 
commonly received wisdom that firms who can’t maintain this balance will 
not survive. However, the longer term sustainability of this model remains to 
be seen and as discussed in the Section 7.5, is dependent on the availability 
of drug candidates for sale from other firms. 
7.3.2. NRDO Firm Development and the Role of Finance 
The evidence from the case studies also suggests that finance plays an 
important part in the continuing development of the firm and the decisions 
that are made around external product acquisition, development and 
innovation. The following table summarises the findings from the NRDO case 
studies: 
Table 13. The Impact of Finance on NRDO Firms 
NRDO Firm Development and the role of finance 
Development and the role 
of finance 
PanGenetics 
 
Venture Capital 
financing imposed strict 
conditions for in-
licensing that impacted 
the firm’s innovation 
strategy. The view 
taken by the VCs of in-
licensing and its critical 
role in the firm is 
interesting. 
The firm has indicated that it will 
cease operations now that it has 
sold its primary asset. It also 
indicated that the plan was 
always to set up a ‘transitory’ 
organisation that would not be 
expected to remain in business 
for a lengthy period of time. 
ProStrakan 
 
The company merged 
with a discovery 
company (ProSkelia) 
based on VC 
recommendations to 
add discovery 
capabilities to its 
business model prior to 
the IPO. 
Ultimately, Proskelia was 
divested in order to fund 
investment in commercialisation 
resource needs and so 
discovery capabilities were no 
longer part of the company’s 
business model once again. 
ViroPharma 
 
Within a year of its 
formation, ViroPharma 
The firm made a deliberate 
decision to change its business 
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NRDO Firm Development and the role of finance 
Development and the role 
of finance 
in-licensed to financially 
support drug discovery 
efforts and improve its 
valuation.  
orientation to ensure the 
survival of the firm based on 
scarce financial resources and a 
perception that stock markets 
would be more supportive in 
terms of this business model. 
Actinium 
 
New private equity 
financing supported the 
continuation of the 
business model and 
product development for 
a further 10 years  
despite no proven or 
published clinical 
success in marked 
contrast to commonly 
received wisdom of the 
role generally played by 
financiers as well as the 
time commitments. 
 
There is evidence from all firms to suggest that the role of finance (in terms 
of the influence of specific sources of finance as well as financial 
considerations) was an integral part of all decisions made with respect to 
their product development and innovation strategies. While this is not 
necessarily a new revelation, the extent of that involvement and influence in 
terms of the balance of exploration and exploitation in a firm is significant. It 
has implications for the ability of a firm to manage product development and 
innovation and adds to the knowledge of the role of finance and how it 
impacts firms specifically. 
For PanGenetics, their VC financing dictated that the had to in-license 
another product despite the existence of several products in house. The 
provision of new finance was contingent on their acquisition of an external 
product. This suggests that in-licensing was deemed critical by their 
financiers for the continuing success of the firm. For ViroPharma, acquisition 
of products was deemed critical for financial survival and this was related to 
the perception that the stock market would support this rather than the 
continuation of discovery and exploration. ProStrakan too had to choose 
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between allocating financial resources to research or later stage clinical 
development and marketed products. Interestingly, the case of ProStrakan 
provides contrasting evidence to that of PanGenetics in that the source of 
finance (VC) was an important determinant of the firm also becoming a DD 
firm, albeit, for a short while. Prior to embarking on its IPO, ProStrakan’s VC 
investors advised that they thought the IPO would be more successful (and 
therefore the capital markets more receptive to the IPO) if there were 
discovery capabilities in the firm and thus the firm merged with ProSkelia 
who were a discovery firm. This is in contrast to the role of Index Ventures 
who at around the same point in time believed that research based activities 
would not create value for the firm.  
However, as discussed, the discovery assets of the new ProStrakan firm 
were spun out only two years later. The decision was made based on 
financial resource constraints. ProStrakan’s story is remarkable in that it 
changed its orientation from NRDO to DD and then back to NRDO. It also 
shows that different VC firms attach different value to the role of research in 
the firm and consequently it is difficult to ascertain an overall picture for the 
role of VC with respect to the NRDO based on these examples. 
Nevertheless, it does suggest that some VC firms are willing to back a firm 
that is not founded on cutting edge technology but rather on the promise of 
successful product development. The view taken by Index Ventures to 
specifically invest in NRDO companies reflects a decision to allocate more 
financial resources towards NRDO firms rather than solely towards DD firms 
with exploratory capabilities. The influence of public stock market funding in 
the re-orientation of ViroPharma towards an NRDO focused business model 
was that the company believed that the markets would not support their 
continuation unless they made serious changes to their business.  
ViroPharma and ProStrakan indicated that in order to fund the development 
and marketing of their products they felt that they had to discontinue their 
investments in their discovery activities as the funding would not stretch to 
both. But these decisions are less about the influence of specific types of 
finance and more about the value that the firm attaches to its exploratory and 
exploitation related activities. 
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Another curious aspect to the NRDO story is that of the role of a Private 
Equity59 firm in the development of Actinium (General Atlantic60 assumed the 
role of primary financier once Organon had made a decision to cease being 
the sole funder of the firm). This Private Equity firm continued to finance 
Actinium for almost 10 years despite any visible clinical success of the 
product. The example illustrates that the unwavering financial support was 
integral to the survival of the company and it ability to continue down its 
NRDO path.  
The role of finance in the development of these firms could be summed up 
as follows: 
Table 14. Summary of Impact of Finance on NRDO Firms 
Firm 
Allocation of 
Finance to 
Later Stage 
Clinical 
Development – 
Financial 
Pressures 
External 
Product 
Acquisition – 
financial 
pressures, 
financial 
value of the 
firm 
Direct 
Financial 
Influence 
of VC/Bus 
Angel 
PanGenetics - ! ! 
ProStrakan ! ! ! 
ViroPharma ! ! - 
Actinium - - ! 
Financial considerations are of paramount importance to firms particularly 
when it comes down to a matter of survival and the choices that have to be 
made with respect to exploration and exploitation. In three out of four of the 
cases presented, the firms believed that their success and survival was 
contingent on an exploitation focused business model. This evidence 
provides support for the prior findings related to the balance of exploration 
and exploitation in firms as past research has shown that exploitation will 
                                            
59 Private equity is defined as any investment made in a firm that does not involve the issuance of any 
public offering of stock in a firm and is an overall term used to include all forms of private equity 
investment such as venture capital and business angels. Not all private equity investments are 
venture capital. 
60 General Atlantic defines itself as a ‘leading global growth investor’ that engages in a variety of 
investments not limited to venture capital investments 
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dominate over exploration (Levinthal and March, 1993). This appears to be 
the case for these NRDO firms and is particularly well illustrated by the 
examples of ViroPharma and ProStrakan who found themselves having to 
discontinue their exploratory operations in favour of funding exploitation for 
survival. 
7.3.3. Summary 
The evidence presented and discussed has indicated a number of important 
findings with respect to the role of finance and capital markets in the 
changing division of labour. The primary change in the division of labour is 
the focus on exploitation activities by the NRDO firm. It is important to 
emphasise what these specific activities mean from a financial perspective in 
order to understand why finance plays an important role in this division of 
labour. These exploitation activities are focused on the testing of a drug 
candidate in animals and in humans. A drug candidate at this stage has 
already gone through a lengthy process of identification, characterisation and 
formulation and thus the investment related to these activities is both 
substantial and for the NRDO firm, has been made by someone else. Thus 
their risk is reduced and from a financial investment point of view this is 
critical and represents both a cost saving and a risk reduction. This was why 
Index chose to configure PanGenetics as a NRDO firm and why ProStrakan 
also chose to focus on both the NRDO and generics model.  The findings 
illustrate that firms will allocate financial resources in favour of later stage 
clinical development activities over exploratory activities because these 
activities bring the firm closer to the market, quicker and this reduces risk. 
This also explains why firms will invest in external products: to reduce risk 
and exposure by investing in products that have reached a particular point in 
their development. The final observation is on the importance of the direct 
influence of investors such as VC and Private Equity firms.  The criticality of 
the role of Index in the decision to form PanGenetics as an NRDO firm is 
notable. While the role of VC firms has always been understood to be 
influential, this particular example illustrates a central role in the firm’s 
direction technological orientation. 
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7.4. Understanding and Explaining Changes to the Discovery 
and Development (DD) Firm 
7.4.1. In-licensing 
The evidence from the discovery and development (DD) case study firms 
presented in chapter 6 illustrates some interesting findings in relation to 
changes to the firm. The most notable of these is related to the extent to 
which these firms acquire external products for development. The 
quantitative analysis indicated that over 56% of DD firms acquired products 
externally for development with the firm. This raised significant questions 
about the activities of the DD firms which were explored through case 
studies. The pertinent findings from the case study analysis have been 
summarised in the table below: 
Table 15. Summary of Impact of Finance on DD Firms  
DD Firms Origin Development and the role of finance 
Actelion Actelion was formed by 
Roche scientists as a 
DD company. They 
later in-licensed 
products from Roche. 
Actelion has continued to in-
license products, despite 
having a strong in-house 
research capability, for 
revenue and valuation 
purposes  
Cara Cara was formed by 
Arena scientists as a 
DD company but the 
company was based on 
a drug from Ferring 
Pharmaceuticals. 
Cara was able to 
successfully develop their 
externally acquired product 
internally and sell it on to 
another company. 
Pharming Formed as an 
academic spin out from 
University of Leiden 
Pharming has since re-
orientated its business 
model three times between 
2002 and 2010 alternating 
between its identity as a 
research and development 
focused company and that of 
a development and 
commercialization focused 
company.  
Pharming has announced its 
divestment of a significant 
part of its research 
organisation to redirect 
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Table 15. Summary of Impact of Finance on DD Firms  
DD Firms Origin Development and the role of finance 
funding towards the 
commercial launch of 
Rhucin, its lead product 
Pharmacopeia Formed as an 
academic spin out  
The in-licensing of two key 
products from a large 
pharmaceutical company 
brought the company further 
along the drug development 
continuum faster and the 
expectation was that this 
would bring the company 
greater revenue, quicker. 
The changing focus of the 
firm to include clinical 
development activities 
placed a large financial 
burden on the firm and 
ultimately forced the firm to 
reduce its early stage 
discovery activities by 50%. 
However, the firm was later 
taken over. 
It is very interesting to observe the way in which two of these DD firms were 
formed. Cara, while formed as a DD firm, was based on a product from 
Ferring. It was not an academic spin out firm. It acquired its discovery 
technology and assets once the Ferring drug was acquired. This would 
appear to be more in line with the NRDO firm formation but in contrast, the 
company acquired exploratory discovery based assets believing that these 
were a necessary part of its operations.  However, changes in the markets 
for technology are evident because Ferring conducted the exploratory work 
on the drug prior to selling it to Cara who then worked on the exploitation and 
development of that drug. These are also related to changes in the division 
of labour and a surplus of unexploited knowledge. The role of finance in this 
transaction is also notable because Cara’s management indicated that the 
acquisition of the Ferring drug greatly improved their valuation. This is an 
interesting example of a Corporate Spin Out (CSO) firm and illustrates the 
heterogeneity in the origins of firms in this sector which is also evident in the 
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other case study firm Actelion. While Actelion was not founded specifically 
with a product from Roche, it did acquire a product from the company and 
was formed by company scientists but not as a direct CSO, again 
representing a different mode of CSO formation. These types of origins of 
firms have not been discussed in the literature and represent an updated 
picture of how firms are formed in the industry. 
The story of Actelion is also similar to that of Cara whereby the company was 
formed by a group of scientists that had left another company. Actelion also 
built up discovery capabilities and then in-licensed a product from Roche 
within a year of its formation. These examples provide evidence for distinct 
changes in the markets for technology with respect to their acquisition of 
technology (products) from large firms. There is also further evidence in 
support of key changes in the markets for technology and the surplus of 
unexploited knowledge provided by the example of Pharmacopeia. This firm 
acquired products from a large firm specifically to enhance its clinical 
development stage pipeline and therefore positively impact its financial 
valuation.  
Acquisition of external products for DD firms also appears to be a critical part 
of the DD firm product development strategy, not something that is currently 
acknowledged in the literature on small firms in this industry. This is 
especially interesting given that over 56% of firms in the sample acquired 
products externally. Three of these case study firms out of four 
acknowledged that in-licensing products was integral to improving the 
financial prospects of their firms. Firms indicated that the presence of later 
stage clinical products brought them closer to market in one or both of two 
ways: closer to regulatory approval and thus revenue generation through 
product marketing or closer to sale of the product to another firm and thus 
revenue generation. Thus the role of finance as a key influence on this 
decision to acquire products from external sources for development must be 
acknowledged. This suggests that financial pressures even for DD firms are 
influencing product development decisions in a significant way. The 
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corresponding implications for the markets for technology are dealt with in 
Section 0. 
7.4.2. Changing DD Firm Orientation – Financial Considerations   
Two of the DD firms interviewed were in the process of making changes to 
the orientation of their business model and they indicated that their 
investment in discovery activities was being reduced considerably. In 
essence, these firms were beginning to orient themselves towards the NRDO 
model. The need to ensure continued financing from the Public Stock Market 
was closely related to the firms’ decisions to reduce their discovery based 
activities and focus instead on commercialisation related activities.  
" Pharmacopeia, a publicly funded firm, was forced to reduce discovery 
activities by 50% because of funding issues and shareholder pressure to 
allocate resources away from discovery and towards development  
" The case of Pharming, another publicly funded DD company, also 
illustrated how competing resource pressures meant that their discovery 
assets (DNage) were spun out in favour of funding their commercial 
activities.  
Firms explained that their decisions to focus more resources on development 
stage products rather than earlier stage products were a matter of resource 
prioritisaton (cited by both ViroPharma and ProStrakan in the same 
situation).  Pharmacopeia and Pharming both indicated that they faced 
financial resource constraints and were moving towards allocation of finance 
to commercialisation activities (exploitation) rather than research 
(exploration). Costs of marketing products and scale up of required activities 
were provided as the key pressures. The reasons why some of these firms 
are redirecting resources towards clinical and market development and thus 
reorienting towards the NRDO model are clearly related to issues of finance. 
Once again, these examples clearly illustrate the domination of exploitation 
over exploration particularly when it comes to decisions related to investment 
of financial resources. The table below summarises the impact of finance on 
the DD firms: 
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Table 16. The Impact of Finance on DD Firms 
Firm 
Allocation of 
Finance to 
Later Stage 
Clinical 
Development – 
Financial 
Pressures 
External 
Product 
Acquisition – 
Financial 
pressures, 
Financial 
Value of the 
Firm 
Direct 
Financial 
Influence 
Towards 
Changing 
NRDO 
Business 
Model 
Actelion - ! - 
Cara - ! - 
Pharming ! - ! 
Pharmacopeia ! ! ! 
There are key similarities between the cases of Pharming, Pharmacopeia, 
ViroPharma and ProStrakan. The findings suggest resources have to be 
allocated in the firm between earlier stage discovery and later stage 
development, regulatory and marketing activities but resources will be 
predominantly allocated towards those activities that firms believe will 
produce the most financially advantageous result in the quickest time. Firms 
in this sample believed that exploitation related activities will produce more 
financially advantageous results as this involves products that are closer to 
milestones that are associated with product sale, market launch and revenue 
overall. All four firms cited above are publicly funded companies. This 
suggests that the pressures resulting from this form of finance may influence 
firms and their orientation towards the NRDO business model, especially 
when they have products that are ready for approval and marketing. Publicly 
funded firms are subject to the perceptions/wishes/vagaries of a range of 
shareholders that want to see dividends and will therefore likely support 
actions that result in greater dividends. ViroPharma is a prime example of 
how negative perceptions of shareholders based on performance can almost 
financially ruin a company when their share price fell from $23 to $.83. 
ProStrakan also saw their share price halve recently because of negative 
publicity related to clinical development milestones. Publicly traded 
companies face serious financial pressures as result of the relationship 
between stock price and information that comes from the company’s 
operations. Pressure to deliver significant dividends in a timely fashion exists 
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and if this means cuts to spending on other areas, such as earlier stage 
research, then clearly, some firms will take this course of action. The 
evidence suggests that publicly funded firms are more likely to take this 
course of action. 
7.4.3. Summary 
The evidence from DD firms suggests that overall the role of finance has 
played a key role in changes to these firms and suggests that there are also 
changes occurring in the markets for technology which are significant. Out of 
four DD firms, three (Actelion, Cara, Pharmacopeia) in-licensed products to 
enhance financial prospects by obtaining products in a more advanced stage 
of development.  Two out of the four case study firms have indicated that 
they have reduced exploratory operations in favour of exploitation related 
development operations primarily because of the need to prioritise financial 
resources in favour of these activities (Pharming and Pharmacopeia). Two 
different types of firm (NRDO and DD) provide compelling evidence for the 
role of finance in their decisions to allocate more resources to exploitation 
rather than exploration activities and also provide evidence for changes in 
markets for technology and a surplus of unexploited knowledge, discussed 
further in Sections 7.5 and 0.  
7.5. Surplus of Unexploited Knowledge and the Changing 
Division of Labour 
The evidence presented so far has pointed out the role of finance in the 
changing division of labour but it has also illustrated the importance of 
externally sourced products for firms. This implies that there is a given 
‘surplus of unexploited knowledge’ in the form of potential drug compounds 
that are for sale because firms have not developed these products 
themselves. These compounds have passed through the lead optimisation 
stage of development and have been traded in either the pre-clinical, phase I 
or in the case of ViroPharma, the marketing stage. Therefore the availability 
of products at this later stage of development (ready for human clinical trials) 
also emerges as a part of the explanation for the new division of labour. 
Again, the evidence so far shows that firms are willing to trade these 
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products because they have chosen not to develop them internally. This 
section presents the evidence for the surplus of unexploited knowledge and 
discusses the reasons why this surplus has emerged and why firms are 
willing to trade this unexploited surplus knowledge.  
7.5.1. Large and Small Firms – Surplus Unexploited Knowledge and 
the Role of Finance  
The database that was created for the purpose of ascertaining the existence 
of the NRDO firm also facilitated the collection of other important data in 
relation to the activities of both  NRDO firms and DD firms. This data pointed 
to some interesting findings in terms of the origins of firm products and 
suggested that further examination of these findings in relation to the origins 
of these products be undertaken. The evidence indicated that large and 
small firms now have a range of roles to play in the changing markets for 
technology and in the division of labour. But why firms are playing these 
various roles can also be understood to a large extent by reviewing why they 
have spun out products. The large sample of firms illustrated that 56% of 
firms were obtaining products from other firms for development in-house. 
Case studies have revealed that all eight firms obtained products from other 
firms, both large firms and small, in contrast to what has been written about 
the activities of both in this industry.  
The table below summarises those firms that have spun out products in 
relation to the firms presented in the research case studies and the main 
reasons why (when available) large and small firms have spun out products. 
The table is in date order. 
Table 17. Trade In Products Between All Case Study Firms 
Product 
Originator 
Firm 
When What Why? Receiver Firm 
Organon 1993 Radio isotopes 
Development 
in a different 
organisation 
Actinium 
Pharmaceuticals 
Eastman Kodak 1994 Pleconaril Portfolio Management Eli Sanofi 
 
198 
Table 17. Trade In Products Between All Case Study Firms 
Product 
Originator 
Firm 
When What Why? Receiver Firm 
Eli Sanofi 1995 Pleconaril Portfolio Management ViroPharma 
Roche 1997 Tezosentan 
Portfolio 
Management 
‘New 
knowledge’ 
difficulties 
Actelion 
Strathmann AG 1999 Adcal D3 N/A ProStrakan 
ValPharma 
/Galen 2001 Isotard 
N/A ProStrakan 
Oxford 
GlycoSciences 2002 Zavesca 
Financial 
difficulties Actelion 
PDL 2003 MAb Financial Difficulties 
Actinium 
Pharmaceuticals 
Roche 2003 Bosentan 
Portfolio 
Management 
‘New 
knowledge’ 
difficulties 
Actelion 
GlaxoSmithKline 2003 Maribavir Portfolio Management ViroPharma 
Eli Lilly 2003 Vancocin Portfolio Management ViroPharma 
Ferring 
Pharmaceuticals 2004 
Pain 
(CR665) 
Development 
in a different 
organisation 
Cara 
Cellegy 2004 
Rectogesic 
Tostran 
N/A 
ProStrakan 
Orexo 2005 Rapinyl 
Financial 
Gain and 
complement
ary assets 
(marketing) 
ProStrakan 
Schering Plough 2005 MAbs Portfolio Management PanGenetics 
LayLine 2006 PG110 Financial Difficulties PanGenetics 
BMS 2006 Hypertensive 
Portfolio 
Management Pharmacopeia 
CoTherix 2006 Ventavis N/A Actelion 
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Table 17. Trade In Products Between All Case Study Firms 
Product 
Originator 
Firm 
When What Why? Receiver Firm 
Lev Pharma 2008 Cinryze Financial Difficulties ViroPharma 
In total, 18 companies spun out products consisting of nine large and nine 
small firms.  
7.5.2. Explaining the Surplus of Unexploited Knowledge - Diversity 
of Knowledge 
As the evidence above has shown, large and small firms have been trading 
in products that they have generated internally but chose to sell or trade. 
Again, these are products that are drug candidates that have passed through 
the discovery and lead optimization phase into the pre-clinical and phase I in 
many cases. In total, 18 companies spun out products consisting of nine 
large and nine small firms. The prolific changes in the knowledge base of the 
pharmaceutical sector have been discussed in chapter two to explain the 
division of labour that occurred during the third epoch but there are further 
implications arising from this that must be revisited here because of their 
relevance for the arguments presented. The increasing diversity of the 
scientific landscape has resulted from multiple discoveries in molecular 
biology, cell biology and biophysics and in addition, medicinal chemistry 
remains an integral part of the scientific landscape (Pisano, 2006). This is 
significant because the changes in the biotechnology knowledge bases of 
this industry and in the chemistry knowledge bases mean that there has 
been an increase in the amount of knowledge that has been generated but 
not exploited via internal development by those firms that have generated 
that knowledge. These changes have impacted the range and indeed the 
number of potential drugs as well as the corresponding number of potential 
targets.  
A number of important and interlinking developments in biology, chemistry, 
process technologies and informatics essentially resulted in the development 
of industrialised high-throughput screening (HTS) platforms, combinatorial 
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chemistry and improvements in bio-based assays. These were all critical 
developments (Nightingale, 2000). Together, these enabled generation and 
rapid screening of extensive chemical libraries against a greater number of 
new targets created by significant advancements in genomics (Hopkins et al, 
2007). The new developments also created a significant focus on quantity 
over quality (Hopkins et al, 2006; Pisano, 2006). As a result, a larger number 
of potential clinically active compounds have been identified. This is reflected 
in changes in the total number of patents granted in the US61 over the period 
1978–2002 (these are patents for therapeutically active compounds). This 
can be used as an indicator of the number of compounds considered 
‘attractive enough to warrant patent protection, but not necessarily viable 
enough to enter development’ (Hopkins et al, 2006). During this period, the 
number of patents rose from less than 2,500 in 1978 to over 20,000 in 2003 
representing an 800% increase in the number of patented compounds, 
however, the most significant increase has taken place over the last 10 
years.  
While the new knowledge has created a greater number of potential drugs 
and greater knowledge of drug targets, it has potentially created a dilemma 
for large companies in particular. Faced with the ever increasing vast array of 
new knowledge (the most recent of which has resulted from discoveries 
related to genomics and proteomics) and coupled with increasing financial 
costs of drug development, companies have had to make decisions with 
respect to those products they retain and develop internally versus those 
products they don’t. References to an increasingly narrow range of 
therapeutic area focus on the part of large companies (Hopkins et al, 2006) 
are supported by some of the findings of this research that indicate that 
some larger companies have indeed been closing down research in some 
therapeutic areas (Bristol Myers Squibb was shuttering its bone and 
endocrine divisions when Pharmacopeia obtained their drugs from the 
company). Ultimately this array of new knowledge and products has led to 
                                            
61 This was in patent classes 424 and 514 for potentially therapeutically active compounds 
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difficult decision making in relation to product portfolios and overall company 
strategy. The following section 7.5.3 illustrates just how this surplus of 
knowledge has resulted overall, creating opportunities for new companies 
and indeed opportunities for existing companies.  
7.5.3. Explaining the Surplus of Unexploited Knowledge – Financial 
Considerations 
Interviews with executives from case study companies revealed important 
insights into the reasons behind why firms are selling drug candidates to 
other firms. These findings were then substantiated with another interview 
with a representative62 from a large firm, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK).  The 
interviewee was in the business development group and a discussion was 
initiated to review the firm’s actions in relation to portfolio management, out-
licensing, and corporate spin outs. Several interesting findings emerged from 
the interview related to these three areas. With respect to portfolio 
management the firm noted that the lack of adequate financial resources 
prevented investment in everything that was developed and as a result, 
prioritisation decisions had to be made. Strategic decisions were made at a 
corporate level to prioritise therapy areas and therefore make cuts by closing 
sites and shuttering entire therapy areas. This resulted in products that were 
selected for out-licensing in a specific bid to generate additional revenue for 
the firm as these products were ‘lying around.’ In therapy areas where the 
company had exited, scientific personnel were encouraged to take drug 
candidates and set up spin-out firms (funded with external financing) while 
retaining an equity share in these new firms. 
The findings from the case studies and this interview indicate that the role of 
portfolio management is a key factor which is in turn driven by financial 
considerations related to resource allocation and risk. Portfolio management 
is a process whereby firms must evaluate and select which new products to 
develop and then prioritise the sequence in which to develop them. The 
‘portfolio’ must ‘maximise the expected economic returns at an acceptable 
                                            
62 B. Carr. Director, Drug Discovery Transactions, GlaxoSmithKline 
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level of risk for a given level of resources in a new product development 
pipeline’ (Blau et al, 2004). Large firms have for some time practised 
‘portfolio management’ whereby they are constantly reviewing their complete 
range of products in their various stages of development to make informed 
decisions on what products they should develop, continue to develop or 
discontinue.  
The complexity inherent in drug development is an issue common to every 
therapeutic area.  However, the nature of disease and epidemiology means 
that each therapeutic area (e.g. cardiovascular, cancer, central nervous 
system) has biological and chemical complexities that mean that knowledge 
of the mechanisms of cells and tissues within one therapeutic area may not 
necessarily mean that the same knowledge can be applied to the 
development of drugs for another area. In many cases, the economies of 
scope are particularly limited. Some of the firms connected with these case 
study firms have reduced the number of therapeutic areas in which they are 
active and it is possible that this explanation is relevant. For example, Bristol 
Myers Squibb sold their hypertensive product to Pharmacopeia as they were 
shutting down their Endocrine therapeutic area to reduce their breadth of 
therapeutic areas. Eastman Kodak also sold part of their key drug business 
to Sterling Winthrop in the 1990s in a bid to decrease their areas of focus. 
Most recently, GlaxoSmithKline indicated earlier this year that it would 
reduce its work on depression and pain which has subsequently resulted in 
the creation of a number of spin-outs63.   
7.5.3.1. Portfolio Management - Development Costs and Revenue 
Maximisation 
The literature on large firms in this industry has described how firms during 
the second epoch of the development of this industry were able to generate 
huge libraries of compounds (drugs) for potential screening. In addition, 
those firms that internalised capabilities in biotechnologies to aid in the 
search for new products were also able to generate large numbers of 
                                            
63 Based on information from an interview with B. Carr at GSK in September 2010. 
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potential products. Large firms in this industry have traditionally worked in a 
range of therapeutic areas and produced a range of products and as a result 
of the combination of these factors, the discovery efforts of large firms have 
resulted in a prolific number of drug candidates (Nightingale, 2000; Walsh, 
2004). However, only a limited number of these products can be selected for 
development because of the need to manage an entire portfolio of existing 
marketed, development stage and discovery stage assets. The portfolio is 
limited by the extent of both capital and human resources available to 
develop the products but particularly the availability of resources to pay for 
the development and or marketing of products within the entire portfolio. 
Increased financial pressure on large companies due to patent expirations 
and reduced revenues from products, for example, has potentially made 
large companies more sensitive to costs of development. As a result, 
products in various stages of development, including those that may just be 
ready for Phase I, are discontinued in light of the entire portfolio. This has 
resulted in firms having products ‘sitting on shelves’ as evidenced by the 
table above.   
These firms realised that there was an opportunity to extract value from 
these products financially and this was also noted as a particular reason for 
the actions of GSK in out-licensing their products. By allowing other firms to 
obtain these de-prioritised assets (through a variety of transaction types) and 
develop them, large firms can still obtain value from these products but 
without risk to themselves. The pressing revenue needs as discussed 
throughout Chapter two, three and six, have forced large firms to look for 
more ways from which to extract revenue from products to fund existing 
research and development activities. This was also linked to the growing 
financial pressures on large companies resulting from drugs coming off 
patent64.  The prioritisation of some products over others can be offset by the 
ability to trade these products left ‘on the shelf’ and obtain revenue from 
them.  
                                            
64 Glaxo is expected to lose patent protections on drugs such as diabetes drug Avandia, osteoporosis 
treatment Bonviva, and cancer drug Hycamtin that all generated 2008 sales of $2 billion 
 
204 
This is essentially another form of product development through the 
reduction of risk but maximising revenue potential at the same time and this 
has been discussed in the context of markets for technology, distributed 
innovation processes and open innovation. The fact that large firms in this 
sector are also engaging in trade of drug candidates is somewhat surprising 
because of the extensive literature that has concentrated on the way small 
firms sell technology and not large firms. The extent to which it appears to be 
an activity pursued by many firms in this industry was a surprise especially 
given that the movement of products was always been characterised as a 
one way exchange from small to large firms. However, the activity should not 
be entirely surprising given the current level of attention and discussion 
related to open innovation, distributed innovation processes and markets for 
technology tackled in greater detail in the following section (Coombs and 
Metcalfe, 2000; Arora et al, 2001; Chesbrough, 2003). The growing output 
from the research activities from large firms has potentially influenced the 
growth of in-licensing by small firms and the growth of the NRDO firm and 
thus the division of labour and markets for technology. In turn, the role of 
both the availability of this surplus knowledge for sale and financial 
considerations subsequently represent an important element of both the 
division of labour and changing markets for technology in this sector.  
7.5.4. Summary 
The findings of this research have indicated that a new division of labour is 
evident but a key element of this division of labour is the role of a surplus of 
unexploited knowledge in the form of clinical stage drug candidates. Firms 
developed capabilities (high throughput screening and combinatorial 
chemistry) to generate a substantial number of products for development but 
face resource pressures related to costs of development which means that 
not all products can be developed fully in-house. These ‘intermediate’ 
products are being sold by large companies to small companies as part of 
portfolio management decisions and by small companies who can no longer 
afford to develop them. Large companies are maximising value from 
products that they would not have otherwise developed and this provides 
support for the need for growing markets for technology to ensure efficient 
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use of products that would not otherwise be developed by firms (Arora et al, 
2001). Financial considerations are a key part of the decision by both large 
and small firms to sell intermediate products. These new trading patterns 
represent changes in the markets for technology to which the focus now 
turns.  
7.6. Changes in the Markets for Technology in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector 
The pharmaceutical sector has been characterised by a sharp rise in the 
number and type of arrangements for trading and exchanging 
technology/knowledge during the third epoch of this industry (Powell, 1996; 
Arora and Gambardella, 2001; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; Hagedoorn, 
2002). These markets for technology65 have been a key characterisation of 
this industry but historically, this characterisation has described particular 
roles played by large and small firms in these markets for technology (also 
noted in Chapter two). Small firms have been consistently described as 
providers of technology while large firms have been described as receivers 
of technology (Galambos and Sturchio, 1996; 1998; Henderson et al, 1999; 
McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001; Walsh, 2004; Pisano, 2006). The novelty of 
biotechnology created a role for small firms as transfer agents for the new 
knowledge from academic institutions and the applicability of this new 
knowledge to the pharmaceutical industry enabled them to become conduits 
of this new knowledge (Orsenigo, 1989; Powell, 1996; McKelvey and 
Orsenigo, 2001).  
7.6.1. Characterising Changes in Markets for Technology  
The information gathered from both the database and the case studies 
illustrates that there are identifiable changes in the markets for technology.  
56% of DD firms are obtaining products from other firms for development and 
100% of NRDO firms obtain products for development from other firms. This 
means that of the whole sample, 67% of firms obtained products externally 
                                            
65 Arora et al define technology as ‘an imprecise term for useful knowledge rooter in engineering and 
scientific disciplines, but also drawing from practical experience from production.’ Arora et al 2001.  
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for development. Trade in products in four key directions not previously 
discussed in the literature have been identified as follows: 
1. From large firms to small firms (DD) 
2. From large firms to small firms (NRDO)  
3. Between small firms – DD to NRDO 
4. Between small firms – NRDO to DD 
This type of movement of products for development has been taking place 
for at least the last 15 years and as a result, this does not indicate any 
sudden or recent changes in behaviour as the evidence suggests that these 
strategies have been executed since the mid 1990s. This movement of 
products (drug candidates) represent a variety of transactions that have 
taken place between these firms including: licensing fees only, licensing with 
milestone payments, equity stakes with no upfront fees, and equity and 
upfront fees. However, these findings also represent the fact that markets for 
technology in this sector have invariably become more complicated than 
were previously acknowledged. The diagram below is an attempt to illustrate 
how this complexity has changed.  
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Figure 16. Changes in the Markets for Technology 
The complexity in the markets for technology and the division of labour can 
be illustrated together with four interesting examples from the case study 
firms.  The diagram in Figure 1717 maps the path of the drug candidates in 
terms of the number of companies that were involved in their discovery and 
development. These examples show the movement of products between 
firms and the stage at which the next firm took over development as well as 
the stage completed by each firm.  Both NRDO and DD firms are 
represented in these examples where the division of labour is also evident.  
Prior experience with the product and a key relationship with the ‘seller’ also 
emerged as another key reason for six of the case study firms obtaining 
products (from both large and small firms): 
1. Actelion – Roche 
2. Actinium – Organon 
3. Cara – Ferring Pharmaceuticals 
4. PanGenetics – LayLine Genomics 
5. Pharmacopeia – Bristol Myers Squibb 
6. Pharming – DNAge 
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Figure 17. Increasing Complexity in the Markets for Technology and the Division of Labour 
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As described in the case studies, another key part of why some of these 
firms wanted to obtain these products was precisely because they had 
knowledge of or extensive experience with the drug. Powell acknowledges 
that in many cases licensing is based on prior knowledge and relationships 
and this evidence confirms these prior findings (Powell et al, 1996). This was 
particularly relevant for ViroPharma and Pharmacopeia whose executives 
had direct experience with the products. Findings have indicated that locating 
good products to in-license is difficult because of lack of in-depth knowledge 
of the products, something particularly difficult to ascertain when trading in 
drug products. However, two of these firms also indicated in interviews that 
they had a prior relationship with the seller which also influenced their 
decision to acquire products. Cara and PanGenetics both noted that their 
decisions to obtain products were also related to their prior relationship with 
the seller rather than specific knowledge of the product. Conversely, 
however, firms were allowed to purchase these products because the seller 
deemed them capable of developing the products. In addition, as these 
products emerge from the strength and calibre of a large pharmaceutical 
discovery effort, they are typically better characterised66 and carry less risk 
than traditional early stage programs, which also makes them a more 
desirable acquisition 
7.6.2. Trade in Unexploited Knowledge by Large Firms 
As noted previously, the historical portrayal of the movement of products and 
knowledge was a simplified relationship between public research institutions, 
small firms and large firms. This was based on the key notion that the new 
knowledge generated from these public institutions was then transferred to 
small firms who then developed it further and ultimately transferred it to large 
firms. The markets for intermediate technological inputs has been a key 
feature of the pharmaceutical sector (Arora et al, 2001) and this evidence 
provides continuing support for this. However, the findings from this research 
show that the picture is more complex particularly with respect to large firms. 
                                            
66 A phrase used in the industry to denote the amount of information known about the drug candidate 
including physiological and structural information.   
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The evidence shows that large firms in this sector also develop technology 
they don’t utilise providing support for the arguments put forth by Arora et al 
with respect to the need for markets for technology (Arora et al, 2001).  
Large firms are increasingly under financial pressure and will also look to 
maximise value from products that have historically ‘sat on the shelf’.   The 
evidence confirms licensing as a mechanism of revenue generation, 
particularly for large firms (Autio, 1994; Kollmer and Dowling, 2004). Large 
firms will generally out-license technology to firms in markets in which they 
don’t typically operate (Arora et al, 2001) as evidenced by cases such as 
GlaxoSmithKline and Bristol Myers Squibb, who out-licensed technology 
related to therapeutic areas in which they no longer intended to operate. But 
in their discussion on markets for technology, Arora et al also point out that 
the presence of small firms (who are usually more aggressive licensors) may 
induce larger potential rival firms to also license more aggressively (Arora et 
al, 2001). These authors point out that large firms must also become 
‘effective technology licensors and compete in the market for technology’ if 
they are to maximise value from technology (in this case drug candidates not 
being developed). The extensive out-licensing behaviour by small firms in 
this sector has demonstrated that licensing is an effective mode of trade so 
the evidence from this research illustrates that this is potentially applicable 
for large firms also in this sector. Large firms have technology in the form of 
drug candidates that they are willing to trade to maximise the financial gain 
while reducing their risk which has been the strategy pursued by small firms.  
7.6.3. Trade in Unexploited Knowledge Between Small Firms 
While the literature on networks has provided extensive accounts of the 
relationships between small firms and between large and small firms, there 
has been less said on the actual markets for technology in terms of the trade 
of drugs candidates between small firms in this industry. The evidence from 
these case studies noted in Table 1717 suggests that small firms are trading 
products amongst themselves also indicating the importance of markets for 
technology between small firms as a means by which firms can maximise the 
value from technologies that may no longer hold value for them. A key 
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example noted in the PanGenetics case study was that of LayLine who sold 
their lead product to PanGenetics because financial difficulties meant that 
they were unable to develop the product internally. Actelion’s acquisition of 
Zavesca was for the same reasons. While the literature focuses on other 
positive issues such as complementary capabilities and sharing of risk, the 
references to financial difficulties suggest that the relationship between 
product development and innovation and finance warrants much closer 
examination. Small firms are increasingly under financial pressure to add 
value to their organisations and have shown that they will in-license products 
in order to fulfil those expectations. The rationale presented in Table 1717 
also indicates that financial difficulty is cited as a key reason for why firms 
trade products.  
7.6.4. Summary  
There have been important changes in the markets for technology in this 
sector as evidenced by the database findings and the case studies. The 
evidence also reveals that relationships between firms are also a key factor 
in the markets for technology. Intermediate technologies - drug candidates - 
are being traded and developed by a number of firms and markets are no 
longer confined to the one way trade of products from small firms to large 
firms. Large firms are trading their own internally developed drug candidates 
(and marketed products in some cases) with small firms and small firms are 
trading products amongst themselves. The importance of the findings 
discussed above that related product sale/product acquisition to finance 
means that it would appear that markets for technology are inextricably 
linked to finance and a surplus of unexploited knowledge. The availability of 
products for sale is related to a need for revenue and to maximise the return 
on investment in a product that might not necessarily be considered for 
internal development by the firm. The propensity to buy products is 
correspondingly related to financial needs – acquisition of products means 
greater value is associated with the small firm. The reasons for these 
changes in the markets for technology are closely related to the changing 
division of labour also which has been partly explained by the arguments 
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related to the surplus of unexploited knowledge and the financial needs of 
companies in the present day. 
7.7. The Implications of the Research Findings  
7.7.1. Modelling the Relationship Between the Division of Labour, 
Finance, Surplus of Unexploited Knowledge, and Changing 
Markets for Knowledge 
The evidence from the discussion and analysis of the research findings from 
the database and the case studies provides support for the model of these 
interrelationships as proposed in Chapter three. The following model was 
proposed in Chapter three denoting the proposed interrelationships between 
all of the four factors discussed: 
Figure 18.Association of all Factors – The Division of Labour – Surplus 
of Unexploited Knowledge – Finance – Markets for 
Technology 
 
The arrows have been positioned as multidirectional to reflect the two way 
relationships between each of the four factors. Each factor has an impact on 
the other and there is no one-way causality in effect. This model supports the 
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evolutionary perspective with respect to way in which industries grow and 
change and is supported by the findings of this research. 
7.7.2. Changing Balance of Exploration and Exploitation Within the 
Firm 
The combined case study and database evidence shows that the changing 
division of labour has important implications for firms.  Evidence suggests 
that the balance of exploration and exploitation has completely changed in 
some firms that have become exploitation focused  (27% of the database 
sample were NRDO firms). While in other firms, the balance has shifted with 
more emphasis on exploitation of resources along with the retention of 
exploratory activities. When allocating financial resources, the firms studied 
as part of this research had to make a choice between the extent to which 
various activities would be funded: exploratory or exploitation activities. The 
evidence suggests that financial pressure on firms results in the allocation of 
resources towards those activities that will bring it closer to market, sooner; 
what have been described as exploitation activities.  
Firms have demonstrated that when it comes to this type of funding choice, 
they will reduce or even cease funding discovery (exploratory) activities in 
favour of funding later stage exploitation activities. ViroPharma, 
Pharmacopeia, Pharming and ProStrakan are all examples of firms who had 
to make these decisions and who chose to allocate their resources toward 
exploitation activities. The cost pressures on firms for product launch and 
marketing have been cited as the main reasons for these decisions as firms 
have to find ways to fund drug launch and marketing. This usually results in 
cutting earlier stage activities related to exploration.  This may have further 
implications for the level of research/exploratory activity in this sector. The 
data indicated that 27% of firms in this sector are no longer carrying out 
research activities amounting to over a quarter of the firms in the sample.  
The implication is that this may be impacting the level of exploration in the 
sector overall if less firms are carrying out exploratory as well as exploitation 
activities. Further empirical work on this may well be warranted to 
understand if an overall shift is apparent in the sector. This is particularly 
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relevant for a sector that has been closely associated with a high proportion 
of exploratory research and scientific activity in firms. 
These findings support earlier research work carried out by Levinthal and 
March that indicates that as a firm matures, exploitation of current knowledge 
drives out exploration of new ideas (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 
1993). However, some of the findings of this research differ from one of the 
fundamental parts of the Levinthal and March argument.  They propose that 
the likelihood of firm failure is increased due to this changing balance in 
favour of exploitation but the findings of this research show that firms that 
have undergone this changing balance towards exploitation for some time, 
are still in business today (ViroPharma, ProStrakan). They also emphasise 
that this takes place in the mature firm while the firms in this sample were 
arguably not necessarily ‘mature’.  Overall the findings from this research 
indicate that for some firms in this industry, the orientation towards 
exploitation related activities can mean success rather than failure. It also 
suggests that financial considerations are a major cause of this change in 
activity and thus the potentially declining level of exploration in the sector as 
a whole.  
7.7.2.1. Finance and the changing balance of exploration and exploitation 
within the firm 
The database findings indicated that over 90% of all firms had received VC 
funding at some point in their history suggesting that VC funding is a critical 
resource for firms. The findings from two of the case studies in particular 
provide some interesting observations related to the role of VC finance and 
the support for research (exploratory) activities in the firm. In Cara’s 
experience, the attitudes to discovery and the allocation of financial 
resources to those activities, meant that they felt they had to ‘cloak’ 
discovery because of variations in their board’s support. As noted in the case 
study, some board members felt that spending on discovery activities was 
not an efficient way to allocate funding within the firm, suggesting a decline in 
VC support might be apparent for exploratory activities. This was echoed in 
the PanGenetics case study.  PanGenetics also represents another 
interesting example in terms of VC support for exploitation rather than 
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exploratory activities. PanGenetics was specifically set up by a VC company 
as an exploitation only (NRDO) focused company with no exploratory 
activities included in their business model. This was because of the view 
taken that investment in exploratory activities did not bring the required 
return on investment soon enough. It was also revealed that the VC (Index 
Ventures) view was that there was a more robust market for later stage 
assets, based on knowledge of what prospective buyers (large 
pharmaceutical firms) were looking for. This suggests that financiers may 
have a bigger role that has been acknowledged in the past in terms of how 
they impact the overall level of exploratory activity in the sector. In 
conjunction with the earlier discussion on the importance of financial 
considerations and financial support, this evidence also suggests that there 
is a considerable impact on innovation that can be related to financial control 
in firms.  
The database findings indicate that 56% of NRDO firms are publicly listed 
while only 39% of DD firms are publicly listed representing a sizable 
difference between firms in the sector. The case studies illustrate that 
managing financial expectations as a public company are difficult and result 
in trade-offs having to be made around the allocation of scarce financial 
resources in the firm which has implications for exploratory activities in 
particular. The evidence presented in this chapter therefore suggests that 
publicly funded companies face financial pressures that will negatively 
impact the level of exploration in the firm. In four of the publicly traded case 
study firms – Pharmacopeia, Pharming, ProStrakan and VIroPharma, the 
prioritisation and allocation of resources was made towards later state 
‘exploitation’ activities rather than early state exploratory/research based 
activities. The rationale provided by the firms in all of these cases strongly 
suggests that the firms had to focus resources on these activities. The need 
to fund activities that result in the firm being able to generate revenue as 
soon as possible was the most compelling argument for this allocation of 
finance away from exploration and research.  
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It is also notable that for ProStrakan and VIroPharma, this decision meant 
that absolutely no remaining internal resources would be allocated towards 
research activities. While this provides further support for the 
exploration/exploitation arguments proposed in the literature, this evidence 
adds to this debate with the more compelling finding that exploration 
activities can disappear completely from the firm. This has not explicitly been 
dealt with in the literature to date. In essence, there appears to be a demand 
for exploitation activities more than exploratory activities form the capital 
markets overall.  
7.7.3. Exploration and Exploitation in the firm: Changing 
Capabilities and Core Competencies 
The capabilities related to exploration and exploitation within the NRDO and 
DD firms in this sector have shifted. Capabilities and core competencies that 
are required by NRDO firms to execute product acquisition and development 
strategies for effective exploitation of products are in contrast to the 
capabilities required for research and early stage discovery. DD firms have 
had to adapt their capabilities as they have concentrated more of their 
resources towards development, regulatory and marketing efforts for their 
products. These findings (particularly as they relate to the NRDO firm) offer a 
marked contrast to the conventional understanding of capabilities in the small 
traditionally understood classical biotechnology firms operating in this sector.  
Rothaermel and Deeds notes that ‘biotechnology firms focus on the ‘R’ of the 
research and development process whereas large pharmaceutical 
companies focus on the ‘D’ (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). However, this 
generalisation can no longer be applied to all firms in this sector as indicated 
by the findings of this research related to the NRDO firm whose focus is the 
‘D’ in research and development. Firms have already demonstrated that they 
have these capabilities that were traditionally only associated with large 
pharmaceutical firms. 
Baden-Fuller and McNamara noted in the Celltech case study that ‘new 
capabilities needed to be developed to focus on new product development, 
rather than technical excellence’ (McNamara and Baden Fuller, 1999). In the 
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case of Celltech, this firm had to make ‘a fundamental switch from 
technological capability to a more therapeutic-based capability’ and this 
provided a considerable challenge for the firm (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 
1999). This study illustrated how the firm specifically needed new and 
different capabilities in order to change its exploration/exploitation balance 
and provides a valuable frame of reference for the findings of this research.  
DD firms have had to augment capabilities in development, regulatory affairs 
and marketing in addition to their early stage research capabilities while 
NRDO firms have had to be built with these capabilities from the outset.  
7.7.3.1. New and Renewed Capabilities  
It is important to note that the traditional core competencies of the DD firms 
in particular were perceived to lie in research (Kenney, 1986; Orsenigo, 
1989; Pisano, 1991; Henderson et al, 1999; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001).  
But in fact the core competencies of NRDOs and indeed some DD firms 
have shifted to include a concentrated focus on downstream activities as 
noted above. The following table illustrates the key capabilities observed 
within the case study firms: 
Table 18. Changing Capabilities of Firms 
Firm 
In-
licensed / 
Acquired 
product(s)
? 
Success? New Capability 
Actinium CSO – No No ! Clinical development 
Actelion Y 
Y - Licensed to 
Genentech 
Y - Marketed 
! In-licensing 
! Co. acquisition 
! Clinical development 
– Phase I-III 
! Regulatory affairs 
! Marketing 
Cara Y 
Y - Developed 
through Phase I, 
Sold to ALZA 
! In-licensing 
! Clinical development 
Phase I, II 
PanGenetics Y Y - Sold product to Abbot 
! In-licensing 
! Pre-clinical 
development 
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Table 18. Changing Capabilities of Firms 
Firm 
In-
licensed / 
Acquired 
product(s)
? 
Success? New Capability 
! Clinical development 
Phase I 
Pharmacopeia Y No 
! In-licensing 
! Clinical development 
Phase I, II 
Pharming 
Y – 
Acquisition of 
co. 
Y – regulatory 
success 
! Co. acquisition 
! Regulatory affairs 
ProStrakan Y 
Y - Marketed a 
range of 
products 
! In-licensing 
! Clinical development 
! Regulatory Affairs 
! Marketing 
ViroPharma Y Y – Marketed two products 
! In-licensing 
! Clinical development 
! Regulatory Affairs 
! Marketing 
The core competencies of the firm have arguably thus changed in the 
following ways: 
a. New In-licensing capabilities have become critical – the ability to 
obtain products 
b. Changing capabilities of large firms to out-license products 
c. Some existing capabilities have become more important = 
Development capabilities have become critical – While this is not 
necessarily new, the focus on the importance of these activities is. 
1. Ability to Obtain Products from Other Companies 
The capability to attract ideas from research universities and government 
laboratories was cited as a key factor of growth in small firms operating in 
this industry (Enright, 1998; Kenney, 1986; Prevezer, 2001; Niosi, 2003) but 
there is evidence to suggest that there has been a shift in the nature of this 
capability. While it is still important, obtaining products from other firms may 
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create the need for a different type of capability related to in-licensing from 
other firms in contrast to academic sources and out-licensing which has been 
previously associated with small firms (Kollmer and Dowling, 2004). This 
implies capabilities that are necessary to complete a transaction to 
successfully obtain a product from another firm. This is identified as a new 
capability because historically, this capability was not observed but it is an 
integral part of the new division of labour and changing markets for 
technology as such is identified as a new core competency of the firm 
operating in this industry.  
2. Out-licensing as a Capability 
While point one above makes reference to the importance of being able to 
acquire products, this capability focuses on the opposite end of this 
transaction which is the capability of firms to ‘sell’ products. As noted in the 
interview data collected on GlaxoSmithKline and in the case of PanGenetics 
and Schering Plough, the ability of firms to transact on the sale of their 
product also reflects a particular set of capabilities required to be able to 
divest a product successfully to another firm. Both firms noted serious issues 
with this process (PanGenetics and GlaxoSmithKline). Nevertheless, this 
capability has been identified as distinct and necessary for firms if they are to 
obtain value from products they wish to sell67. Arora and Gambardella noted 
that problems of appropriation may hinder the division of innovative labour 
and this certainly warrants greater consideration in the present. 
3. Ability to develop products 
Evidence from the case studies suggests that some of these firms were able 
to execute better product development strategies than other large and small 
firms implying that these firms had superior capabilities in this area 
(Pangenetics, Actelion, Cara, ProStrakan). The role of PanGenetics in the 
successful clinical development of its product where its peer had failed 
                                            
67 Interestingly, there is perhaps some relationship to the extensive literature that has abounded on the 
difficulties of alliances and firms trying to work together where documentation of failure was 
estimated at around 60%. 
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(LayLine) illustrates that the firm was able to execute a superior clinical 
development strategy. PanGenetics was able to do with the PG110 product 
what LayLine could not and that was successfully develop, produce and test 
this product to produce favourable results. Actelion demonstrated their 
capabilities in clinical development, regulatory affairs and marketing when 
they took a Roche product and managed to take it all the way through to 
approval. Cara demonstrated their capabilities by successfully developing 
the Ferring product and selling that to Alza. ProStrakan also proved their 
capabilities in regulatory affairs and clinical development when they were 
able to assess the data from their acquired products, have a dialogue with 
the FDA and re-design clinical studies (Cellegy failed to get Celegesic and 
Tostran in the US approved) turning those products into successes via their 
own development strategy and thus capabilities. These types of capabilities 
(regulatory affairs and marketing for example) have usually been attributed 
solely to large firms and not something that small firms are credited with, 
however, the evidence here shows that these firms have these capabilities.  
This may also be explained by the presence of scientists and executives 
from other companies in the formation and management of these firms which 
is an important common element. This in itself is not necessarily a new 
finding in terms of the involvement of these types of individuals (Kenney 
1986, Orsenigo 1989, Pisano 1993, McKelvey 1996). However, these 
founding members and managers with corporate experience in a large firm 
(Bristol Myers Squibb, Eastman Kodak, Roche, Schering, Shire) or 
experience in multiple small firms (Cara, PanGenetics management teams) 
bring expertise and experience in important activities related to the range of 
drug development needs which has been systematically applied in a new 
range of activities within these small firms. These individuals have brought 
important competencies to these small firms with respect to drug 
development and their organisations benefit from these capabilities as 
illustrated in the table above.  
Teece’s discussion on complementary assets concluded that successful 
commercialisation of an innovation requires that the know-how in question be 
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utilised in conjunction with other assets such as services (Teece, 1986). 
Being able to obtain a new product is only one part of the process; being 
able to develop the product utilising clinical development and regulatory 
expertise represents those critical complementary assets. The majority of the 
firms interviewed as part of this research have demonstrated those 
capabilities and complementary assets (ViroPharma, ProStrakan, Cara, 
PanGenetics, Actelion). 
7.8. Exploration and Exploitation in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector – A System Level Summary Review and 
Conclusions 
Important changes within the sector have been discussed throughout this 
chapter and this thesis related to the division of labour, why this has occurred 
and changes in markets for technology. These changes can now be viewed 
at a system level utilising the lens of exploration and exploitation for the 
sector as a whole. A key argument based on the evidence from this research 
has posited that an outcome of the previous focus on exploration in the 
sector produced a surplus of unexploited knowledge in the form of drug 
candidates. The development of a range of technologies related to high 
throughput screening, combinatorial chemistry, and the myriad developments 
in genomics (to name but a few) contributed to greatly improved productivity 
of search processes for drug candidates (Nightingale, 2000). These activities 
were focused on the upstream discovery and thus exploratory areas. They 
are best evidenced by the growth in the number of classical biotechnology 
firms that emerged throughout this epoch who focused on these exploratory 
activities.  
However, this concentrated focus on exploration has now resulted in a 
surplus of drug candidates produced by this system level concentration on 
search efforts. As Nightingale also notes, ‘productivity improvements have 
produced a series of shifting bottlenecks and excess capacity within the 
system’ (Nightingale, 2006). The findings of this research as evidenced in 
Table 1717 above clearly indicate that firms have produced more drug 
candidates than they can develop internally. This system level focus on 
exploration has essentially created a deficit of exploitation capabilities at the 
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system level. Thus the massive system level exploratory focus has ultimately 
opened up the opportunity for NRDOs to enter the sector as a new and 
distinct class of firm that concentrate on the downstream exploitation 
activities necessary to develop and market drug candidates. 
The cycle of discovery proposed by Nooteboom has been utilised to explain 
how changes have already occurred in the pharmaceutical sector and this 
may help to explain current changes proposed as a result of the findings 
from this research (Nooteboom, 2000). A system level cycle of discovery68 
explains how exploration and exploitation build on each other and illustrates 
how various phases within the overall exploration/exploitation cycle progress 
from exploration to exploitation and vice versa. These authors explain how 
exploitation starts when the variety of content that emerges from exploration 
is reduced in a ‘consolidation’ phase (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). A 
division of labour is associated with this phase and an increase in 
specialisation by firms that possess more specific knowledge on a narrower 
range of issues is apparent. This may explain the current changes being 
witnessed in this sector with the identification of the NRDO firm and its 
concentration on exploitation. This represents a division of labour and the 
specilisation that Gilsing and Nooteboom are referring to in their description 
of how a sector moves through the phases and ultimately between 
exploration and exploitation. The changes evident in the pharmaceutical 
sector today indicate that the sector may be moving towards an exploitation 
phase overall to take advantage of the levels of surplus unexploited 
knowledge and the opportunities for exploitation overall. 
The original impetus behind the formation of small new firms in this industry 
was related to a need to bridge a gap between basic university research and 
discovery/clinical development of drugs (Henderson at al, 1999) driven by 
new knowledge that arose from discoveries in molecular biology. A market 
for know how was built up with small firms as upstream suppliers of 
technology and R&D services and incumbents (large firms) positioned as 
                                            
68 Discussed in Chapter 2. 
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downstream buyers who could provide capital and access to other 
competencies required for successful development and marketing (Pisano 
and Mang, 1993). This latest division of labour, however, appears more to do 
with issues of efficiency, self sufficiency and viability of the firm on an 
economic level. The role of capital markets has been presented as a critical 
influence on this changing division of labour in concert with the 
corresponding surplus of knowledge. Financial considerations as well as cost 
pressures on firms exerted by both public stock markets and VC firms have 
emerged as key influences on all three types of firms discussed: NRDO 
firms, DD firms and large firms. However, a supply of products available for 
in-licensing is also critical factor that has enabled this changing division of 
labour.  
The markets for technology have grown increasingly more complex as 
illustrated by the flows of products between firms studied as part of this 
research. Universities are no longer the only the major suppliers of 
knowledge and products to small firms operating in this industry. An increase 
in the available level of products and knowledge has greatly impacted the 
surplus of knowledge related to advanced (exploitation/development stage) 
drug candidates in the system but this surplus is comprised of drug 
candidates that have progressed through several important milestones and 
as such are more developed products. The emergence of this new NRDO 
firm and the changing strategies of DD firms have provided a key way in 
which the surplus knowledge can be redistributed. This becomes a more 
compelling argument when viewed with evidence that relates to financial 
pressures and constraints on firms. As firms face more and more pressure to 
be a success financially, they find themselves in need of advanced stage 
products to positively impact their financial position. Thus a need for products 
arises and is fulfilled.  
Arora and Gambardella noted that ‘the body of knowledge and information 
for innovation has become more ‘divisible’ pieces of knowledge, and bodies 
of expertise and information can be ‘separated into different organizations 
and re-assembled at a later stage’ (Arora and Gambardella, 1994). This 
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certainly appears to be the case in the pharmaceutical sector  as the NRDO 
firm, changes to the traditional DD firm and changes in the outlicensing 
activities of large firms illustrate a new division of innovative labour that has 
been made possible by this ‘divisibility’ of knowledge and expertise. Large 
firms are undertaking important strategic changes that are influencing the 
innovative strategies of smaller firms but not necessarily in the way that has 
been historically described. The evidence suggests that the creation of these 
new NRDO firms may also be a response to an increase in the number of 
opportunities for product development created by a surplus of knowledge 
from large firms with an excess of unexploited drug candidates in more 
advanced stages of development.  
If, as the evidence suggests, more efficient markets for technology are 
apparent, then there are more exploitation opportunities available for firms 
and it is possible that there will be an increase in the numbers of NRDO 
firms. The case of PanGenetics implies that there may also be a shift in the 
expectations of these firms in terms of their organisation, their goals and 
ultimately their longevity. PanGenetics was specifically reincarnated by Index 
for development of products only. Once that goal was achieved, the firm was 
essentially dissolved. Firms may be consciously set up as temporary or 
‘project based’ organisations to fulfil a specific purpose. Arora et al suggest 
that this would also mean that once their purpose is achieved, assets can be 
allocated elsewhere and the firm dissolved (Arora et al, 2001). Whether or 
not this type of transitory firm will become more popular in this sector 
remains to be seen but forms an interesting avenue for future research. 
Serious problems exist with current business models in the sector where the 
returns to R&D investment have decreased (McKelvey 2008) and this 
provides an important context for these findings. Pisano also has noted that 
persistent poor performance of firms in the sector has created a real need to 
organise firms differently to address this fundamental performance issue in 
the sector. This becomes particularly important in terms of the very large 
sums of money that have followed many firms into decline and closure 
(Pisano, 2006; Lazonick and Tulum, 2010). The arguments provided by 
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Hopkins et al in 2007 were also significant in that they pointed out compelling 
reasons to think that the pace of technological change in the sector has been 
both disappointing and not at all revolutionary (Hopkins et al, 2007). These 
observations in the literature provide an important foundation for the 
relevance of the findings from this research: namely that the emergence of 
the NRDO firm and the changes to DD firms are ultimately the sector’s 
response to the pervasive issues of disappointing performance from a 
technological and financial point of view. This becomes a more compelling 
argument when viewed with evidence that relates to financial pressures and 
constraints on firms. As firms face more and more pressure to be a success 
financially, they find themselves in need of advanced stage products to 
positively impact their financial position. Thus a need for products arises and 
is fulfilled. How the overall performance of the sector will ultimately change 
now based on these new organisational changes and fundamental changes 
in the division of labour and markets for technology remains to be seen.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusions of the Research 
The literature provided a frame of reference that indicated change is to be 
expected because of the dynamic and evolutionary way in which firms and 
industries evolve. A new division of labour has taken place in the 
pharmaceutical sector. The No Research Development Only (NRDO) firm 
has been identified as a new type of firm within the division of labour of the 
pharmaceutical sector. The evidence indicates that a surplus of unexploited 
knowledge and the demands of capital markets as well as the corresponding 
response by firms to financial pressures have an important role to play in this 
division of labour. This has also been accompanied by a change in the 
markets for technology whereby markets have become more complex than 
previously understood. A model was used to illustrate the important 
connections between all of these areas that were studied as part of this 
research. 
8.1. Main Findings of the Research  
8.1.1. Changing Division of Labour 
The literature illustrated how a division of labour emerged from the 1970s 
onwards within the pharmaceutical sector. The new small classical 
biotechnology firm fulfilled a key role in the dissemination of new knowledge 
from the academic centres to the private commercial sector. These new 
small firms concentrated primarily on upstream exploratory research and 
became providers of this technology and knowledge to large firms thus 
illustrating the division of labour as these firms were essentially ‘research 
boutiques.’  However, evidence from the trade literature suggested that there 
was yet another change in the division of labour that was not related to 
upstream exploratory activities but rather downstream exploitation related 
activities including clinical development, regulatory affairs and product 
marketing (in some cases). This research looked for evidence that a new 
type of firm had emerged that represented a new division of labour.  
The No Research Development Only (NRDO) firms were identified through a 
quantitative study that examined a range of firms from the sector. A random 
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sample of firms from the sector was collected to determine if there was a 
division of labour evidenced by a new type of firm. The creation of the 
categorisation of NRDO companies was based on the analysis of a sample 
of companies that examined the span of drug discovery and development 
activities together with a review of their product pipeline and the existence of 
any platform technologies. The results indicated that 27% of the firms 
sampled were NRDO firms. The primary focus of these firms was on clinical 
development (and in some cases marketing) of products rather than 
exploratory discovery activities leading to the creation of products. This 
exercise provided an indication that the operations of the NRDO company 
were not focused on the discovery of products in contrast to that of their 
peers and the characterisation in the literature as noted in chapter two. Case 
studies confirmed this understanding and revealed that the development of 
each of these firms was in inextricably linked to finance, a surplus of 
unexploited knowledge and changing markets for technology. The range of 
activities of NRDO firms spanned multiple product platforms and multiple 
therapeutic areas and indicates that the formation of these NRDO firms is not 
peculiar to one particular product type or therapeutic area.  This provides 
evidence for the changing division of labour.  
However, the rationale for why this division of labour has happened in terms 
of NRDO firms is related to the role of capital markets and availability of 
surplus unexploited knowledge. These are two key factors that have been 
identified as a result of this research.  Changes in the markets for technology 
have also become apparent and are related to the changing division of 
labour. None of these areas can be viewed in isolation as they are all linked.  
8.1.2. The role of capital markets as an influential factor in terms of 
the new division of labour 
Sources of finance including Venture Capital (VC) and Public Stock Markets 
were important in the emergence of the initial division of labour that took 
place during the third epoch of the pharmaceutical sector. During the 1980s, 
1990s and early 2000s, for the most part, the markets ‘directed’ capital to 
early stage exploratory research activities being carried out by many firms in 
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the hope that new exciting knowledge and products would emerge. These 
sources of finance supported the growth of the classical biotechnology firms 
who were research intensive exploratory firms in need of capital to fund their 
research based activities. The public stock markets provided an exit for VC 
firms and way of raising substantial amounts of capital for these classical 
biotechnology firms.  
However, there has been a change in the nature of firms operating in this 
sector and thus a change in the division of labour. A new type of NRDO firm 
has emerged that only concentrates its resources on development 
(exploitation related) activities while existing firms are also adding later stage 
products for development into their portfolios. These firms do not require 
resources for discovery (exploratory) activities and their product development 
timelines are consequently not as long. These attributes make them 
attractive to both venture capitalists and public stock markets.   
The evidence presented from this research has indicated that the capital 
markets (sources of finance such as Venture Capital and Public Stock 
Markets – the most prolific sources) have played a role in the emergence of 
a new type of firm, as well as changes to existing firms and thus the new 
division of labour. The evidence illustrated that venture capital was 
instrumental in setting up a new type of NRDO firm and ensuring that 
external product acquisition was undertaken while public stock market 
considerations influenced firms’ decisions to discontinue exploratory 
activities. The acquisition of external products by DD firms for development 
was based upon the need for improved financial valuation of the firms.  
The literature has indicated that the costs associated with drug development 
are excessively high and consequently firms need a great deal of capital 
investment. In addition, the nature of these firms means that risk is inherent 
in any investment made. The capital markets have supported many of these 
sorts of firms but the performance of the sector overall has been called into 
question over the last number of years.  The evidence indicates that the 
need for firms to be closer to the market in terms of the stage of development 
of their products was a key consideration related to financial sustainability 
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and was linked to the value of the firm as perceived by its investors. But 
because successes were so few and far between, ultimately, some 
experimentation in the business model was needed and some financiers in 
the capital markets have turned to funding later stage products in different 
types of firms. Finance was consistently cited as a key factor in discussions 
with firms as to why they sourced products externally and why they did not 
have research related exploratory activities as part of their business model. 
Financiers want better results in terms of their return on investment. More 
advanced products represent a faster chance of success. The role of capital 
markets is visible in the changing division of labour.  
8.1.3. Surplus of Unexploited Knowledge as an Influential Factor in 
the Division of Labour 
The role of new knowledge was critical in the development of the new small 
classical biotechnology firm during the third epoch of the pharmaceutical 
sector. This new knowledge was the reason for the foundation of many firms 
(including various different waves of new firms throughout the third epoch). 
Firms traditionally sourced new technologies from public laboratories and 
academic centres. Various developments in a range of areas within 
molecular biology, chemistry and information technologies created many 
opportunities for firms but also added to the body of knowledge of drug 
targets and how to search for new drugs. Some of the key developments 
included High Throughput Screening and Combinatorial Chemistry. As a 
result, large firms in particular were able to produce vast libraries of 
compounds for testing. However, not all drug compounds have been 
exploited by firms and this has resulted in a ‘surplus’ of drug candidates that 
were not internally exploited by firms. Excess knowledge has been produced 
in the sector due to these exponential discovery related developments and 
also because firms face resource constraints in terms of their development 
portfolios.  
However, this has also created opportunities for the formation of new firms 
with those products that firms have chosen not to develop. This has formed 
the basis for the start up of other firms. Firms studied as part of this research 
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have illustrated that this mode of corporate spin out is another way for firms 
to extract value from their surplus stock of knowledge.   
Trade in these products has grown and consequently enabled the division of 
labour to take place whereby firms with ‘surplus’ products offer them for sale 
and development by other firms for reasons related to portfolio management 
and financial resource constraints. It is possible that discovery activity has 
(for the moment) reached a critical mass where a bolus of products has been 
produced but resources need to be applied to develop them. Consequently, 
this division of labour in terms of development activity is the natural answer 
to the problem as new entrants focus on clinical development at this point in 
the sector’s lifecycle. The literature illustrates that there has always been 
changes to firms (large and small) usually in response to changes in 
knowledge in the sector. The findings of this research help to update our 
understanding of how firms appear to have changed most recently and how 
that is related to a surplus of knowledge rather than new knowledge. The 
critical problem remains with successful clinical development. 
8.1.4. Increasingly Complex Markets for Technology   
One of the distinguishing features of this epoch of the pharmaceutical sector 
has been the role of markets for technology as part of the vast networks of 
various types of linkages between companies. When new technological 
developments took place, small firms were the primary conduits of this new 
knowledge from universities and government laboratories to the commercial 
sector where they developed these technologies further in the pursuit of 
product discovery and development. The slow uptake of the new 
technologies by large incumbent firms enabled the creation of a market for 
this technology and related knowledge whereby large firms essentially 
bought products and know how from small firms to ensure they had a 
‘window’ on this technology.  
But as noted in the previous section there is evidence of a surplus of 
unexploited knowledge in the sector and firms have opted to trade these 
drug candidates. Large firms have opted to trade this knowledge for financial 
reasons to capitalize on the value of these products. They have sold these 
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products to other small firms for development because of portfolio 
management decisions whereby scarce resources can only be allocated to 
some projects. Traditionally, these large firms were only associated with 
buying in products and knowledge from small firms where as now they are 
buying and selling products and knowledge to small firms.  
Conversely, while small firms have historically only been associated with 
selling products and knowledge to large firms, the evidence showed that 
there is also trade between small firms. Small firms are trading products and 
knowledge amongst themselves and citing financial pressures and issues as 
the main reason for this trade. The need for other small firms to acquire 
products in later stages of development has been acknowledged and is 
related to financial reasons also. These new trading relationships add up to a 
complex picture of trade in the sector where existing relationships with 
academic institutions are still an important source of new knowledge but the 
picture is more fine-grained with new sellers and buyers in the market. 
In addition, the evidence gathered also indicated another important change 
that was related to the activities of the Discovery and Development firms and 
related to the markets for technology. The anecdotal evidence in the 
literature also suggested that DD firms might also be acquiring products 
externally for development in-house. The database was set up to gather 
information on the external product acquisition by all firms and the findings 
illustrated that DD firms (who are traditionally known for discovering their 
own products) were also acquiring products from external firms to 
complement existing in-house pipelines despite having the capability to 
discover products in-house. This, again, is in marked contrast to what is 
currently understood about how these sorts of classical biotechnology firms 
conduct their business in terms of internal product generation and product 
development.   
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8.2. Contributions to Knowledge 
8.2.1. Overall Theoretical Contribution 
Prior studies on the pharmaceutical sector have provided much valuable 
knowledge on the structure and dynamics of the sector and the roles of the 
various firms that make up the drug development sector in particular. 
However, this research has proven the existence of a new type of firm in the 
industry and makes an important new contribution by updating knowledge of 
the various firms in the sector and how they participate in markets for 
technology. It provides support for existing theories that the dynamics of 
industrial structures will continue to evolve in response to various pressures 
and situations and that the pharmaceutical sector itself is dynamic and 
responsive to a range of changes (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 1996; McKelvey and Orsenigo, 2001, McKelvey, 2008). Changes 
in markets for technology within the sector have been identified and an 
updated understanding of the range of exchanges taking place in the sector 
by accounting for a new type of firm and the changing behaviours of existing 
large and small drug development firms. 
 
These research findings add to the stock of knowledge on the industry by 
illustrating the activities of the new type of NRDO firm. This research  
contributes to the stock of knowledge on the reasons why new firms are 
apparent in this sector by illustrating the role of finance and the surplus of 
unexploited knowledge in the sector. The research also illustrates new 
knowledge with respect to the fact that existing firms will continue to evolve 
in response to the same factors as those impacting NRDO firms including the 
unexploited surplus of knowledge and financial considerations.  The 
knowledge in relation to the innovation strategies of firms has also been 
updated and a greater understanding of the role of finance and financial 
pressures and the actions of financial providers is made explicit by the 
research. The research shows how the range of firms in the sector have 
capitalised on the availability of unexploited knowledge and how this relates 
to financial considerations. 
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These contributions to knowledge were made possible by an original 
research approach that used a quantitative and qualitative information 
gathering process to establish the existence of a new type of firm and some 
of the key reasons for the existence of the firm. The existence of the new firm 
was confirmed by a random sampling approach but was supported by the 
range of qualitative data that was gathered on each of the firms in a large 
100 firm sample. A database captured a range of information on each firm 
that made it possible to ascertain key activities of the firms including the 
evolving DD firm. Case study qualitative approaches usually involve only one 
or two firms but a total of eight firms were used to establish and verify the 
reasons for the changes taking place within the firms operating in the sector 
and overall this made it possible to confirm the role of finance and the 
surplus of unexploited knowledge. This unique combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods has enabled the range of research questions to be 
addressed successfully and provided different types of data and evidence 
required to make a series of important contributions overall. 
8.2.2. Identification of a New Organisational Typology  
It has been noted throughout this thesis that significant challenges are 
inherent in the integration of science and business (Pisano, 2006) and 
evidence has shown that novel organisational experiments are evident as a 
result. The evidence presented here indicates that a new organisational 
arrangement, the NRDO firm, is visible and it makes up over a quarter of 
firms in the sector. This is an organization that is oriented towards 
exploitation, focusing on the development of drugs. This organizational form 
has not been formally identified in the literature to date and this research 
presents this finding as a major contribution to knowledge.  
8.2.3. Identification of a New Division of Labour  
The pharmaceutical sector has witnessed many changes throughout the third 
epoch and it appears logical that still more changes are evident in the 
division of labour. The most well known division of labour was the role of 
small firms as research and exploration focused businesses while large firms 
took on the role of developers, regulatory experts and marketers. However, a 
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new division of labour is now evident where some small firms are focusing on 
a different part of the drug development continuum – that concerned with 
clinical development of drugs rather than discovery of drugs. This represents 
an important updated understanding of the division of labour in the sector. 
8.2.4. Identification of Increasing Complexity in the Markets for 
Technology  
This research findings show that there have been changes in the markets for 
technology. These were previously characterised as one way transfers of 
knowledge and products from academic centres to small firms and from 
small firms to large firms. These markets for technology are now more 
complex as small firms and large firms engage in new types of transactions 
that are different to the current understanding with small firms buying 
products and large firms selling products. This research has provided a more 
up to date view of the markets. 
8.2.5. Financial Considerations are an Important Influence on the 
Changing Division of Labour 
The drivers of the new organisational type and changes in the division of 
labour are, in part, directly linked to financial considerations. This research is 
not claiming that this is the only driver of this new changing division of labour 
but rather that this particular influence is significant and noteworthy. The 
evidence has shown that financial pressures will result in firms’ decisions to 
allocate resources towards more developed products at the expense of 
exploratory work. The need for firms to extract the maximum financial value 
from their portfolios appears to be a key concern implicit in the new division 
of labour. The more central role of finance has not been well discussed as a 
key factor that influences a firm’s innovative direction or the division of labour 
but it has emerged as a key consideration in this research that warrants 
more attention in the future. 
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8.3. Extending This Research  
8.3.1. The Transitory Nature of the NRDO 
According to Levinthal and March, an organisation that engages exclusively 
in exploitation will ordinarily suffer from obsolescence (Levinthal and March, 
1993). However, one of the interesting findings that has resulted from this 
research is that the firm’s primary goal may not necessarily be long term 
survival, in which case the firm’s focus on exploitation is not necessarily a 
problem because long term survival is not actually a fundamental part of the 
firm’s strategy. The case of PanGenetics illustrates this point. The long term 
survival of the firm was never part of the overall plan of its creators, Index 
Ventures. The firm was specifically engineered to be a transitory organisation 
that was created for successfully developing a product(s) that would be sold 
to another firm.  
But how transitory is the NRDO business model and division of labour as a 
whole? Is it here to stay or will they in turn be forced to turn to exploration 
when the supply of unused drugs runs out? Maybe increasing specialization 
can’t be maintained, or maybe it’s a transitory phase in the market similar to 
the way in which discovery only firms have changed and become discovery 
and development firms. Arora et al suggest that the transitory nature of firms 
may be a useful organisational arrangement for any industry as firms arise 
specifically for a project (Arora et al, 2001) and then resources are re-
allocated once the project has been completed (such as PanGenetics). This 
area represents an interesting avenue for considerable future attention.  
8.3.2. Changing Levels of Exploration in this Sector 
These findings indicate that the balance of exploration and exploitation in the 
sector as a whole may be changing. The level of exploration may be 
declining (with the growth of NRDO firms and in-licensing of DD firms) which 
will have consequences for the sector as a whole. This trend away from 
exploration must be reviewed further. The findings suggest that the influence 
of capital markets may be impacting the overall level of exploration activities 
in this sector but this needs to be substantiated with additional research that 
would examine the overall level of exploration in the sector. This could be 
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combined with research to ascertain the extent of the influence of sources of 
funding on the level of exploration in the sector.  In the context of the findings 
of this research, there is a need for future researchers to be more aware of 
the impact of finance on basic science and research activities.  
8.3.3. Social Network Theories and the Role of the Serial 
Entrepreneur 
The role of ‘serial entrepreneurs’ moving from company to company to found 
and develop firms appears to be important given these particular findings. 
‘Scientist entrepreneurs’ are spotting opportunities and persuading 
companies to give them products for development. These findings illustrate 
that the presence of an academic founder or indeed the intellectual property 
from an academic institution are no longer the sole prerequisites for firm 
formation in this sector. Therefore, the extent and importance of the role of 
human capital in moving products around from company to company poses 
an interesting avenue for future research.  
8.3.4. The Role of Corporate Spin outs as a New Mode of Division of 
Labour 
One firm in the sample, Actinium, was created specifically to pursue the 
development of products that the parent firm had decided not to pursue 
internally. While this is the only example of this type of firm in this set of case 
studies, Skelia, (whom ProStrakan merged with) was a spin out from Aventis. 
GlaxoSmithKline also noted that they were becoming more active in setting 
up spin out firms with products that did not make it into their development 
portfolio. The portfolio management issues faced by large pharmaceutical 
companies are becoming more and more topical in the sector today as 
companies are scaling down operations and narrowing therapeutic area 
focus. The trade literature has noted many other examples of companies that 
have engaged in this activity. In terms of future research, the creation of a 
new company specifically to develop a parent company’s product or series of 
products represents an interesting avenue of further research in this sector 
because this is an under researched topic. The advantages and 
disadvantages of such a mode of innovation are not well discussed but 
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would represent an important line of inquiry from a management and 
strategic perspective. 
8.3.5. The Role of Finance and its Impact on Innovation 
The findings from this research point to a more direct role between finance 
and its role in innovation and its value as an explanatory factor in how and 
why firms make various decisions related to innovation. This could be better 
understood by looking at other industries. The role of finance should be given 
more prominence in terms of the links between financial decision making and 
innovation strategy. Future research could focus on other industry examples 
of this type of division of labour to ascertain the role of finance and how it 
impacts innovation.  
8.3.6. Understanding how Firms Change Capabilities 
The division of labour is fundamentally characterised by a change in firm 
capabilities. As these ‘buyer’ firms are able to bring these products in-house, 
these findings would imply that different capabilities are a key aspect of this 
process but the exact role and relative importance of these capabilities have 
yet to be ascertained. Future research could help to ascertain how these 
capabilities have changed and how firms have internalised these new 
capabilities.  
8.4. Summary 
This thesis is about the dynamics of an exciting sector – the pharmaceutical 
sector. It is about industrial change on a macro level (the division of labour, 
changes in markets for technology) and firm change on a micro level. It is 
about how firms adapt to survive the range of pressures and expectations, 
particularly financial pressures, that surround them in their quest for success.  
But it is also about how firms respond to various opportunities; in this case, 
the availability of unexploited knowledge in the form of pharmaceutical drug 
candidates. Firms are buying in drugs (56% of DD firms) that have already 
been discovered (and generally passed through the important phases of drug 
discovery) from other companies to develop internally. A significant number 
of firms are dedicated to developing rather than discovering products (27%) 
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while others are balancing the dual demands of exploration and exploitation 
in an attempt to have the best of both worlds. Why is this happening? 
Because these firms recognise two things: That there are opportunities out 
there in the form of drug candidates and that these opportunities greatly 
improve the chances of obtaining capital. When these products are obtained 
and integrated into a pipeline it puts them closer to the market and to 
success and ultimately, they benefit and their financiers benefit.  Poor 
performance has been an issue for the sector but it is now possible to 
recognise that there are potentially many unexploited opportunities that have 
resulted from the prolific exploration that has been taking place. A market for 
these products has arisen as firms on both sides (buyers and sellers) have 
something to gain. These changes also represent very interesting variations 
in how we understand the way in which knowledge and products are traded.  
Overall, the markets for technology have become more complex and variable 
than previously understood. 
The landscape of this sector is changing. More than a quarter of firms 
analysed were NRDO firms. More than 50% of all firms analysed were not 
formed based on academic discoveries and were instead formed as 
standalone entities by various scientists and venture capitalists or angel 
investors. More than half of all firms in the sample sourced drug candidates 
externally. This is a dynamic sector and increasingly, firms are being formed 
by entrepreneurs who see new opportunities with existing products combined 
with the need to reach profitability as soon as possible. They are also 
responding to greater financial demands particularly in an era when poor 
performance is becoming less acceptable. The NRDO firm is a new 
organisation concentrating solely on development but the established and 
well understood traditional DD firm is also buying in these more advanced 
stage products. The activities of these firms are shifting with an ever 
increasing emphasis on financial success. It remains to be seen how long 
the NRDO model will form part of the landscape but one thing is for sure: 
there is nothing more certain than change itself. As Gary Pisano has said 
‘There is no more important challenge for both scholars and practitioners in 
twenty first century economics than contributing to our evolving knowledge of 
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the business of science’ (Pisano, 2006). It is greatly hoped that this research 
has made such a contribution. 
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